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Dependability assessment, by system manufacturer, during aircraft design, based on 
stochastic modeling, is of common practice, but model based operational dependability 
assessment online, during missions’ achievement, is seldom done. Usually, the stochastic 
assessment addresses aircraft safety.  
This thesis addresses aircraft operational dependability modeling to support mission and 
maintenance planning, as well as the achievement of the missions. We develop a modeling 
approach, based on a meta-model that is used as a basis: i) to structure the information 
needed to assess aircraft operational reliability and ii) to build a stochastic model that can 
be updated dynamically. The update concerns the current state of the aircraft system, a 
mission profile and the maintenance facilities available at the flight stop locations 
involved in the mission. The aim is to enable operational reliability assessment online. 
Two case studies, based on aircraft subsystems, are considered for illustration. We present 
examples of evaluation results that show the valuable role of operational dependability 
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Air transportation has become a common means of travel for a growing number of people. 
With this increasing interest in air transportation and the competitive market aircraft 
operators have to deal with, it is essential for aircraft manufacturers and airlines to develop 
means that can support aircraft operation for an optimal exploitation. New approaches 
need to be developed to improve operational capabilities so as to achieve and maintain 
higher levels of service delivery, minimize disruptions and avoid economical losses due to 
inoperability and customer dissatisfaction. 
The @MOST (Airbus Maintenance Operations Solutions & Technologies) project has 
been set up by Airbus to examine new approaches to aircraft operation and maintenance, 
that can enhance operability and minimize costs. The principal target of the project is to 
develop predictive means in order to achieve operation efficiently and accomplish 
maintenance activities just in the right time. 
In the context of @MOST, the DIANA (Decision Impact ANAlysis) project aimed at 
developing a model-based dependability assessment framework that can be used to 
analyze and ensure operational dependability, and by this way ensure success and 
efficiency in aircraft operations with regard to disruptions related to failures. For this 
purpose, the current approach that focuses on the dependability analysis during the aircraft 
design phase cannot be considered sufficient. The design phase analysis is most of the 
time concentrated on safety assessment or, when addressing operational reliability, the 
analysis focuses on the relative perceived reliability of one technology over another. In 
addition, the dependability assessment framework is intended to be used while the aircraft 
is in service so as to consider the current operational information for an adapted 
dependability assessment. To the best of our knowledge, model-based dependability 
assessment, in real time, during operation, has not yet received the focus it deserves in the 
dependability assessment community. Yet, the constant demand for efficiency and the 
evolving nature of today’s systems require the use of accurate data in operation for up-to-
date dependability assessment so as to support choices. 
The research summarized in this dissertation has been carried out in the context of the 
DIANA project and concerns the development of a model-based dependability framework 
for assessing aircraft operational dependability, focusing especially on the model 
construction and the use of the model during missions’ achievement. The objective of the 
dissertation is the establishment of the dependability model that can enable operational 
dependability assessment while an aircraft is in service, so as to improve the likelihood of 
success in achieving its missions. Aircraft systems dependability models have already 
been considered in the literature, especially for safety analyses during the design phase, 
but the scope of the assessment in DIANA requires a dedicated study to tackle the aspects 
that are not straightforward. The substantial motivations for carrying out the dissertation 
work are presented in the beginning of chapter I. These are principally the need to take 
into account all operational relevant constraints, instead of the special events related to 
safety, and the need to consider current operational information for the assessment. 
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To identify the role that dependability assessment can play during aircraft operation, and 
understand its importance in aircraft maintenance planning, it is necessary to have an 
overview of the different ways that aircraft operations can be carried out, and take a look 
into the underlying principle of the maintenance practice in the field. The construction of 
the model-based assessment framework, especially the operational and maintenance aspect 
requires, in addition to dependability analysis techniques, an insight into aircraft 
operations and maintenance together with how they are organized. The global cultural 
background for carrying out the work is given in the rest of chapter I. We present 
dependability concepts and analysis methods, give an overview of aircraft operation and 
describe the maintenance policies that support the current aircraft maintenance. We also 
present a review of works aiming at improving aircraft operability, from modeling studies 
contributing to safety reinforcement, through design and maintenance planning support 
studies for operational dependability enhancement, to post operational disruptions 
management. The objective is to clarify the place that model-based dependability 
assessment will take in the process of improving aircraft operability and avoiding 
operational disruptions. 
The scope of the model-based dependability assessment framework, including the role of 
model-based dependability assessment in the process to achieve continuous operability, is 
presented in the end of chapter I. That is, as the aircraft may have to achieve different 
kinds of missions with different requirements, the assessment framework will be 
providing evaluations of the probability to succeed missions or the risk of encountering an 
adverse situation, considering the current operational information. The evaluation 
concerns the adaptation of the mission profile and maintenance planning to the current 
operational state of the aircraft. Missions and maintenance planning can be adjusted based 
on the evaluation. The assessment can be done after major events during operation.  
The second chapter aims at presenting the developed modeling approach. The challenges 
related to the construction of the model are addressed. The model has to enable the 
evaluation of relevant reliability measures. Besides the complexity of aircraft systems, the 
consideration of the current information in operation so as to have an adapted model must 
also be tackled. Furthermore, as different types of aircraft do exist, and in order to 
harmonize the construction of the model, it is worth establishing a common basis for the 
model construction. We consider updating the model in operation in order to cope with the 
need to take into account the current operational information, and we consider the best 
practices in aerospace system dependability modeling to design the model. We establish 
the common basis for the model construction through meta-modeling. The meta-model is 
presented based on a detailed specification of the model content, which should help in a 
concrete construction of the model.  
The modeling approach is established considering stochastic state-based technique so as to 
have a good expressiveness. Thus, any formalism supporting stochastic state space 
technique can be used to build the model. The model is, in particular, intended to be 
developed using the AltaRica language that has been used by Airbus to develop models 
for safety analyses. However, due to the fact that AltaRica and its current supporting tools 
were mostly developed for qualitative analysis, we have also selected Stochastic Activity 
Network (SAN) formalism to experiment the quantitative analysis aspects of the model. 
The project DIANA intends to develop a tool that can support the processing of the model 
in AltaRica in order to obtain quantitative results. The SAN formalism is supported by an 
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academic tool and is well known for quantitative dependability and performability 
analyses. We present a comparative analysis of the two formalisms in chapter III. Methods 
to transform models between the two formalisms are also examined.  
The formalisms are used to develop case studies based on aircraft subsystems. We present 
the case studies developed using SAN in chapter IV. The implementation of the modeling 
approach using AltaRica is given in annex. 
We firstly consider the rudder control subsystem that consists, inter alia, of flight control 
computers and servo-controls. Based on the related requirements, we analyze different 
scenarios of failures, of failure distribution changes due to wear out mechanisms, and of 
mission changes. Then we consider the electrical power supply subsystem also to analyze 
its impact on the successful achievement of the missions.  
The assessment results show that events, like failures that do not prevent the 
accomplishment of the mission, can have significant impact on the likelihood of success of 
the mission. 
Finally, we conclude by reminding the problem addressed, and our principal achievements 
in dealing with it. Possible directions for the future development of the research study 




I Context and Background 
This chapter presents the general background of the work that is reported in this 
dissertation. The dissertation addresses model-based dependability assessment in the 
context of aircraft operation. The global objective is to improve aircraft operation by 
enhancing the service delivery. Dependability concepts and analysis techniques are 
reviewed together with aircraft operation achievement in order to get an appropriate basic 
background of the subject and clarify the area that model-based dependability assessment 
will address. The dependability assessment targets failures and maintenance issues that 
may result in disruptions. The fundamental principles of aircraft maintenance are also 
overviewed. 
This chapter is organized as follows: The chapter opens up by stating the objective of the 
work, after which, an overview of dependability concepts and analysis methods is given. 
This is followed by a description of aircraft operations planning and achievement. An 
overview of the main considerations in aircraft maintenance and its accomplishment is 
provided. Subsequently, a literature review of the work related to the subject is presented. 
Finally, a summary giving the thesis orientation is presented. 
I.1 Motivation and Objective  
As for any critical system, special attention is paid to an aircraft’s dependability issues 
during its design phase. Safety has always been the major concern and significant works 
resulting in certification requirements and standards (FAR 25.1309 / EASA CS 25.1309, 
SAE ARP4754, ARP4761 for examples) have been carried out to analyze and ensure its 
attainment. Qualitative as well as quantitative techniques have been developed to assess 
and tackle the major issues that may arise. Aircraft systems are, for example, designed 
such that no single failure can lead to a catastrophic event. Another consideration based on 
a quantitative analysis viewpoint, is that the risk of occurrence of such an event must not 
exceed 10-9 per flight hour. These measures lead to several rules and recommendations 
that must be applied while the aircraft is in service. Programs of regular maintenance 
activities are also established to maintain an aircraft’s functional state. The problem now is 
the continuous operability of the aircraft while respecting these rules. Indeed, operational 
issues may arise if for example, due to a failure, the aircraft current mission does not 
comply with the aircraft functional state. The maintenance team must be able to promptly 
cope with the problem. Furthermore, the operational dependability analyses at the design 
phase are based on general assumptions, considering the whole operational life of the 
aircraft, for average behavior analyses, which may not cover accurately all the various 
specific situations that may be encountered. An assessment during operations considering 
the current operational conditions could provide more appropriate analyses.  
The objective of the dissertation is to use dependability modeling to analyze and assess in 
service operations in order to improve the service availability. This consists in developing 
models that can be used to forecast the behavior of the aircraft considering its operational 
state, the profile of its mission, if one is assigned, and maintenance activities. The model is 
intended to be integrated in a tool that can be used whenever needed during the aircraft 
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operation, to support continuous monitoring of the aircraft operability. The aim is to 
provide, in every context, as much as possible information on the current state and 
reliability trend of the aircraft, in order to anticipate adverse situations and increase the 
likelihood of operation success. The tool is intended to be used by all the actors involved 
in the aircraft operation. Pilots and flights planning crew need to define and prepare the 
aircraft missions using the indication on its future behavior. The maintenance team needs 
to plan and be prepared for maintenance activities using an estimation of the components 
reliability and the probable time the maintenance will be required.  
The model is expected to integrate runtime information when it is solicited to provide an 
up-to-date indication. Indeed, the indication can be useful only if the model is 
representative of the current situation in service. Therefore, the different changes and 
choices that may take place during operations must be taken into account. The different 
actors involved in the aircraft operation must be given a means that allows them to provide 
the necessary information (data about the planned operations and maintenance activities).  
The work is not specifically dedicated to safety, but rather considers operational 
requirements that cover safety issues as major property while ensuring a continuous 
achievement of missions. The fundamental idea is to enable operational dependability 
assessment in service, based on a model that allows for an adaptation to in-operation 
situations. However, the model construction can be based on the safety modeling studies 
performed during the aircraft construction process, and the modeling approach must also 
offer the possibility to be used for the traditional safety analyses. The latter use case will 
not be during operation; it will concern the aircraft system manufacturer who will be the 
builder of the model, using the proposed modeling approach and considering the system 
specificity. 
Before the description giving more details on aircraft operation and maintenance in section 
I.4, an overview of dependability concepts is presented firstly in section I.2, putting more 
focus on dependability evaluation in section I.3.  
I.2 Dependability Concepts 
Dependability is defined in [Avizienis et al. 2000; Avizienis et al. 2004]1 as the ability to 
deliver service that can justifiably be trusted. A service delivered by a system is its 
behavior as perceived by its user(s); a user is another system that interacts with the former. 
The behavior of a system consists in the sequence of states that the system exhibits in 
order to do what it is intended for. Correct service is delivered when the service 
implements the system function, i.e., what it is intended to do.  
Dependability is a generic concept that is led by three groups of fundamental concepts: its 
attributes, the threats to its attainment and the means to reach the desired dependability 
goals. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 All the definitions given in this section are from these references. 
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I.2.1 Dependability attributes 
The dependability attributes represent different aspects of the service delivery. They are 
used to express and analyze the quality of the service delivered or expected from the 
system. Based on the needs of the user(s), several kinds of attributes can be found, but 
they are almost compositions or specializations of the following basic ones:  
• Reliability, which characterizes the continuity of correct service; 
• Availability, which characterizes the readiness for correct service; 
• Safety, which characterizes the absence of catastrophic consequences on the user(s) 
and the environment; 
• Integrity, which characterizes the absence of improper system alterations; 
• Maintainability, which characterizes the ability to undergo modifications and 
repairs. 
An additional fundamental attribute is considered while addressing security: 
confidentiality, which is defined as the absence of unauthorized disclosure of information. 
Security is defined as the concurrent existence of i) availability for authorized actions 
only, ii) confidentiality, and iii) integrity where ‘improper’ means ‘unauthorized’. 
Due to the imperfections generally inherent to all systems, the achievement of these 
attributes must be interpreted in a relative sense, not in an absolute, deterministic sense. 
The requirements for the attributes must be specified in terms of acceptable levels, and 
some of them may not be required for a given system. 
I.2.2 Threats to dependability 
The threats to dependability are faults, errors and failures. They are the circumstances at 
the origin of an incorrect service delivery. Their effects deteriorate the level of satisfaction 
of the dependability attributes. 
• A failure is an event that occurs when the delivered service deviates from correct 
service; it is a transition from correct service to incorrect service delivery. 
• An error is the part of the system state that may cause a subsequent service failure; 
a failure occurs when an error reaches and alters the sequence of the system 
external states in which the service consists. 
• A fault is the adjudged or hypothesized cause of an error. 
A system may not always fail in the same way. The ways a system can fail are its failure 
modes, and they are usually ranked according to their severities. The period during which 
incorrect service is delivered is called an outage.  
Based on the notion of failure, an alternate definition of dependability, which provides a 
criterion for deciding if the service is dependable, is given as the ability to avoid service 
failures that are more frequent and more severe than is acceptable. 
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I.2.3 The means for dependability  
To contain the threats and improve dependability, actions may be undertaken from the 
early design phase of the system, to its use phase. At the current stage of dealing with 
dependability issues, the means to attain the various attributes can be grouped into four 
major categories: 
•  Fault prevention, which deals with how to prevent the occurrence or introduction 
of faults; 
• Fault tolerance, which deals with how to deliver correct service in the presence of 
faults; 
• Fault removal, which deals with how to reduce the number and severity of faults; 
• Fault forecasting, which deals with how to estimate the present number, the future 
incidence, and the likely consequences of faults. 
Fault prevention is more related to general engineering processes and is handled by quality 
control techniques employed during design and development of systems. Fault tolerance is 
carried out via the implementation of error detection and system recovery mechanisms. 
Redundancies and diversity are part of the techniques used for fault tolerance. Fault 
removal can be carried out both during the development phase, and during the use phase 
of a system. Fault removal during the development phase consists of verification, 
diagnosis and correction. Fault removal during the use phase of a system consists in a 
corrective or a preventive maintenance. Fault forecasting is conducted by carrying out an 
evaluation of the system behavior with respect to fault occurrence or activation. 
The implementations of the techniques offered by the means are themselves subject to 
imperfections. Therefore, their combined utilization is strongly recommended in order to 
enhance dependability. Moreover, they are not mutually exclusive at all; they are 
complementary. Fault prevention and fault tolerance are aimed at providing the ability to 
deliver a service that can be trusted. However, their underlying techniques can also be 
sources of errors and the system internal faults may still produce errors besides. Fault 
removal and fault forecasting are aimed at reaching confidence in the ability to deliver a 
trustable service, by justifying that the system is truly dependable. 
This dissertation concerns fault forecasting during the use phase, in the context of aircraft 
operation. It is focused on developing an evaluation framework that can support choices 
and fault removal activities during the aircraft use phase. 
I.3 Dependability Evaluation 
Dependability evaluation can be conducted using either a qualitative analysis or a 
probabilistic analysis. 
I.3.1 Qualitative evaluation 
Qualitative or ordinal evaluation aims to identify, classify, and rank the failure modes, or 
the combinations of events (component failures or environmental conditions) that could 
!7),(+8(!&,2!9&%:;$)6,2!
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lead to system failures. Qualitative dependability evaluation can be conducted based on 
two majors categories of approaches:  
• Approaches driven by an analysis from the causes to the effects, which are aimed 
at analyzing the consequences of an event, usually a component failure, on the 
whole system. 
• Approaches that are based on a backward analysis, which aim to characterize the 
possible causes of a given situation. 
The most popular representatives of the two groups are respectively failure modes, effects 
(and criticality) analysis – FME(C)A [Wei 1991; ECSS 2001], and fault tree analysis – 
FTA [Lee et al. 1985; Vesely and Roberts 1987; Ericson 1999]. They are presented in the 
next subsections. 
I.3.1.1 Failure modes, effects and criticality analysis – FMECA 
FMECA is an inductive approach whose principle is to analyze, for each component, the 
consequences of its possible errors so as to identify systematically all the failure modes of 
this component as well as their consequence for the system. The approach can be applied 
during the system design, development, and even its use phase. It is convenient to apply 
FMECA as early as possible to detect design weaknesses and reorient choices according to 
dependability requirements. The lack of details about the actual system may, however, be 
a handicap for its efficiency at an early design phase. It can be applied as an 
accompanying process from the design to the system use phase. During the early design 
phases, the FMECA can be used to verify the feasibility in regard to the expressed system 
requirements, and when more details are provided thanks to advances in the design and 
development, it can be used to verify and maintain the compliance with the requirements. 
During the use phase, it can be used as a guide to collecting field data for assessing 
analysis accuracy, and for developing maintenance troubleshooting procedures [Bowles 
1998]. The FMECA of complex systems is usually performed based on the system 
functional structure followed by an analysis at the component level when the information 
needed becomes available. 
In general, the application of an FMECA consists in listing in a table, based on the 
functional or structural description of the system, the various failure modes of each 
component and their characterizations. Each failure mode is characterized by [Laprie et al. 
1995]: 
• its possible causes; 
• its effect, which can be local, i.e., only the component behavior is affected, or 
propagated up to the system level; 
• the detection means; 
• the corrective actions, especially when dealing with a catastrophic failure mode; 
• its criticality. 
The criticality of the failure mode is a categorization of the failure mode based on the 
severity, the frequency of occurrence, and sometimes, the possibility of detecting earlier 
symptoms. In some cases, the criticality of the failure mode is not taken into account. In 
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that case, the approach is referred to as FMEA. Failure modes with identical effects can be 
combined and summarized in a Failure Mode and Effects Summary - FMES. 
Iterating the application of the method based on a refinement of the decomposition may 
help identify the failure modes that are not straightforward. By characterizing the system 
failure modes, the FMECA table represents a valuable documentation and a basis for the 
system validation and for the system support during its use phase. However, it is worth 
noting that the approach has some limitations. For a complex system, it is practically 
impossible to reach the objective of covering all the failure modes. Also, the approach is 
not designed to address combinations of failures, since each failure mode is addressed 
separately. Actually, given the number of failure modes that may be identified, 
considering their combinations raises the problem of combinatorial explosion. Deductive 
approaches like fault tree analysis intrinsically copes with combination of failures. 
I.3.1.2 Fault tree analysis 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a deductive approach, which consists in describing the 
combinations of events that may lead to an undesirable event, such as a catastrophic 
failure. As for FMECA, a fault tree analysis can be applied at any phase, from the design 
to the use phase of the system. The specificity of fault tree analysis is that it is not a 
systematic analysis of all the possible failures; FTA targets events of particular importance 
and only failures related to the targeted event are examined.  
An FTA is based on a graphical representation of the events using logical connectors or 
gates. Many logical connectors can be found in the literature but the fundamental ones are 
the AND and OR gates. The resulting diagram, called fault tree, consists in successive 
levels of events; the top-level event, i.e., the tree root, is the undesirable event. The 
analysis starts with the undesirable event, and then iteratively determines (deduces) the 
causes using a systematic backward-stepping process, until reaching events considered 
elementary.  
The primary benefit of constructing a fault tree is that it helps in gaining significant 
insights of the causes of the top event. The fault tree can also be processed to derive 
further refined information. The principal qualitative exploitation is based on the 
computation of minimal cut sets. A cut set is a collection of elementary events that can 
lead to the undesirable event at the tree root, and it is minimal when it doesn’t contain any 
other cut set. The analysis of these minimal cut sets allows highlighting the critical events 
related to the occurrence of the undesirable event. A particular attention is paid to minimal 
cut sets containing a single event and precautions are taken regarding their realization.  It 
is worth noting that minimal cut sets corresponding to intermediate events in the fault tree 
can also be computed. 
The activity of constructing a fault tree represents a qualitative analysis activity, but the 
obtained fault tree represents also a basis that can be used for quantitative evaluation. 
Besides, qualitative and quantitative evaluations are not mutually exclusive. Model-based 
approaches (section I.3.2.3), taking into account the dynamics of the system, can be used 
for both qualitative and quantitative evaluation. 
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I.3.2 Quantitative evaluation 
Quantitative or probabilistic evaluation aims to evaluate in terms of probabilities the 
extent to which some of the dependability attributes are satisfied; those attributes are then 
viewed as measures. 
I.3.2.1 Quantitative measures  
The alternation of correct-incorrect service delivery is quantified to define reliability, 
availability, and maintainability as measures of dependability. Several other measures 
(like the mean time to failure - MTTF, mean up time - MUT, etc) characterizing the 
behavior of the system, with regards to occurrences of failures and the system recovery, 
can be considered. Two main categories of measures can be distinguished [Laprie et al. 
1995]: 
• Measures that characterize the sojourn time in the state where the correct service is 
being delivered: e.g., reliability and MTTF, which measure the delivery of correct 
service before failure. 
• Measures that consider the correct service delivery with respect to its alternation 
with incorrect service delivery; they correspond to the various forms used to 
measure availability.  
Generally, for fault tolerant systems, several modes of service delivery can be 
distinguished. These modes represent different levels of service delivery and may range 
from full capacity to emergency service. From a dependability evaluation viewpoint, two 
main extreme cases can be identified: 
• Several modes of correct service completion and a single mode of incorrect 
service. 
• A single mode of correct service delivery and several modes of incorrect service. 
The safety measure corresponds to a special case of the measures that consider this aspect 
of the service delivery, when all the failure events that may affect the system are not 
catastrophic. Safety is actually reliability with respect to catastrophic failures. The state of 
correct service and the states of incorrect service due to non-catastrophic failures are 
grouped into a safe state. 
In general, the measures related to these kinds of systems, which take into account the 
impact of the service degradation, are called performability measures [Meyer 1992].  
An overview of the techniques for the evaluation of the measures is presented in the 
following. 
I.3.2.2 Quantitative dependability evaluation techniques 
Quantitative evaluation is carried out based on two main approaches: measurement-based 
evaluation and model-based evaluation. The two approaches are nevertheless 
complementary since the model needs input data that may be obtained by measurement. 
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Measurement-based evaluation consists in testing the system or observing its behavior 
during its use phase, in order to collect data characterizing the targeted measure. 
Measurement-based evaluation is attractive as it provides the most accurate information. 
However, it is costly and it may take a long time to have an effective result in case of 
faults that are seldom activated. Besides, it is only applicable to systems that are already 
developed. For systems that are not yet built, but not limited to them, model-based 
evaluation can be applied using parameters from a similar system or parameters defined in 
the system specification.  
Model-based evaluation consists in using an abstract representation to analyze the system 
behavior. It has the advantage of being usable all over the lifecycle of the system. During 
the design phase, model-based evaluation can be conducted to help make appropriate 
choices concerning dependability requirements. Solutions that best characterize the 
dependability of the system can be selected among various candidate alternatives, based 
on the results of their evaluation. Model-based evaluation is also useful in investigating 
further the solution chosen. Sensitivity analyses can be carried out with respect to some of 
the design parameters. Model-based evaluation is still a good solution to analyze a system 
that is already in use in order to improve its dependability. 
The approach developed in this dissertation concerns model-based evaluation using up-to-
date data collected during the use of the system. The main characteristics of model-based 
evaluation are presented in the following sections. 
I.3.2.3 Model-based evaluation 
Model-based dependability evaluation generally consists of three basics steps: i) the 
definition or choice of the measure(s) to evaluate, ii) the model construction, and iii) the 
model processing. The choice of the measure to evaluate depends on the requirements of 
the system. The measures should reflect the goals of the system service delivery. The 
model construction consists in describing the behavior of the system based on its 
architecture and its elementary processes. The model processing corresponds to the 
computation of the dependability measure(s). Depending on the experience gained in the 
use of the system under consideration, an additional step, which consists in validating the 
model, is taken into account.  
The following subsections give more details about the model construction and the model 
processing.   
I.3.2.3.1 Model construction 
To build a dependability model, one has to determine carefully the facets to be represented 
as features in the model. A trade-off is to be made between the tractability of the model 
and the full representation of all the aspects of the system. The elements to include depend 
on the measure to evaluate, the data available (the model parameters) and the modeling 
method. Two main groups of dependability modeling methods can be distinguished: 
combinatorial methods and state-space methods. 
Combinatorial methods include the use of fault trees [Ericson 1999], reliability block 
diagrams [Bennetts 1982] and similar methods that generally capture a static view of the 
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system with respect to an objective or a feared situation, which accounts for the measure 
to evaluate. The resulting models are concise and easy to understand. Fault trees are the 
most commonly used. The diagram resulting from an FTA represents a model for a 
quantitative evaluation of the undesirable event. Combinatorial models have efficient 
solution methods but they are highly limited in dealing with complex systems, especially 
systems with complex stochastic dependencies.  
State-space methods are the most appropriate when dealing with complex systems and 
where it is necessary to use combined measures when performing an evaluation. They can 
deal with almost all the aspects of systems dynamics, including stochastic interaction 
between the system components. Historically, state-space methods have been explored in 
the context of mathematical models that specify probabilistic assumptions about time 
durations and transition behavior [Nicol et al. 2004]. Therefore, the resulting models are 
usually supported by strong mathematical theories. Markov processes are the most widely 
used, especially Markov processes with discrete state space, usually referred to as Markov 
chains. Time-homogeneous Markov chains are the most predominant. For measures that 
are based on a continuous time scale, the choice of a continuous-time Markov chain 
(CTMC) as the underlying process for the model construction, assumes that the waiting 
time until the occurrence of an event is exponentially distributed. 
In practice, due to the complexity of the systems generally manipulated, it is uncommon to 
directly build the model as a Markov process or any other random process that may be 
used. The model is thus developed using high-level graphical or textual description 
formalisms. The model construction consists then in describing the system using the 
formalism features. 
The various stochastic extensions of Petri nets are the most popular among the graphical 
description formalisms, encountered in the literature. Stochastic Petri Nets (SPNs) 
[Molloy 1982] are extensions of the initial Petri Nets with timed transitions for which the 
firing time distributions are assumed to be exponential. Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets 
(GSPNs) [Ajmone Marsan et al. 1984; Marsan et al. 1995] are SPNs extensions that allow 
the transitions of the underlying Petri nets to belong to two different classes: immediate or 
instantaneous transitions (represented by thin bars) and timed transitions (represented 
either by white rectangular boxes or thick bars) GSPNs have been widely used to model 
the dependability of component-based systems (e.g., [Kanoun and Borrel 1996; Fota et al. 
1997; Fota et al. 1999; Betous-Almeida and Kanoun 2004]). Deterministic and Stochastic 
Petri Nets (DSPNs) [Marsan and Chiola 1987] have been introduced as an extension of 
GSPNs, to allow the modeling of events having deterministic occurrence times. A 
transition can be specified to be immediate, exponential, or deterministic. The Stochastic 
activity network (SAN) formalism [Meyer et al. 1985; Sanders and Meyer 2001] 
represents another extension with more flexible firing rules based on the introduction of 
gates, and the use of new terminologies. The SAN formalism supports the use of any kind 
of distribution function in the specification of the transitions, which are called activities.  
Textual formalisms are based on the paradigms of programming languages and come out 
with a list of keywords and syntax rules. One of the motivations that lead their 
development is that systems designers and developers are used to programming languages 
and thus, can easily master the use of these formalisms in a context of integrating 
dependability analyses to the design and development process. The AltaRica language 
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[Arnold et al. 1999; LABRI 2010] represents an example of these languages. AltaRica is 
developed to allow the construction of “user friendly” models that are very closed to the 
system architecture. The Figaro language [Bouissou et al. 1991; Bouissou 1993], 
developed at EDF (Electricité de France),  represents another example. Figaro is an object-
oriented language, which allows modeling specialists to develop modeling components 
that can be easily used by system designers for dependability analysis. Many other textual 
formalisms such as the PRISM language [Kwiatkowska et al. 2009] and AADL (see e.g., 
[Rugina et al. 2008; Rugina et al. 2011]) can also be found. Despite the fact that they are 
based on textual descriptions, it is possible in some cases (for example AltaRica and 
AADL) to use graphical representations while developing the model. 
In the context of this dissertation, the AltaRica and SAN formalisms have been 
considered. The former has been used to model a number of aeronautic systems for safety 
analysis. The SAN formalism is used to model a wide variety of systems (e.g., [Hamouda 
et al. 2009]) as it allows for quantitative analyses and is supported by an existing tool that 
offers many model processing means. 
I.3.2.3.2 Model processing 
The computation of the dependability measures can be done either by solving the model to 
obtain an “exact” solution, or by estimating the measure using statistical methods based on 
simulation. The computation of an “exact” solution depends on the content of the model, 
especially the elementary processes used to parameterize the model. Model solvers usually 
provide “exact” solutions only for models that contain, exclusively, exponentially and 
deterministically distributed events. State space models containing non-exponential 
distributed events can be, however, transformed to exponentially distributed events model 
using the method of stages [Betous-Almeida and Kanoun 1997]. The method transforms a 
non-Markovian process into a Markovian one. Statistical estimation based on simulation 
can be used on any arbitrary model.  
Since dependability models are in practice constructed using high-level formalisms, many 
tools have been developed to support the construction, and they usually integrate one or 
several model processing engines.  A wide range of tools has been proposed for Petri-nets 
and their extensions (SURF-2 [Béoumes et al. 1993], TimeNet [German et al. 1995; 
Zimmermann 2010], GreatSPN [Chiola et al. 1995] for instances). There are also tools 
such as the Möbius tool [Daly et al. 2000], which are aimed at supporting several 
formalisms. The Möbius tool supports the SAN formalism and provides analytical model 
solvers as well as statistical estimation based on simulation. The tool Cecilia Ocas [Bieber 
et al. 2004], provided by Dassault Aviation, is one of the well known supporting tools for 
the AltaRica formalism. It does not provide intrinsically quantitative evaluation means, 
but it is designed to allow the integration of other modules including quantitative 
evaluation modules. The DIANA project includes the development of a quantitative 
evaluation tool EPOCH [Teichteil-Königsbuch et al. 2011] capable of processing AltaRica 
models. 
This dissertation is aimed at addressing the construction and processing of dependability 
models considering the aircraft systems, their operation and maintenance. The next section 
presents the global context of aircraft operation and maintenance. 
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I.4 Aircraft Systems, Operation and Maintenance  
Due to the criticality of its activities, aviation represents the transportation mode that is 
managed with the most important care. Aircraft systems are designed in such a way to 
avoid severe failures. Flights are carefully prepared and achieved considering procedures 
that are aimed at ensuring their successful completion. A maintenance program is required 
for aircraft operation, and the program has to be approved by the regulatory authority.  
I.4.1 Aircraft systems 
An aircraft is composed of several subsystems, which deliver its high-level functions. The 
Air Transport Association (ATA) specification, which provides a common referencing 
standard for aircraft documentation, devotes chapter 21 up to chapter 49 to their 
classification. These are, for example, the air conditioning and pressurization system 
(chapter 21), the electrical power supply system (chapter 24), the flight controls system 
(chapter 27), the hydraulic power supply system (chapter 29)… 
These subsystems are designed considering dependability requirements that have been 
identified earlier at the beginning of the development process. Generally, their detailed 
designs include several redundancies (resulting from dependability requirements) and 
complex reconfiguration scenarios that are aimed at surviving failures and skipping the 
failed components in the loop of the function delivery. The systems are also designed with 
functional interfaces that allow for interaction with the other subsystems.  
For the purpose of repair times optimization, the subsystems are made of Line Replaceable 
Units (LRUs), which interact so as to provide the functions that are required in the 
achievement of a flight. Examples of LRU are flight control computers, hydraulic and 
electrical power generators, .... An LRU can be involved in several functions. For instance, 
the flight control computer that is the subject of the study in [Meyer et al. 1980] is 
involved in eight functions.  
The ability of an LRU to deliver the service required in the accomplishment of a function 
depends on its current state, which can take several forms. For example, a flight control 
computer may be simply operational, erroneous, or totally lost; alternatively one may 
consider that a flight control computer is either operational or not. Due to the interactions 
between the LRUs, the ability to deliver the service also depends on the state of the 
interacting LRUs or subsystems.  
While in service, the LRUs are subject to errors and failure events that lead to changes in 
their state. When an LRU is no longer operational, it may be maintained or replaced 
during a stop before undertaking any other flight, or at a convenient time, after some 
flights, depending on its criticality. 
The services the aircraft systems have to deploy correspond to those required by the 
missions. An aircraft mission consists of a series of flights, and each of them may have its 
specific requirements. Furthermore, a flight consists of different phases with different 
requirements in terms of functions to deploy. For example, the landing gear deployment is 
not needed during cruise, while it is absolutely required during the landing phase.  
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I.4.2 Aircraft operation 
Aircraft operations involve the planning and the achievement of the planned missions that 
consist of flights. It is worth noting that the word flight may be misunderstood in the 
aviation industry, due to different declinations of its meaning. Generally, a flight is a trip 
through air, from a location to another one and which is assigned an identification number. 
A flight may include one or more intermediate stops, dividing it into several legs (also 
called segments). A flight that does not involve any intermediate stop is called a non-stop 
flight. Technically, a flight leg corresponds to a flight cycle, i.e., a takeoff and landing. 
The following gives an overview of the operations planning and achievement. 
I.4.2.1 Operation planning  
The planning involves activities from the airline high-level organization down to specific 
airport station crews. There is primarily strategic planning, over a given period, which 
defines the service the airline will offer to passengers [Clarke and Naryadi 1995]. Based 
on the desired schedule of services established by the commercial department, the set of 
flights to be presented to the customers is defined. In particular the origin and the 
destination of the flights, and a global timetable for their achievement are established. This 
schedule of flights to be proposed to customers is used as a basis for crew scheduling and 
aircraft scheduling. The crews scheduling and aircraft scheduling are analogous [Grandeau 
1995]. They basically consist in a resource allocation problem. Sequences of flights are 
assigned to crew members and specific aircraft within the airline’s fleet.  
The particularity in the aircraft scheduling is that one has to take into account maintenance 
bases capable of servicing the aircraft type. Usually, the aircraft are assigned to fly 
repeating patterns of flight legs called rotations, which start and end at a maintenance 
base. Aircraft have periodic maintenance and inspection requirements after various 
numbers of flight hours. The rotations must account for all maintenance and inspection 
requirements.  
The aircraft rotations are initially scheduled based on the aircraft types, before assigning a 
physical aircraft corresponding to the type. The process of assigning a physical aircraft to 
the flights is also called tail number assignment due to the fact that all aircraft have an 
identifying number on their tail, and airlines generally refer to specific aircraft using their 
tail numbers.  
After the planning of the global activities of the airline, the ultimate step is the execution 
of these activities. The scheduled flights are executed on a daily basis, and they may be 
readjusted, if necessary, to cope with irregular events. Prior to its achievement, each flight 
requires planning tasks and careful preparation to ensure its safe and successful 
achievement.  
I.4.2.2 Flight achievement process 
To ensure the correct achievement of the flights, great care is taken concerning the 
operational state of the aircraft. The accomplishment of the flights is subject to a dispatch 
process that involves the consideration of various information to make a decision, in 
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compliance with approved procedures. Figure I.1 summarizes the process to dispatch an 
aircraft as it is today [Papadopoulos and Bernard 2008]. 
Whilst operating an aircraft or during maintenance, the anomalies that have occurred are 
reported based on different means. The ECAM (Electronic Centralised Aircraft 
Monitoring) monitors the aircraft systems and provides the cockpit crew with warnings, 
which are classified from level 1, the highest, down to level 4. These notifications are 
reported together with other Flight Deck Effects (FDE) and crew observations in the 
aircraft logbook. The Built In Test Equipments (BITE) also deliver warnings that are 
recorded in Post Flight Reports (PFR). In some cases, a part of these messages is 
transmitted in real time to the Maintenance Control Centre (MCC) through ACARS 
(Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting System). During their activities, the 
maintenance crew also report the anomalies observed.  
 
Figure I.1 Dispatch process 
The warning and messages collected are checked in order to have insights into the 
problems and to determine the actual sources among the potential candidates incriminated 
by the warnings. This is done by means of troubleshooting using the troubleshooting 
manual, logbook analysis to try to replicate what is described, Post Flight Report Analysis 
to complete information received, and test that is part of the troubleshooting process to 
eliminate candidates. This investigation is conducted by the maintenance crew and may 
begin even before the aircraft is landed.  
Once a component has been identified as inoperative, it is necessary to determine if it is 
critical for the flight. The Minimum Equipment List (MEL) is referred to, where either 
components are clearly marked as Go, or No-Go components. Or alternatively they may 
be Go-If components with a list of conditions to be validated to allow the aircraft to pursue 
its mission. If certain conditions are invalidated the component becomes a No-Go 
component. The components that are not mentioned in the MEL are considered No-Go 
components. Figure I.2 summarizes the different scenarios related to a component in the 
MEL.  
• The Go components can be left failed. 
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• No-Go components obligatorily require corrective actions.  
• The Go-If components may be left in a failed state or may be required to be removed 
or disconnected, but they require operational limitations (Go-If-o) or maintenance 
(Go-If-m) procedures to be applied, e.g. if anti-ice protection is unavailable then an 
aircraft may be dispatched as long as it is operated outside of an environment that has 
a risk of ice build-up. The system may be disabled by pulling and placarding a circuit 
breaker. In some cases, it is necessary to carry out a change to an operating procedure, 
e.g., flying below a certain altitude, or flying with the gear extended. 
 
Figure I.2 Components status in MEL 
The pilot, as part of his preparation activities, has to get an insight into the potential 
anomalies and their causes, if any. Once he i) has understood what the current state of the 
aircraft is, ii) has understood the imposed limitations in the way he can operate the 
aircraft, and iii) has applied them to the intended mission considering the prevailing 
weather conditions, he can then determine whether he is capable of flying the aircraft or if 
some actions are required to be taken in addition to what is described in the MEL. The 
airline helps the pilot by collecting the information that is pertinent for the pilot to take a 
decision on whether the aircraft can be used to achieve the flight or not. The decision must 
consider the whole planned mission, especially the flights to achieve after the current one, 
and more generally other missions linked to the mission in question. 
The decision to dispatch the aircraft is very important at each flight since it not only deals 
with the ability to achieve the flight, but also the beneficial use for other missions. 
Nevertheless, it is still a technical preparation. To finally perform the intended flight, the 
flight handling crew must cope with the other activities ensuring the full readiness for 
dispatch. Activities before actual departure include passengers boarding, baggage and 
cargo processing, fueling, and other ...  
When all ground activities are completed, the pilot requests the clearance to taxi to 
departure runway and initiates the take-off. During the take-off roll, the flight crew 
monitors the aircraft centerline tracking, engine parameters and conditions both inside and 
outside of the aircraft [Midkiff et al. 2004]. The take-off may be aborted (called rejected 
take-off) if a critical problem occurs. The abortion on runway may cause multiple tire 
failures due to heavy braking, and may result in a significant period of runway 
unavailability since the runway may need to be decontaminated. 
!7),(+8(!&,2!9&%:;$)6,2!
! 19 
During the flight, the flight crew must be constantly prepared for the possibility of 
contingencies requiring diversion of the aircraft to an en-route alternate airport. The 
causes of a diversion include medical emergencies, aircraft equipment problems, terrorist 
activities in-flight, unacceptable holding times, and fuel shortage.  
Abortion during take-off and diversion in-flight represent operational interruptions that 
occur during the actual execution of the flight. A flight may be also subject to an 
operational interruption before its actual execution. 
I.4.2.3 Operational interruptions 
During the achievement of the planned flights, there may be several issues causing 
disruptions in the planned operations execution. The effect of the disruptions may range 
from simple readjustment noticeable only at the airline side, to deviations in the schedule 
affecting the passenger’s travel. The latter directly affects the service, and ultimately the 
airline revenue. Nevertheless, whatever the disruption that may arise, one should be able 
to contain the situation in order to avoid the potential cascading effect. From a flight 
achievement viewpoint, the major undesirable situations that may be encountered, called 
operational interruptions, are delays, cancellations, in-flight turn-backs and diversions.  
Among the factors at the origin of an operational interruption, several factors external to 
the aircraft in charge of the flight can be identified. Unfavorable weather condition may 
lead to the closure of an entire airport, resulting in the cancellation of all the flights 
departing and arriving at this airport. The flights heading to this airport at the closure time 
must be diverted. Some less severe weather conditions may only lead to flight delays. The 
flight crew, the ground handling services as well as the air traffic control services can also 
be causes of delays and cancellations. A disruption in the accomplishment of the airport 
service can easily affect the full achievement of the flight.  
The factors related to the operational state of the aircraft to which the flight is assigned are 
failure events and maintainability problems. Any equipment failure may cause an 
interruption during the achievement of the aircraft planned rotations. A critical failure 
during a flight can cause a turn-back or a diversion to another airport. In this case, the 
aircraft should be routed to the nearest maintenance station that can accomplish the repair. 
However, thanks to the multiple redundancies in the aircraft system, the flight can be fully 
completed in most cases of failure. The interruption will then concern the next flight. The 
dispatch decision process should cope with the issue before the subsequent flight. If 
maintenance is required, the ability to promptly cope with the problem depends on the 
resources available at the considered airport. Otherwise the flight can be delayed or even 
cancelled if no spare aircraft is available. 
The occurrence of an operational interruption can be very severe, especially the cascading 
effect. One or several aircraft may have to change from their current planned missions to a 
different mission. The replacement of an aircraft by another one may inject deviations in 
the missions of the latter, which may also affect other aircraft missions. Diversions to an 
airport where the airline does not have a base will leave the airline with aircraft, 
passengers, and crewmembers all at a wrong location with fewer options for recovery.  
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Airlines usually collect statistics on operational interruption occurrences. They evaluate 
the dispatch reliability, which corresponds to percentage of flights that are not cancelled 
and which are achieved without delay; and the operational reliability, which considers in 
addition to delays and cancellations, in-flight turn-backs and diversions. 
To contain disruptions, airlines reserve margins in the service schedules and when a 
disruption happens, they try to re-plan the missions in such a way to resume the initial 
schedule as quickly as possible. For the disruptions resulting from failures, efficient 
maintenance policies can considerably reduce the problem. 
I.4.3 Maintenance 
In the early days of aviation, it was not mandatory to elaborate a maintenance program for 
aircraft operation. With the increasing development of the field and the notable 
complexity of aircraft systems, a maintenance program has been required for every aircraft 
in service. The maintenance program specifies the maintenance policies to be applied to 
the various components of the aircraft system.  
I.4.3.1 Maintenance policies 
A maintenance policy defines which type of maintenance must be performed on a system 
or a system component. Three main categories of maintenance policies can be 
distinguished: failure-based maintenance, time-based maintenance and condition-based 
maintenance. Condition-based maintenance policy can be itself split into inspection-based 
maintenance and examination-based maintenance [Kumar 2000]. 
I.4.3.1.1 Failure-based maintenance policy 
Failure-based maintenance policy is an approach where the system or the system 
component considered is operated until failure. It consists in carrying out corrective 
maintenance after failures, and there is no planned intervention until the occurrence of the 
failure. Failure-based maintenance is usually applied to components that are non-safety 
critical and non operational relevant for the global system. It is also applicable to 
redundant and fault tolerant systems. The advantage of a failure-based maintenance policy 
is essentially the full use of the operating life of the component. The drawback is that the 
repair activities are always achieved as an unscheduled maintenance. When it is applied to 
an inappropriate component or system, the consequence of a failure can be disastrous.  
I.4.3.1.2 Time-based maintenance policy 
For components that are safety critical or whose failure may lead to significant economical 
consequences, it is important to prevent the failure or reduce the likelihood by carrying out 
regular maintenance actions. Time-based maintenance policy corresponds to the approach 
where preventive maintenance activities are carried out at a predetermined frequency to 
restore, overhaul, or replace the component. The frequency may be based on the operating 
times or units such as number of flight hours, number of takeoffs or landings … etc. The 
advantages of a time-based maintenance policy are the improvement of safety, the 
efficiency of the maintenance activities performed, as they are prepared in advance, and 
the reduction of unforeseen service disruptions. The disadvantages are essentially the 
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waste of operating life, the service downtime caused by the preventive maintenance 
activities and their cost. As the maintenance activities are carried out on a predetermined 
basis, it may not be globally efficient since the actual operating conditions may not always 
comply with the planning assumptions. Furthermore, the time-based maintenance is 
essentially aimed at reducing the faults accumulated with the time; the failure pattern of 
the component may not be time dependent. 
I.4.3.1.3 Condition-based maintenance policy 
Condition-based maintenance is the policy that is aimed at overcoming the drawbacks of 
the previous maintenance policies. The principle is to base the achievement of the 
maintenance activities on the actual state or performance trend of the component in 
service. It consists in detecting or monitoring changes in the component or system 
condition, which are likely to indicate an incipient failure, and achieving the maintenance 
when it is cost effective. It is suited to components for which cost effective techniques, 
capable of assessing the component condition and detecting the failure before it happens, 
exist. According to the techniques used, the condition-based maintenance policy can be 
classified as inspection-based maintenance or examination-based maintenance.  
Inspection-based maintenance: It is an approach based on periodic inspections to 
determine whether the condition of the component is satisfactory or denoting a change that 
needs to be contained. The frequency of the inspections is determined before the 
component is put in service. 
Examination-based maintenance: It is based on the use of indicators that provide 
information about the condition and a prediction of the future behavior of the component 
or the system. The indication is in form of numerical results whose analysis determines the 
next action to take. It is a dynamic approach.  
Condition-based maintenance is designed to be a cost effective policy that enables a fuller 
use of the operating life of components whilst ensuring a good level of safety and 
reliability. However, it cannot be applied to every component. Its effectiveness depends on 
the accuracy of the monitoring technique. The maintenance program of complex systems 
usually combines all these kinds of approaches. The following presents considerations that 
lead an aircraft maintenance program. 
I.4.3.2 Aircraft maintenance program 
The objectives of an aircraft maintenance program are stated by the Air Transport 
Association of America (ATA) as follows [Kinnison 2004]: 
• To ensure the realization of the inherent safety and reliability levels of the 
equipment;  
• To restore safety and reliability to their inherent levels when deterioration has 
occurred;  
• To obtain the information necessary for design improvement of those items whose 
inherent reliability proves inadequate;  
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• To accomplish these objectives at a minimum total cost, including maintenance 
costs and the costs of resulting failures.  
These objectives do not take into account the operator’s needs when the aircraft is in 
service. They are rather aimed at maintaining the safety and reliability level defined by the 
aircraft manufacturer. The maintenance program may have to be adjusted to fit airline 
operations in the field. The consideration of customer satisfaction may drive maintenance 
decisions. 
The maintenance program is established based on the maintenance-planning document 
(MPD), which is provided by the aircraft manufacturer. The MPD is made of an initial 
maintenance program and other information such as the location and the numbering of the 
aircraft components. The initial maintenance program specifies the required maintenance 
tasks and the recommended frequencies.  
Initial maintenance program development approaches 
There have been two basic approaches to the development of an aircraft maintenance 
program: the process-oriented approach and the task-oriented approach. These two 
approaches correspond to different evolutions of procedures issued by the Maintenance 
Steering Group (MSG), a group of airlines and manufacturer representatives, as MSG-1, 
MSG-2 and MSG-3. MSG-1 and MSG-2 correspond to the process-oriented approach, and 
MSG-3 corresponds to the task-oriented approach. 
The process-oriented approach focuses on individual items to determine which kind of 
maintenance must be applied. It uses three primary maintenance processes: 
• Hard-time: a time-based maintenance, which requires that the item be periodically 
overhauled or removed. It concerns items that have predictable life limit. 
• On-Condition: an inspection-based maintenance that requires that the item be 
periodically inspected or checked against some appropriate physical standard to 
determine whether it can be kept in service. The purpose is to remove the unit from 
service before failure during normal operation occurs [FAA 1978]. It concerns the 
items that have detectable wear out. 
• Condition-Monitoring: a maintenance process for items that have neither Hard-
Time nor On-Condition maintenance as primary maintenance process. No 
predetermined preventive maintenance task is associated to the item. The operator 
has to develop an appropriate condition-monitoring program to handle the item 
failure. The condition-monitoring program usually consists in tracking the item 
failure by means of data collection and analysis to help in predicting and avoiding 
the failure. The concerned items are usually operated to failure. 
The process-oriented approach helped improve considerably aircraft maintenance by 
introducing different approaches to maintenance based on the component specificity, 
instead of applying systematically the traditional time-based approach to all the system 
components. However, the air transportation association of America published in 1980 




The task-oriented approach still uses the underlying philosophy of the previous 
maintenance processes (i.e., periodic maintenance, condition check and monitoring), but 
with a different approach. It consists in establishing the scheduled maintenance based on 
the tasks to achieve, instead of categorizing the items with a given type of maintenance. 
An item may be subject to a combination of tasks corresponding to different maintenance 
processes. The MSG-3 methodology is used to identify the suitable scheduled tasks to 
prevent the failures. The methodology is essentially a reliability-centered maintenance 
methodology, which is a consequence driven approach. It uses logical diagram for 
determining the suitable maintenance tasks. The analysis is made of two levels. The first 
level is intended to determine the failure effect category. The failure is categorized based 
on its impact on safety, operations and economy. The second level is aimed at determining 
the suitable maintenance task necessary for the prevention of the failure. The resulting 
tasks are accomplished based on predefined intervals.  
Scheduled maintenance intervals 
There are various types of maintenance intervals. Airlines can define their own named 
intervals, but they must either maintain the integrity of the initial maintenance 
requirements or receive the approval of the regulation authority. The standard intervals are 
[Kinnison 2004]: 
• Transit checks: They are performed after landing and before the next take-off of 
the day. They consist of oil level check and a general visual inspection (walk 
around). If any problem is found, the resolving action will be however an 
unscheduled maintenance. 
• 48-hour/daily checks: As named, they are done once every 48 hours or day and 
concern more detailed tasks than the transit checks. 
• Hourly checks: They concern components that have maintenance tasks assigned 
based on the number of hours they have been operating. They are applied to items 
such as engines, flight control systems. 
• Operating cycle limit checks: They are applied to items whose usage depends on 
the number of cycles performed.  For example tires, brakes and landing gears, 
which are used only during take-off and landing.  
• Letter checks (A, B, C, D): These correspond to the traditional grouping of aircraft 
maintenance. Essentially used before MSG-3 revision 2 [ATA MSG 1993], they 
were based on the simple belief that each part on an aircraft requires periodic 
overhaul. Thus, for modern aircraft, maintenance checks are based on the number 
of operating hours and cycles. The industry, however, generally still refers to 
maintenance intervals as ‘A’, ‘B’ and so on. The tasks carried out increase from A 
to D. 
The program associated to these tasks represents the scheduled maintenance activities. 
They are intended to detect the failing components and repair or remove them. Some 
checks, like transit-checks, do not lead to immediate maintenance of the components 
found inoperative. They are either handled during higher-level maintenance tasks if they 




In the working viewpoint, maintenance activities are divided into on-aircraft maintenance 
and off-aircraft maintenance [Kinnison 2004]. As implied by the denomination, the 
difference between them is whether the tasks are performed at/on the aircraft or 
somewhere else; the faulty component may be removed from the aircraft and sent to the 
appropriate shop for repair. On-aircraft maintenance is itself divided into two categories: 
• Line maintenance: it is performed at gate and includes everything from transit and 
daily/48-hours checks to A-checks. The aircraft is kept in service. It is worth 
noting that many specific denominations, which can be qualified of line 
maintenance “sub types” exist. These are base, outstation, turnaround and 
overnight maintenance. 
• Hangar maintenance: it concerns major maintenance activities or modifications of 
the aircraft. The type of activities addressed are scheduled tasks above A-check (C, 
D); modification of aircraft or systems by service bulletin, airworthiness directive, 
or engineering order; fleet campaigns; special inspections required by airline or 
operational conditions; painting of aircraft; and aircraft interior modifications. 
This dissertation considers only line maintenance activities, since the objective is to deal 
with operational issues during missions’ achievement. 
I.5 Aircraft Operational Dependability Assessment and Improvement 
Related Work 
The dissertation concerns aircraft operational dependability assessment. The assessment is 
intended to be used for missions and maintenance planning adjustment. The objective is to 
improve the aircraft ability to achieve its missions without significant disruptions, 
especially disruption due to failure. Several studies have been carried out in the context, 
involving safety issues, reliability prediction principally during design phase, maintenance 
planning and optimization, and operational disruption management. The following gives 
an overview of the related work. 
I.5.1 Aircraft safety assessment usable during operation  
As safety represents a fundamental issue that must be covered before considering 
operational issues, several studies focus on safety analysis to address aircraft operation. 
The safety assessment is mandatory at design phase for certification purpose, and 
recommended processes and methods have been given (for instance SAE ARP 4754 and 
ARP 4761) for its achievement. The studies presented in this section represent the 
complementary studies which address operational issues in addition, or whose underlying 
principles can also be used to support operations achievement. 
Usually, the analysis is aimed at verifying the fulfillment of safety and operational 
requirements. It is the case in [Ramesh et al. 2008], where mathematical models and 
solutions to determining the average probability of failure during a flight are presented. 
The aim is to provide means for demonstrating that the probability bound required for the 
system is respected. Redundant components with constant failure rate as well as aging 
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components with Weibull failure distribution are analyzed considering the whole 
operational life of the aircraft and the components maintenance mechanisms. The 
maintenance of a component is considered instantaneous. In [Prescott and Andrews 2005], 
the safety analysis is aimed at ensuring that the deferment rules of maintenance activities 
meet standards requirements.  
[Tomaszek and Wa!ny 2009] analyze scenarios of aircraft operation safety using a simple 
model consisting of three possible aircraft states: operational state, repair state and 
complete loss of airworthiness state. The authors determine the probability of being in 
each of these states at a given time, considering different scenarios of reaching the state of 
complete loss of airworthiness. The analysis is rather appropriate to an elementary 
component.  
Due to the particular complexity of aircraft systems, it is necessary to consider the 
components interaction and analyze the failure propagation. An approach to the evaluation 
of the cascading effect of aircraft system failures is presented in [Biswaws and Shrimali 
2001]. The approach is composed of two steps. The first step consists in defining a 
relational matrix that represents the interdependencies between the aircraft subsystems. 
The second step develops, for each subsystem, the effects of its failure modes on the 
dependent subsystems identified in the first step. The authors claim that the outcome is 
very useful for flight crew in preparing their emergency procedures. The approach, 
however, is purely aimed at analyzing safety.  
[Meyer et al. 1980] propose a model to assess the performability of a flight computer 
considering different levels of service accomplishment based on four attributes: safety, no 
change in flight plan, no operational penalties, and no economic penalties. The model 
considers a single flight profile and distinguishes different phases, which require different 
functions provided by the computer. The model is structured in three levels:  the mission 
level which represents the different degrees of service accomplishment, the aircraft level 
which represents the functions deployment and the operating environment, and computer 
level that represents the computer internal behavior according to the different flight 
phases. The study does not deal with maintenance issues before or after the flight.    
In [Sachon and Paté-Cornell 2000], delays and safety in airline maintenance are addressed. 
A probabilistic risk analysis model is developed in order to quantify the effect of airlines 
maintenance policies on the occurrences of delays and in-fight safety. The model 
developed is an influence diagram consisting of three tiers: a tier composed of decision 
variables that represent the qualification of the maintenance personnel, the time to start 
maintenance activities and the maximum number of deferrals; a tier consisting in a ground 
model that represents maintenance resources availability and the ability to maintain; and a 
tier representing the scenario of a crucial event occurrence.  
I.5.2  Aircraft operational dependability assessment at design phase 
The works aimed at enhancing aircraft operational dependability are mostly carried out 
during aircraft design and development phase for reliability prediction and improvement. 
Analytical approaches as well as simulation models can be found in the literature.  
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The design enhancement is the purpose of [Bineid and Fielding 2006], which aimed at 
developing a dispatch reliability design methodology. From an allocated dispatch 
reliability at the aircraft level, the methodology derives the corresponding dispatch 
reliability at component level, which is to be compared with a predicted dispatch 
reliability based on the components failure and maintenance rates. The components of the 
aircraft system are assumed to be in series configuration, and their failures and 
maintenance rates are constant.  
In [Hugues et al. 2002], the dispatch reliability is predicted using Markov processes. The 
approach is based on estimating the dispatch reliability as the sum of dispatch reliabilities 
corresponding to the aircraft subsystems. Dispatch events are also the subject of [Saintis et 
al. 2009]. The paper presents a modeling approach based on the fault tree of the targeted 
aircraft system, together with a computing algorithm to estimate the bounds of the 
dependability measure. It considers a series of flight cycles and provides a means of 
evaluating the occurrence probability of one of three events at each cycle:  “No Go 
dispatch”, “Accepted Degraded Mode” which corresponds to the case where a “Go-If” 
occurs and the airline accepts to perform the corresponding tasks, “Refused Degraded 
Mode” which is a “Go If” that is not accepted by the airline. The probability that more 
than one component failure occurs during a flight is considered negligible.  
[Balaban et al. 2000] propose a simulation model that takes into account the fact that more 
than one failure can occur during a flight. The model was aimed at estimating the mission 
capable rates of new configurations proposals for the enhancement of the USA air force  
C-5 aircraft, so as to determine the best configuration. The mission capable rate is 
estimated considering three primary levels of readiness: fully mission capable, partially 
mission capable, and not mission capable. The paper does not detail the content of the 
model.  
The Ultra Reliable Aircraft Model (URAM) presented in [Jones et al. 2002] appears to be 
a general discrete events simulation framework for aircraft design enhancement with 
regard to reliability. The model covers i) the system architecture representation using 
state-space-based techniques, ii) the system functions based on a mapping with the system 
components states, and iii) maintenance by considering a grouping of the components so 
as to represent maintenance of the functions. The model is used as an interactive tool for 
the investigation of different failure scenarios. The output produced is the probability of 
achieving a desired Maintenance Free Operating Period (MFOP) length. The MFOP 
modeling is also addressed in [Chew et al. 2008], together with Phased-Mission System 
(PMS) modeling. The model developed was solved by simulation.  
Generally, aerospace systems dependability modeling is addressed as a PMS modeling 
problem. The consideration of the different phases of a PMS is led by the fact that during 
different time intervals, identified as phases, the system is in different configurations and 
different functions are required according to the phase. The PMS modeling has been 
tackled considering different characteristics of the mission profiles and the system. The 
durations and the sequencing of the phases represent one of the characteristics that are 
generally considered. For the systems whose mission profile can be defined in advance, 
the durations and the sequencing of the phases are considered known in advance and thus, 
deterministic durations are used in the description of the phases. This approach is 
considered for example in [Meyer et al. 1980] to analyze the single flight mission. Other 
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aspects are whether the trajectory of the mission profile is static or dynamic, and whether 
during each phase, the system has time-homogeneous Markov process property or not. 
Any combination of these aspects can be covered by approaches based on Markov 
regenerative processes, with the possibility to have analytical solution under some given 
conditions [Mura and Bondavalli 2001].  
Concerning the structuring of the model of a PMS, the distinction of different levels of 
abstraction and the use of sub models represent a flexible approach for decoupling the 
mission profile characterization from the system description, and thereby facilitate the 
consideration of changes in the mission profile. The example considered in [Mura and 
Bondavalli 2001] is structured using two sub models representing the mission profile and 
the system, whereas [Meyer et al. 1980] distinguish three levels of abstraction. 
The works aimed at design phase analyses, are useful in ensuring the best inherent 
operational dependability to the system. While in service, the inherent dependability has to 
be maintained. The following presents some studies aimed at improving maintenance 
planning and achievement. 
I.5.3 Aircraft maintenance 
As presented in subsection I.4.3.2, the current aircraft maintenance programs are 
elaborated using reliability centered maintenance process, which is a consequence driven 
approach. However, one cannot ensure its total efficiency, and the resulting program 
application needs to be supported.   
In [Ahmadi and Soderholm 2008], the objective is to support the reliability centered 
maintenance process that is applied while developing an aircraft maintenance program. 
The operational consequences of aircraft system failures are analyzed using event tree 
analysis. The paper discusses and categorizes the possible consequences of failures taking 
into account the flight phase during which they have occurred. Given a failure, the 
analysis determines the corresponding categories and computes the annual cost the failure 
may generate.  
In service maintenance planning and achievement also represent an important aspect that 
has been dealt with in the literature. The issue that is mostly addressed concerns the 
consideration of maintenance in the problem of assigning aircraft to missions (see e.g., 
[Clarke et al. 1996; Moudani and Mora-Camino 2000]). Given a flight schedule, [Sriram 
and Haghani 2003] propose an approach to determining the best aircraft assignment and 
line maintenance planning that optimize costs. The approach considers only scheduled 
maintenance of types A and B, and doesn’t take into account any unexpected maintenance 
constraint, such as failures during the achievement of the flights, which require an 
accomplishment or deferment of maintenance activity.  
A decision support approach to maintenance planning and deferment is presented in 
[Papakostas et al. 2010]. That is, thanks to redundancy, the aircraft can continue operating 
in degraded mode with some equipment inoperative; however, the risk of occurrence of an 
operational interruption is increased. A method is proposed to decide on the maintenance 
deferment at a given stop, taking into account optimization criteria: cost, remaining useful 
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life and operational risks. It is worth noting that the work is not aimed at assessing the 
operational dependability. It uses the dependability measure as input.  
After planning the maintenance activities, their effective accomplishment can also be a 
concern. [Gupta et al. 2003] present a stochastic simulation model for the efficient 
planning of the maintenance technicians’ jobs. The model is principally focused on the 
labor utilization and the workload management. 
Researches on inherent reliability enhancement and on efficiency of maintenance are 
aimed at avoiding failures that may result in operational disruptions. Other studies have 
been targeting the efficient actions to alleviate the disruption when it occurs.   
I.5.4 Aircraft operation disruption management 
The problem of recovering from operational disruption has been the subject of several 
studies [Le et al. 2011; Filar et al. 2001] belonging to the operational research community. 
The approaches proposed are aimed at resuming normal operation as soon as possible so 
as to reduce the economical losses.  
The first paper [Teodorovi" and Guberini" 1984], commonly found in the literature, 
addresses the problem as resulting from the unavailability of one or more aircraft. The 
paper is aimed at reducing delays, using a network model. [Yan and Yang 1996] present a 
modeling framework based on network flow techniques, which is aimed at managing the 
disruption resulting from a single aircraft failure. The paper proposes four strategic models 
to handle the disruption, considering (1) only flights cancellations; (2) cancellations and 
ferry of spare aircraft; (3) cancellations and delays; and (4) cancellations, ferry of spare 
aircraft and delay. The models corresponding to (1) and (2) can be solved efficiently; (3) 
and (4) are NP-hard. The approach doesn’t consider maintenance constraints. 
Due to the complexity of the problem, the use of heuristics has been considered. [Argüello 
et al. 1997] describe an approach based on the heuristic GRASP (Greedy Randomized 
Adaptive Search Procedure) to reschedule the aircraft routings when one or several aircraft 
cannot be operated. The heuristic is based on randomized neighborhood search. The 
objective is to resume the original schedule within one day, while minimizing the cost of 
the reassignment. The approach was experimented and validated using data from 
Continental Airlines.  
The occurrence of an operational disruption may not necessarily be due to an aircraft 
failure. Other factors such as crew unavailability, air traffic control and weather problems, 
may cause disruptions. Therefore, the disruption management has been a prevalent issue 
for airlines. [Clarke 1998]  presents an overview of the practice in Airline Operations 
Control Centers (AOCC) for dealing with irregular airline operations together with a 
literature review of the research related to disruptions management. [Kohl et al. 2007] 
present the numerous aspects of the disruption management and an overview of the 
current related work. The paper is aimed at reporting on the experience gained in the 
DESCARTES (DEcision Support for integrated Crew and AiRcrafT recovery) research 
project, involving British Airways.  
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An extensive survey of model formulations and solution approaches to the disruption 
management problem can be found in [Clausen et al. 2010]. The survey distinguishes 
researches with emphases on recovering aircraft schedule, crew schedule, passenger 
schedule, and those integrating two or the three of these problems.  
I.6 Summary and Thesis Orientation 
The problem that is targeted concerns aircraft continuous operational dependability 
improvement whilst coping with failures.  
As described in section I.4.2.2, aircraft are operated in compliance with operational 
requirements depending principally on the current functional state of the aircraft systems 
components and the intended mission profile. Since the operations are planned in advance, 
the occurrence of unexpected events may cause significant disruptions in the planning. 
Indeed, even if most of aircraft systems are fault tolerant, offering thereby the possibility 
to operate with some components failed, there are still some failures or some external 
events that can prevent them from being operational. The disruptions result mainly into 
operational interruptions, i.e., delays, flight cancellations, in-flight turn-backs and 
diversions. These interruptions may lead to heavy economic losses due, for instance, to 
inoperability, unscheduled maintenance cost and compensation given to passengers.  
Therefore, a continuous attention must be paid to the aircraft, regarding the operational 
requirements fulfillment. The approaches to the operability improvement, based on design 
improvement and disruption management, are not sufficient. The missions and 
maintenance activities must be adjusted regularly. Paying a continuous attention to the 
effects of the aircraft system components failures helps in the successful achievement of 
the missions. Failures that may disturb the achievement of the aircraft mission have to be 
handled with adequate corrective actions. Furthermore, the ability to promptly cope with 
these failures depends on the location where they occur, as maintenance facilities are not 
the same at all airports. Generally, airlines have more facilities at their main base than at 
the other airports. Efficiently adapting maintenance resources availability to the aircraft 
missions will be definitely worth for the airline activities. The issue is to develop an 
assessment method, to evaluate the operational dependability that one can use as support 
for the assignment of a suitable mission to a given situation, and for the accommodation of 
maintenance activities. 
The approach in this dissertation consists in assessing, during the aircraft’s operations, its 
ability to satisfy the operational requirements, in the presence of failures, and the ability to 
undertake an adapted action to prevent adverse situations. There is a need to have a good 
control on the aircraft’s behavior while in service, and to be able to predict, with a good 
level of precision, the events that may be encountered. This includes an ability to cope 
with random events and a capacity to ensure that the solutions adopted are suitable. 
Model-based dependability assessment is well suited to support this process.  
I.6.1  Role of model-based dependability assessment 
Using models offers the advantages of sketching the situation without using the real 
system. In addition, stochastic models are very convenient to represent the stochastic 
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aspects of the events. For our particular case, the model is to be used essentially to 
evaluate the probability to successfully achieve missions or the risk of encountering an 
adverse situation. The estimated value will be used in decision-making processes to 
determine whether proactive actions should be taken or not. The model can be used while 
planning the missions and during their achievement.  
To plan the mission, the model can be used to estimate the period of time during which the 
aircraft system can be operated without reaching an adverse state. It will help in 
determining the mission profile the aircraft can be assigned.  
Once a mission is assigned to the aircraft, the model can be used during its achievement, 
both on ground and while in flight, to assess the ability to succeed in continuing the 
remaining part of the mission, or re-adapt it if necessary. The dispatch decision may take 
into account the ability to continue until the next airport where there are enough facilities 
to correct the problems that may be encountered. All along the mission achievement, after 
the occurrence of (or the detection of) major events that may affect the operability, the 
operational dependability assessment may be performed to provide an indication on the 
dependability of the remaining part of the mission. The outcome may be used to support 
the decision, by the operations control centre, to continue the mission or to revise the 
planned mission. To do so, the model uses runtime information about the aircraft 
operational state and the missions. 
In case of a decision to divert the flight, the model can also be used to determine a 
convenient diversion airport. In case of emergency (due for example, to problems that may 
affect safety), the model is used once a diversion airport is selected, to re-assess the 
operational dependability.  
Finally, the result may help in selecting the most appropriate maintenance or operation 
planning actions in order to improve the ability to achieve the whole mission. Assessing 
the success of a mission is a means for evaluating the concordance of maintenance 
planning with the mission. Hence, different maintenance strategies can be compared 
considering various alternatives for performing the component maintenance. The best 
strategy is then selected based on the estimated probability of mission accomplishment 
without operational disruption.  
In order to implement the model-based assessment, the major characteristics of the 
modeling and assessment problems must be analyzed. 
I.6.2  The modeling and assessment problem characteristics 
The modeling problem concerns aircraft system representation, considering its missions 
and potential maintenance actions, for the purpose of dependability assessment.  
Aircraft systems are characterized by a prominent complexity with multiple redundancies 
and reconfiguration scenarios, as mentioned in section I.4.1. The modeling approach has 
to manage this complexity. The ultimate purpose of the model consists in the 
dependability assessment during the aircraft missions’ achievement, so as to support 
decision-making regarding the missions planning and achievement, as well as 
maintenance processes. Therefore, the model must allow for the consideration of the 
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current operational information in order to provide an adapted and accurate result. This 
goes beyond the classical dependability modeling and assessment during design, for which 
a dependability specialist is available to calibrate the model for the relevant scenarios.  
As suggested in [Malek 2008], and applied in [Masci et al. 2011] to support 
interoperability between networked systems, dependability assessment should encompass 
the need to monitor and perform online assessment, considering online data for short term 
prediction in specific situations, instead of only the design phase assessment which 
considers the whole operational life for an average behavior prediction. Thus, for each 
mission that is to be achieved, one must consider its specificity and calibrate the model 
accordingly, before evaluating the likelihood of mission success. The actual possible 
scenarios of failures must be encompassed in order to provide suitable evaluations. 
Sensitivity with regard to non-critical combinations of failures that were not even evident 
during design could be observed in some situations. 
Therefore, the model will be integrating runtime information about the aircraft system 
component states and behavior, and the characteristics of the missions. The assessment 
will be mainly done by the aircraft operators, who are not necessarily dependability-
modeling specialists. As the developer of the model will not be always present at runtime, 
the dependability modeling and assessment framework must provide means to support the 
integration of the information.  
I.7 Conclusion 
The objective of the dissertation is to develop a model-based assessment framework, for 
aircraft operational dependability evaluation during its operations. Dependability concepts 
and evaluation techniques have been mainly developed to support critical systems 
construction and operation. Quite generic, but efficient techniques have been developed to 
assess or forecast the attainment of required level of service delivery. These techniques are 
widely applied during the design of aircraft in order to cover safety issues that may arise 
during their operation.  
During its operation, an aircraft has to achieve missions consisting of predetermined 
sequence of flights. Each flight is achieved considering requirements and procedures that 
are aimed at reducing the risk of critical malfunction during the flight. Scheduled 
maintenance activities that consist principally of various periodic checks, are also 
conducted to preserve the aircraft operational state. However, due to their nature, there are 
still some unforeseen failures leading to the necessity to accomplish unscheduled 
maintenance activities. The non-accommodation of an unscheduled maintenance with the 
planned mission results in an operational interruption, which may cause other disruptions 
in the airline activities. This is an important issue in today’s aviation industry, which is 
asking for competitiveness. 
Several works related to aircraft operational dependability assessment have been found in 
the literature, but they are rather concentrated on specific aspects that do not cover the 
need to continuously assess aircraft operational dependability in service, so as to enhance 
the delivery of service. Some of them are aimed at dealing with safety concerns. Safety 
represents an aspect that is regulated and is ensured through constraints included in the 
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operational requirements that must be satisfied during operation. The problem of avoiding 
unscheduled maintenance resulting in an interruption is also considered during the design 
of the aircraft. The approaches principally concern the dispatch reliability prediction and 
improvement. The corresponding predictions have to cover the whole operational life of 
the aircraft as scope. 
The operational research community has also been dealing with the reactive action to 
contain disruptions. Their researches are mainly aimed at resuming the initial operation 
schedule as quickly as possible, whilst minimizing the cost. Numerous approaches have 
been proposed, but these are still insufficient to meet today’s concerns. They are limited 
by the great complexity of the problem. The increasing demand in the aviation industry 
and the call for competiveness requires a support for the continuous analysis of aircraft 
operational dependability so as to take proactive measures. Model-based operational 
dependability analysis should play an important role in providing means for continuous 
assessment and objectives adjustment. 
Hence, our research study targets the development of a stochastic state-based model that 
allows for the assessment of aircraft operational dependability, during the aircraft 
operation, whenever it may be needed. During flight and maintenance planning, an 
assessment is done so as to support the selection of the solution that is in accordance with 
the operational capability of the aircraft and with other impacting conditions. After the 
occurrence of major events during a mission achievement, such as failures of presumed 
operational relevant components, the dependability is re-evaluated to assess the impact of 
the new conditions on the mission’s achievement.  
The work includes thus, as essential aspect of the construction of the model on which the 
assessment is based, the consideration of the assessment circumstances, which may 
require an adaptation of the model in order to take into account the characteristics of the 
current situation. This aspect concerns how to manage the model at run-time so as to 




II Modeling Approach and Assessment 
Framework 
This chapter aims at presenting the global modeling approach that is proposed in order to 
enable the aircraft dependability assessment during operation. The model construction 
requires an appropriate analysis that helps to cope with aircraft specificities and the issues 
related to the assessment during missions taking into account the information recorded 
during operation. As a result, the model construction process and the assessment in 
operation involve i) the development of a stochastic dependability model, based on a 
meta-model, and ii) the use of this stochastic dependability model to obtain a model 
integrating the current operational information and which is ready to be used for the 
assessment. We choose to base the construction of the model on a meta-model in order to 
provide a common basis standardizing models that may differ due to the particularities of 
the aircraft systems. The meta-model also represents a reference for getting an insight into 
the model at a high level of abstraction.  
The necessary basis for developing the modeling approach is firstly established. It presents 
the measures that are considered, the information to include in the model, and the 
dependability assessment framework. The approach to update the model so as to take into 
account changes during operation is also presented, as well as the model construction 
process. Subsequently, the model content specification is proposed, together with the main 
variables whose initial value may be affected by changes following an update of the 
model. Finally, we present the meta-model that represents the common basis for the 
construction of models corresponding to different aircraft. 
II.1 Establishing the Model 
Modeling complex systems dependability such as aircraft operational dependability needs 
to be handled with efficient techniques. This section establishes the basis of our modeling 
approach. For this purpose, the kinds of assessments the model can be used for are firstly 
defined. Subsequently, the categories of information that should be taken into account, in 
order to make the model representative of the aircraft operational situations, are identified. 
Based on the categories of information, a first model structure is derived. We consider an 
approach based on the concept of separation of concerns that consists in segregating the 
mission related information and the systems description. Major changes that may happen 
during operation, concerning the information, which must be taken into account in the 
model, are indentified. As shown in Figure II.1, these changes should result in an update 
of the operational dependability model, and a re-assessment of the dependability should be 
initiated if the change is relevant. The framework to monitor the changes, to capture the 
update data and to initiate the re-assessment is also given. The approach to update the 




Figure II.1 Changes and re-assessment during missions 
II.1.1 Measures to evaluate  
The ultimate use of the model will be during the aircraft operation. However, the model is 
intended to be built by the aircraft manufacturer during the aircraft development process. 
Our aim is also to make it possible to use the model for some development phase 
dependability analyses. The analyses generally carried out by an aircraft manufacturer 
concern principally failure effect analysis based on stepwise discrete event simulations 
([Kehren et al. 2004] for instance). The analyses also include the generation of sequences 
and cut-sets of events that may lead to the loss of given functions. The reliabilities of these 
functions are also evaluated. Therefore, the proposed model will allow for the evaluation 
of the reliability and availability measures of the high level functions of the aircraft 
system. 
For the dependability assessment considering the in-operation conditions, the objective is 
to evaluate the probability of occurrence of the adverse events that may lead to an 
operational interruption. Such events principally result from the non-fulfillment of the 
requirements that must be satisfied in order to achieve the missions. Therefore, we adopt 
an approach based on the operational requirements fulfillment. 
The aircraft has to fulfill specific dispatch and in-flight requirements in order to succeed 
the achievement of the mission. We particularly distinguish:  
• The minimal system requirements (Min_Sys_R) that are independent of the mission 
profile and that must be fulfilled to operate the aircraft whatever the mission. 
Min_Sys_R is principally made of the requirements necessary to avoid the MEL 
conditions that may result in a No-Go (I.4.2.2). 
• The mission profile requirements (M_Prof_R) that are specific to given mission 
profiles.  
Based on these defined requirements, we distinguish two principal reliability measures: 
• While planning a mission, the aircraft system reliability (SR) is evaluated with 
regard to Min_Sys_R in order to determine the maximum number of flight hours 
that can be achieved without maintenance, whilst ensuring a given minimum 
reliability threshold. This is used to determine the length of the mission or to plan 
maintenance activities. 
• Once a mission is assigned to the aircraft and during its achievement, the reliability 
measure (MR) which corresponds to the probability to achieve the mission without 
the occurrence of a technical event leading to an operational interruption, is 
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evaluated with regard to Min_Sys_R and M_Prof_R in order to determine whether 
a preventive action must be initiated or not. 
Additionally, in order to obtain quick results in some situations, one may analyze only the 
reliability of a given aircraft function that is identified to be critical for the mission. The 
next subsection presents an overview of the relevant information to be considered in the 
model so as to assess these measures. 
II.1.2 Model content 
To cover the aircraft operational dependability issues, one has to identify the relevant 
types of information involved in the aircraft operability. We consider design phase 
information together with the necessary information in service. 
During the aircraft design phase, model-based safety analyses are conducted for the 
verification of the compliance with safety requirements and the establishment of the 
Master MEL. The analyses follow the aircraft functional decomposition in earlier design 
phases and the aircraft breakdown structure when the systems are completely designed. 
The analyses contain an important qualitative part. For that, the architectures of the 
subsystems supporting the aircraft functions are used together with results of FMEA 
(chapter I, section I.3.1.1) to build dependability models. The subsystems architectures 
provide the structural dependencies between their basic components and the inputs from 
FMEA provide the component fault models. The models constructed include fault trees 
and mostly models based on high-level description formalisms such as AltaRica. The 
models are used to analyze specific functional conditions that are safety relevant.  
For an operational dependability assessment, all the functional conditions that may be 
required during the different phases of the missions must be taken into account in the 
model. The model must also incorporate maintenance information since maintenance 
activities may be possible during the missions’ achievement. Therefore, the aircraft 
system, the mission profile and maintenance (scheduled and provisions for unscheduled) 
represent the main information sources that should be considered for the establishment of 
the model content. Requirements necessary for the correct achievement of the missions are 
also considered in order to define the concordance with the functional state of the system. 
One may additionally consider weather factors, but this type of information is rather 
dependent on the operator appreciation, than on the monitoring sources that will provide 
information to configure the model during operation. Moreover, the description of the 
impact of weather condition is beyond the scope of our work, and the related information 
needed in the model is simply reduced to whether it is favorable or not.  
Figure II.2 gives an overview structuring the relevant categories of information considered 
for the model construction.  
Mission profile: It is composed of information related to the succession of periods during 
which the aircraft is either flying or on ground. The mission profile information can be 
obtained from the flight scheduling process. 
Requirements: they consist of the aggregation of the requirements from the potential 
contributors to the successful achievement and the continuity of the mission. These 
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requirements express the aircraft system functional availability and the constraints related 
to the mission considered. They can be obtained from the policies defined in the MEL, the 
Flight Crew Operating Manual (FCOM) and the Quick reference handbook (QRH). 
  
Figure II.2 Categories of information 
System Behavior: It concerns the aircraft system components. The description of their 
failure scenarios and maintenance represents a fundamental point in the whole model 
construction. The aircraft is made of subsystems, integrating components, which support 
the accomplishment of different important functions as described in section I.4.1 of 
chapter I. The subsystems architectures and their FMEA will be considered together with 
the components maintainability information. 
Maintenance: It concerns the maintenance possibilities at the various airports involved in 
the mission profile. The defined maintenance strategy, which determines the maintenance 
resources at the airports, has an impact on the maintenance time of the system components 
at a given stop.  
The approach is to collect information from the different components that take part in the 
aircraft operational dependability in order to form a global model. The structure of Figure 
II.2 reflects thus the acquisition of data, from the different relevant components of the 
aircraft operability, as pieces of the model.  
From a global viewpoint, the model is structured based on a separation of the concerns. 
Considering the assessment objectives, one can find out that the mission profile and 
maintenance information are not required in every case. The system reliability can be 
assessed with regard to minimal requirements without considering any mission dependent 
information. Therefore, two main parts are considered in the model construction:  
• the system related information, referred to as the core model; 
• the operational information, which integrates the mission profile and the 
maintenance strategy, referred to as mission dependent model. 
The model is thus the composition of a core model that is based on the system 
components description, and a mission dependent model that is based on the mission 
profile related information and which may be removed or changed without affecting the 
ability to use the core model for dependability assessment. Figure II.3 shows the model 




Figure II.3 The operational dependability model composition 
The internal interface between the core and mission dependent models represents the 
requirements to be fulfilled during the mission, and the ongoing mission phase 
information that should be shared by the two parts of the model. 
It is worth noting that the two main parts can also be decomposed into sub models. Both 
parts can be subject to updates following changes during operations.  
II.1.3 Major changes to be accounted for 
We have identified three kinds [Tiassou et al. 2011a; Tiassou et al. 2012c] of major 
changes that may take place during the achievement of an aircraft mission and which may 
require the operational reliability reassessment. They are summarized hereafter. 
• C1: Changes in the state of system components: they correspond to the case 
where for example a system component has failed during the achievement of the 
mission (we assume that this failure does not impact safety, otherwise the mission 
is interrupted).  
•  C2: Changes in failure distributions of the components: they mainly concern 
the case where new failure rates or distributions have been prognosticated for the 
system components, during the duration of the mission. 
•  C3: Changes in mission profile: A mission profile is characterized by the number 
of flights, the ground periods, the flight phases and their sequencing. Due to 
external events such as weather conditions or failures in other aircraft, a mission 
profile that is completely different of the previous one may be assigned to the 
aircraft. The new mission profile may come with new requirements. Changing the 
mission profile also implies changes in maintenance facilities available at the 
various stops (or destinations), as well as in the mean time to repair the failed 
components or the repair time distribution itself.  
Data from different sources will help to notify the changes. The notifications of the 
changes will lead to an update of the dependability model with the up-to-date information. 
The reliability measure is then re-assessed by processing the obtained model. 
II.1.4 In operation assessment framework  
For the integration of the up-to-date information into the model, our framework for the 
dependability assessment in operation consists in relying on data provided by on-board 
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modules that will be monitoring the aircraft system, and on data from the operations 
planning. An assessment manager will validate the data and determine its relevance before 
its integration into the model for the dependability assessment. Figure II.4 shows an 
overview of the proposed in-operation model-based dependability assessment framework. 
A diagnosis module together with a prognosis module will be running during the aircraft 
operation in order to provide indication about the current state and the up-to-date failure 
distribution characterizing the future behavior of the components. 
Diagnoses are based on analyses of the symptoms observed during the system operation. 
The analysis attempts to determine for each system component, the operational state that is 
coherent with the observed symptoms. The diagnosis is firstly performed locally, at each 
component level, then the resulting information is merged taking into account the 
interaction between the components [Ribot 2009]. The indication provided by the on-
board diagnosis may not give firm information on the failure of the components. The 
failed components may be diagnosed with a certain uncertainty. The information must 
then be confirmed by further investigation of the maintenance crew. Nevertheless, the 
indication provided by the on-board diagnosis module can be used for a dependability 
assessment that provides information for preliminary decisions. The assessment will be 
refined after the troubleshooting task of the maintenance crew. 
 
Figure II.4 In operation assessment framework 
Prognoses are also based on analyses of a set of observations. According to [Ribot 2009], 
a prognosis consists in forecasting the system future sequence of states. The future 
behavior is described in terms of probability. It is worth to mention that most of the 
studies in the literature concentrate on the prediction of the Remaining Useful Life (RUL) 
of system components and equipments [Jardine et al. 2006]. The prognosis can also 
provide an estimation of the mean time to failure. For the purpose of the in-operation 
assessment, we will be using characteristics of the failure distribution functions that 
govern the system components’ behavior.  
The diagnosis and prognosis modules can be run either automatically by embedded control 
systems, or occasionally by the operator.   
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Data about the missions and maintenance planning is also accessible. In the operations 
scheduling process, there is primary an initial planning that defines the timing, the origins 
and destinations of the flights; and then the execution of the planning on a daily basis 
[Clarke and Naryadi 1995; Clausen et al. 2010]. Therefore, based on the initial planning, 
one can have the timeline giving general information about the aircraft mission, and 
detailed information can be gotten on day-to-day basis.  
The assessment manager examines the data from these sources and requests the integration 
into the model via a model update interface. The assessment manager also determines the 
relevance of the notified changes of data in order to decide on the necessity to proceed to 
re-assessment, so as to obtain the up-to-date dependability measure. The assessment 
manager can correspond to a human operator or to an automatic algorithm (or probably to 
a mix of both). The evaluation can be done either at the operator’s request or automatically 
in order to notify the operator of changes that may affect the ability to continue the 
mission. 
The operational dependability model should be flexible to cover the main characteristics 
of the aircraft system and operation conditions. It also has to be tractable enough for 
efficient processing during the missions’ achievement. The model will be built based on 
high-level formalisms in order to benefit from their great expressiveness.  
The assessment engine shall implement algorithms that are capable of processing the 
heterogeneity of contents that will result from the different cases of model update, 
especially the different stochastic processes that may characterize the components. 
Furthermore, offline extensions of the model can be considered and as the model will be 
covering as many situations as possible, it should be possible to define additional 
measures to be evaluated when needed. The assessment engine must be extensible so as to 
integrate the capability of processing extensions of the model, including new 
dependability measures definition. 
Updating and processing the model can be performed either onboard or on ground, even 
while the aircraft is still in flight, without waiting for the aircraft landing, in order to 
obtain as early as possible the new assessment results (i.e., the dependability measure). 
Dedicated centers with high processing capabilities can also be considered for the prompt 
delivery of the assessment results. Globally, the update is possible by someone or a 
process that is informed that there are changes requiring a model update, and that is able to 
easily integrate the changes. 
The in-operation assessment framework gives an overview of the interacting components 
involved in the extraction of up to date information for the assessment during the 
missions’ achievement. Our work is more concerned by the model construction and how 
the model will integrate the current operational information. The final model obtained, 
which reflects the current situation in operation, is denoted as the up-to-date model.  
II.1.5 Model construction and update process 
The dependability model should allow for an easy and efficient model update and 
processing. The easiness of the update depends on the model content and the means 
provided for the adaptation to the current situation. Therefore, the approach to update the 
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operational dependability model should be determinant in the model construction 
approach. We propose an update approach that should require only basic actions. The 
model construction process is established accordingly. 
II.1.5.1 The approach to the model update  
Model update and adaptation to an operational situation may involve parameters tuning, 
model composition based on sub-models or model reconstruction. Parameter tuning 
concerns the modification of the initial value of basic variables. Model composition based 
on sub-models involves the selection of sub-models that should be combined in order to 
obtain the model adapted to the current operational situation. Model reconstruction is 
needed when the adaptation to the operational situation requires a deep modification of the 
model content, or includes behavior representations that are not considered in the previous 
existing model. However, a deep modification of the model content may require a 
specialized modeling analysis that could not be carried out in real time. Therefore, model 
reconstruction should be considered only if it is possible to carry out the specialized 
analysis in real time. 
For our particular case, the update of the model should not require the presence of 
modeling specialists. It should be possible to update the model from outside, without 
necessitating a deep knowledge of the model. The model update should not require the 
knowledge of the underlying modeling technique and formalism used. Also, the model 
should be tractable enough to provide quick results whilst covering as many situations as 
possible.  
As a consequence, the approach consists in building and validating a stochastic model for 
which the essential operational information can be entered based on parameter tuning. 
Indeed, the model content cannot be deeply modified during the update, due to the fact 
that it may require an analysis by a specialist. Only basic actions should be done for the 
update and adaptation of the model. Nevertheless, model composition based on predefined 
sub-models can be considered if necessary, since the composition process can be 
automated. Therefore, if some operational situations cannot be reflected by tuning the 
stochastic dependability model, predefined sub-models may be used to capture them. The 
stochastic dependability model is configured for a default situation. 
II.1.5.2 The model construction process overview 
The determinant aspect of the model construction process, which has been dealt with 
above, concerns the update and adaptation of the model to the current situation during 
operation. Accordingly, the model construction consists in developing a stochastic 
dependability model (also referred to as stochastic model), configured for a default 
situation and which can capture other situations based on parameter tuning. 
Furthermore, since the same type of model will be used for supporting operation planning 
for several families of aircraft from the same manufacturer, it is important to follow an 
harmonized procedure to build the stochastic model for several families of aircraft in order 




Therefore, we decided to establish a common basis to support the model construction, 
based on a general specification (i.e., a meta-model) consisting in a structured 
representation of the information that will compose the stochastic model. The meta-model 
is an abstracted representation of the final models, by means of analyzing the relevant 
elements to be modeled. It structures the information about the aircraft system, its possible 
missions and maintenance policies. 
Figure II.5 presents the overall model construction and update process. A specialized 
dependability analyst, with the help of aircraft system manufacturers and specialists of 
aircraft operations and maintenance, establishes the meta-model. 
!!
Figure II.5 Operational dependability model construction process 
The meta-model is used to build the stochastic model using the aircraft specific 
information. The meta-model can facilitate the model construction since models can be 
partly generated automatically based on meta-models. In addition to supporting the model 
construction, it also represents a basis, for the non-specialists that will use the model 
during operation, to have an insight into the general content of the model.  
Before the presentation of the meta-model, the model is firstly specified based on a 
description of its content as presented in [Tiassou et al. 2012a]. The specification gives an 
insight into the model content as traditionally described by dependability modeling 
formalisms. We also highlight the variables that may be affected by changes during 
operation.  
II.2 Model Content Specification 
The specification concerns the two major parts of the model: the core model and the 
mission dependent model. The main variables, whose values may be affected in case of 
changes in operation, are highlighted at the end of the section. 
II.2.1 The Core model  
The core model, mainly dedicated to the aircraft systems description, is specified 
considering:  
! their components, 
! the interdependencies between the components, 
! the functions delivered by the system, 
! the applicable dependability requirements. 
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The simplified hydraulic power supply subsystem presented in Figure II.6 is considered to 
illustrate the description.  
 
Figure II.6 Simplified hydraulic power supply subsystem 
It is composed of a reservoir of fluid, a pressurization pump and an actuator, connected by 
pipes. 
System component (SysComponent): Each system component Cl is characterized by:  
! its identifier (id) ; it will help in managing the component update. 
! its state Variables (stateVars). 
! the Events it may be subjected to. 
A state of a component Cl, let’s say ClS, may take different values identified as its domain 
ClSD. ClSD can be decomposed into two domains ClSD = Operational (ClSO) ! Failed 
(ClSF).  
Usually, at least two distinct states are associated to each component: ClSD = {ok, failed}. 
The pump, for example, is characterized by a health state (which can be ok, lost or 
leaking) and an actuation state (which is either ON or OFF).  
There may be several kinds of events Ei related to a system component but the main 
events for our case are Failure and Maintenance events. The Failure and Maintenance 
events lead to a change of the state variable value from ClSO to Cl,SF, and from ClSF to 
ClSO respectively.  
For instance, the pump can be subject to the failure event loss that changes the health state 
from ok to lost, and the failure event leak that changes the health state from ok to leaking. 
The events are also characterized by the durations until their occurrences, using a 
probabilistic distribution. Accordingly,  
! a distribution Fdistr characterizes the failure event occurrence,  
! a distribution Mdistr characterizes the maintenance activities duration.  
Generally, exponential distributions are assumed for these events, characterized 
respectively by failure rate " and repair rate µ, which are Parameters used in the 
distribution description. For instance, the failure rate of the pump loss can be 10-6 per 
flight hour. 
Functions and dependencies:  
The system provides Functions that are necessary for the aircraft operation. The 
availability of each Function is derived from the analysis of the availability of the system 
components contributing to its implementation. Concretely, apart from its identification 
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name or number, a function is characterized by its state, which is defined by a conditional 
function based on the system components state and other basic function states.  
Hence, one can use the following expression for the definition of the basic functions 
provided by the system: 
fb= = g (C1S, C2S, … CnkS); 
where C1S, C2S, … CnkS are the variables representing the state information of the 
components involved in the accomplishment of fb, g is a conditional function formulating 
the relation between the components states and the function fb. 
The state information of high-level functions, depending on other functions can be 
formulated as follows: 
 fh.  = g (C1S, C2S, … fb1, fb2, …). 
A component behavior description, especially the Failure event, may use the state 
information of a Function in its description. It may also use other components’ state 
information in its behavior description. The information provided represents Dependency 
information that may be used in the component description. The Dependency information 
is characterized similarly to Functions, with  
stateInfo= g (C1S, C2S, … f1, f2, …). 
The dependency information may be obtained from qualitative data such as FMEA data 
and failure propagation scenarios that are produced during design phase analyses. The 
FMEA identifies the effects of the failure events, which determine dependencies between 
the components. For example, as consequence of a leak in Pipe1, the pump may have no 
input fluid and will be lost if its actuation state is ON.  
Requirements: 
Based on the functions and the components’ states one can express requirements 
associated with the dependability measure to assess. The requirements can be expressed 
using Boolean expressions, based on state variables, representing the combination of 
functions or system components that need to be available for the attainment of the 
assessment goal.  
Min_Sys_R is defined accordingly. The requirements, defined by a Boolean expression, 
are determined by the availability of some required functions f1, f2, … fnf :  
Min_Sys_R =f (f1, f2, … fnf). 
II.2.2 The Mission dependent model 
The mission dependent model is intended to capture the Mission profile, its specific 




We describe the sequence of flights composing the mission profile, and their appropriate 
decomposition into phases. 
The actual execution of a flight is subjected to the success of its prior preparation 
activities. Indeed, the decision to dispatch may be conditioned by the success of required 
maintenance activities as described in section I.4.2.2 of chapter I. Moreover, as the 
ultimate goal is to help in reducing operational disruption due to technical problems, the 
ability to achieve the activities and get ready for the execution of the flight should be 
considered. Therefore, the complete successful achievement of a flight consists of the 
success of Ground period activities, prior to the flight, and the success in executing the 
flight itself. Figure II.7 illustrates the decomposition into Ground period and flight period. 
 
Figure II.7 Mission profile representation 
Let Gp denote a Ground period and Fp the Flight execution period. The couple CF =(Gp, 
Fp) or CF = Gp •  Fp represents the Complete flight achievement process, from the flight 
preparation activities to the flight end. In the following, the operator “•” symbolizes a 
succession of activities or periods.  
A mission profile Mp composed of n flights is formulated as follows: 
! 
Mp = •i=1..nCFi = •i=1..n (Gpi,Fpi) . 
Each flight period Fp is decomposed into Phases that are distinguished by the system 
functionalities required for their success. Assuming that a given number p of Phases is 
identified for each flight, we have Fp= Ph1 •  Ph2 •  … Php. The order of the Phases in the 
notation is important in the sense that the Phases are achieved successively. Each Phase 
Phj has a duration determined by a Duration distribution DPhj that may be deterministic. 
Let I denote the occurrence of an interruption during the mission. I might occur during a 
Flight period or a Ground period.  
The interruption of a flight is defined as the interruption of one of its Phases. A Phase 
interruption is defined as the loss of its Requirements fulfillment when the phase is 
ongoing. The requirements fulfillment of a Phase Phi is represented by a Boolean variable 
RPhi, which indicates whether the requirements are fulfilled or not.  
At each Ground period, it should be ensured that the aircraft meets the Requirements in 
order to achieve the next flight, and some activities should complete before departure 
time; otherwise a delay may occur. A ground period can consist of: i) scheduled 
maintenance (SM) activities and other ground activities (OGA) or ii) scheduled 
maintenance activities extended by unscheduled maintenance (UM) activities, followed by 
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the other ground activities. It is noteworthy that the duration of an unscheduled 
maintenance period UM corresponds to the time needed to perform the maintenance 
activities, which are taken into account in the core model as events associated to the 
affected components. 
Accordingly, each ground period can be represented by the succession of the 
corresponding activities: Gp=SM •  UM •  OGA. SM and OGA have an associated duration 
determined by a distribution function, which depends on the considered location. The 
extension of an SM activity with an UM activity depends on the operational state of the 
system and the necessity to undertake maintenance activities. An UM activity generally 
takes place when the dispatch requirements (denoted DR) are not met. It is generally 
dedicated to the repair of the critical system components that are needed to perform the 
flight. A ground period has a deterministic planned duration pd(Gp), which indicates the 
maximum time beyond which a delay or a cancellation of the flight is considered.  
Mission requirements 
The requirements to be satisfied for the successful achievement of the missions take into 
account the decomposition of the mission profile into successive flight and ground 
periods. The successful accomplishment of the phases Phj of a flight is conditioned by the 
availability of a group of functions f1, f2, … fnj delivered by the aircraft system, defined in 
the core model. Thus, the availability of these functions corresponds to the requirements to 
be satisfied during each phase in order to ensure the successful evolution of the flight. 
These requirements, denoted as RPhi, can also be expressed through the identification of 
the combination of function losses that would lead to the interruption of the flight phase. 
The requirements associated to a given mission composed of n flight cycles result from the 
aggregation of the requirements associated to each flight of the mission. For a given flight 
CFi, DRi and RPhj=1..p are the requirements related to ground and flight phases. For 
dispatch requirement DRi, the required functions are almost the same whatever the flight 
to be achieved. The required combinations of functions, needed for every flight, are 
defined by Min_Sys_R. M_Prof_DRi expresses the additional requirements that are 
specific to the mission profile under investigation. These mission profile specific 
requirements can be related to the availability of some functions and to the achievement of 
the maintenance activities (Ma) required to dispatch the flight, if any. Accordingly,  
M_Prof _DRi =f (f1, f2, … fnf, Ma); 
DRi= Min_Sys_R  #  M_Prof _DRi. 
Maintenance achievement: 
Maintenance activities at each ground period are characterized by the resources available 
such as spares and technicians. A logistic delay function LDFGp can be used to determine 
the additional delay that the ability to have the facilities necessary for the maintenance 
tasks at the considered ground period Gp, may add on the nominal maintenance duration. 
A maintenance strategy should also be defined with a priority level associated to each 
component in order to determine the order of the maintenance activities when several 
components are failed. 
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The model content specification also helps in highlighting the major variables that may be 
affected by changes, without referring to the specificity of the ultimate formalism that will 
be used to build the model.  
II.2.3 Main variables that may be affected  
The main variables, whose values may be affected by changes, are presented considering 
the categories of information presented in Figure II.2 and which were fundamentally used 
to establish the model content.  
Mission profile: From the mission dependent model description, it appears that the 
definition of a mission profile requires the knowledge of the number n of flights 
composing the mission, the phases composing each flight and their durations, the ground 
period activities durations, and the sequencing of the ground and flight phases. The 
duration of the ground period activities, beyond which the flight is interrupted, is also 
necessary. The changes may then concern the number n of flights, the parameters of each 
flight, and the ground period parameters. The parameters of a flight are the duration 
distribution of the phases DPh1, DPh2, … DPhp. For a ground period, the parameters 
concern the total duration allocated to the ground activities pdGp, the estimation of 
scheduled maintenance activities (SM) and the other activities (OGA) durations. These 
durations are obtained using estimated values given whether by an operator, or based on 
historical data. These changes only concern basic parameter changes.  
Requirements: When the mission profile changes, the functions required for the 
achievement of the flights in the new mission profile may change. That is for each flight 
Fp in the new profile, the required functions allowing it and those required for each of its 
phases (RPhj=1..p) may be different. The specification of the requirements consists in 
defining combinations of predefined aircraft functions. The requirements can be specified 
by selection of predefined ones or combination established by the operator, based on well-
known aircraft functions. It will be, however, very unlikely to change the requirements 
initially expressed in the model.  
Maintenance: Changing the mission profile also implies changes in maintenance facilities 
available at the various stops (or destinations). The changes concern the logistic delay 
functions LDFGp related to the ground periods involved in the mission profile. These may 
be obtained based on historical maintenance data related to the ground periods. 
System behavior: It appears from the core model description that the relevant 
characteristics that define a system component are its state, its failure and maintenance 
duration distributions. Thus, the changes may concern the components initial state ClS, 
and their failure and maintenance distribution (Fdistrl, Mdistrl). For the state of the 
components, it consists in changing its current initial value to another value of its domain 
ClSD. The impact on the global model is just the change of its initial configuration. For the 
failure and maintenance distributions, it consists in considering a new distribution function 
or new values for the distribution function parameters, in order to have a better fitting of 
the current event occurrence distribution. 
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Changes affecting the system concern the core model update and those related to the 
mission profile, including the requirement and the maintenance facilities, concern the 
mission dependent model.  
Concluding comment 
It is worth remembering that the model is intended to be used during the aircraft operation 
for dependability assessment. Accordingly some information in the model may need to be 
updated in order to consider up to date information for the assessment. This constraint 
greatly impacts the granularity of the model specification.  
Based on the model content description, which helps to highlight the main variables that 
may be affected by changes from an up-to-date model to another one, we develop the 
meta-model, which will be used as a basis for the construction of the operational 
dependability model. The meta-model is an abstraction that structures the data to be 
included in the model. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the dependability assessment requires concrete models 
using an appropriate formalism. The concrete model may include more details than the 
information presented in the specification. Especially, the internal decomposition into 
atomic model components and the representation of the dependencies, so as to facilitate 
the model processing, depend on the modeling formalism and, thus, may be differently 
implemented. The meta-model will highlight the elements that are needed to implement 
the concrete model, but will keep a sufficient level of abstraction with respect to the 
targeted modeling formalisms. 
II.3 The Meta-model 
Meta-modeling consists in abstracting a given category of models. It consists in defining 
the type of data that must be included in the models, their structuring, and the constraints 
that they must comply with. In the context of our work, the meta-model structures the 
elements defined in the model specification to give a high-level overview of their 
relationship.  
II.3.1 Meta-modeling means 
Meta-modeling has been the purpose of an Object Management Group (OMG) standard, 
Meta-Object Facility – MOF [OMG 2010]. MOF is a framework that provides means for 
meta-models representations, and interface specifications for the corresponding models 
manipulation. MOF is based on a hierarchical meta-modeling paradigm [Karagiannis and 
Kühn 2002]. The hierarchy is structured into four layers, listed hereafter from the higher 
level to the lower level.  
• M3: meta-meta-model layer 
• M2: meta-model layer 
• M1: model layer 
• M0: real objects or run-time objects layer 
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The underlying philosophy is that every meta-model is after all a model and, thus, can be 
abstracted to another meta-model which becomes a meta-meta-model for the initial model. 
In this hierarchy established for both models and meta-models representation, the elements 
of a given layer are represented using the features provided by its immediate higher layer. 
MOF is designed to be the top layer (M3) in the meta-modeling hierarchy. As MOF 
belongs to the top layer, it is a self-describing formalism. There are two definitions of 
MOF: a basic definition called the Essential MOF (EMOF) and a complete definition 
called Complete MOF (CMOF). 
The open source project Eclipse has also developed for a purpose of model driven 
engineering support, a modeling framework, named Eclipse Modeling Framework (EMF) 
[Griffin 2003], that includes means (Ecore) for meta-modeling. EMF is conceptually very 
similar to MOF [Gerber and Raymond 2003]. Both are based on the concepts of classes 
with attributes and operations. They principally use UML class diagram features for the 
meta-model representation. MOF is a meta-modeling standard and EMF can be seen as a 
platform specific implementation [Gardner 2003].  
Our meta-model is developed based on EMF since it is implicitly supported by the 
existing and well-known platform Eclipse. The main features of EMF are presented in 
Figure II.8, which shows their graphical representation. 
 
Figure II.8 Ecore features 
EClass: represents an abstraction of a model element, characterized by some given 
attributes and operations, respectively named EAttribute and EOperation.  
EReference: represents an oriented relationship between two objects. In a software-
modeling viewpoint, it represents the fact that the objects of the source EClass have 
properties that are references to objects of the destination EClass. In our case, the 
orientation indicates that the source object uses information of the destination object. An 
EReference can be declared containment, expressing the fact that the destination object is 
completely part of the source object. An EReference is graphically represented by an 
arrow. 
Inheritance: represents a relationship between two EClass, defining the source EClass as 
a particular subtype of the destination EClass. An Inheritance is graphically represented by 
an open-headed arrow. 
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The following presents the meta-model proposed for the operational dependability model 
construction. The description is based on the two major model parts. 
II.3.2 The core meta-model  
The meta-model for the system behavior description is shown in Figure II.9.  
The system components representations are abstracted with the EClass SysComponent. As 
presented in the formal description, the representation of a system component is 
characterized by its identifier (id), its state variables (stateVars) and the events it may be 
subjected to.  
 
Figure II.9 The System meta-model 
Several state variables may be used in the description of a component. An EClass Variable 
is defined to abstract them. A Variable has a name, a domain, which defines the possible 
values that results from the changes of the component state, and a value (initialValue) that 
will correspond to its initialization in the model. 
For the events related to a component, Failure and Maintenance events are distinguished 
as they represent the main events. An Event is described by its name, the guard 
representing the condition under which it may happen, the effect representing the changes 
in the state of the system after its occurrence, and the occurrence delay distribution (time 
to occurrence distribution: TTOdistrib). TTOdistrib is an object of the EClass 
DurationDistrib, which is aimed at representing the distribution law followed by the 
duration spent in a given situation. The distribution is described by the name of the 
distribution law (distribLaw - e.g., exponential, weibull, deterministic) and its 
distribParams, which are abstracted based on the EClass Parameter. A distribution 
Parameter is characterized by its name and a value. 
As mentioned in the specification of section II.2.1, it is necessary to express dependencies 
between the components. Concretely, a component may have to use other component 
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attribute values in its behavior description. In this case, either the attribute value is directly 
accessible, or the value is obtained via an intermediate object, which makes the link 
between the two components. This is abstracted by the EClass Dependency, which is 
intended to combine information from different components, based on a conditional 
function (relation). The resulting information (stateInfo) corresponds to the dependency 
information that can be used in the dependent component behavior description. The 
Functions delivered by the system components are also specified as a particular case of 
Dependency, since the state information of a Function is also derived based on the states 
of its contributing components.  
The functions, as well as the system components state information, are used to define 
requirements related to the system. Figure II.10 shows the features for the requirements 
specification. 
A requirement is a constraint related to a part of the system or the mission profile, which 
must be satisfied in order to succeed in achieving a given part of the mission. It is 
abstracted by the EClass Requirement and is characterized by i) a reference that is an 
identifier, which may be used to reference the same requirement in different situations, ii) 
a Boolean variable status that will indicate whether the requirement is satisfied or not, and 
iii) a constraint or a Boolean expression. The Boolean expression formulates a condition, 
involving the system components and function states, that needs to be satisfied otherwise 
an interruption may occur during the mission achievement. It can be based on combination 
of other requirements. 
 
Figure II.10 Feature for requirement specification 
Requirements that do not require any particular information from the mission profile can 
be expressed as part of the core model. Also every kind of requirements or system 
information that might be necessary in defining a mission profile is represented so as to 
facilitate other specific requirements expression when needed. 
The resulting core model can be used for a stepwise simulation of the system behavior. 
The corresponding model in AltaRica can also be used to generate cut sets corresponding 
to events that may lead to the loss of a given function or the non-fulfillment of some 
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defined requirements. There is no need to set the time to occurrence distribution 
(TTOdistrib) objects associated to the events for the cut set generation. They are however 
needed if one wants to compute quantitative measure. The core model, set with these 
objects, can be used to evaluate the probability to operate the system, according to some 
given requirements, during a given time, known as reliability measure. 
II.3.3 The mission dependent meta-model 
Figure II.11 shows the meta-model for the representation of the mission profile 
information. A mission profile is defined by a given number (NbFlights) of sequenced 
flights to be achieved, and the related maintenance strategy.  
 
Figure II.11 Mission profile meta-model 
For the achievement of each flight, as presented in the specification of subsection II.2.2, a 
Ground Period to get ready for the flight, and a Flight Period that consists in the actual 
execution of the flight are distinguished. The whole process to achieve the flight is named 
a CompleteFlight.  
The ground period precedes the flight period and is composed of the description of the 
activities (GroundActivity) that are achieved on ground until departure clearance. The 
ground activities are characterized by their denomination and duration. The duration may 
be probabilistically distributed.  
The Flight Period is decomposed into different Phases based on the requirement that must 
be fulfilled. A flight Phase is also characterized by a denomination, a duration and 
additional information (adInfo) that might be necessary in the requirements definition.  
As the mission profile is decomposed into a sequence of periods and phases, an Eclass 
Sequenced is defined to represent their common characteristics, which are the identifier 
!"#$%$&'(!)*+$&(#),&-!$+-#&.#-#(/!0!"!1)2+-3.&4+2!&**$)&%5!&,2!%&4+!4(62#+4!
! 52 
(id) and the attribute execState. The attribute execState will indicate whether the 
corresponding part of the mission is in its achievement state. The information of the 
mission part that is being achieved is transmitted to the core model based on the Eclass 
CurrentProcess. The information concerns the type of mission part (ground period or 
flight phase), the flight phase identifier (FPhase) if it is a flight phase, the maintenance 
authorization information if it is a ground period. CurrentProcess will be used to create an 
interfacing object between the core and the mission dependent models. 
On ground the operational state of the system is tested against dispatch requirements (DR), 
which are the synthesis of the MEL. DR corresponds to Min_Sys_R if there is no specific 
mission requirement. The maintenance activities are such that they cannot be considered 
completed if the dispatch requirements related to the system state are not met. The success 
of a ground period is determined by the completion of its activities within its planned 
duration (plannedDuration). The success of a flight is determined by the success of its 
phases’ achievement. A phase is successfully accomplished if its related requirements are 
met during its achievement. 
The achievement of the maintenance activities depends on the availability of adequate 
logistics in the considered ground period. A maintenance Station is associated to each 
ground period and the dependence is taken into account by considering a probability 
distribution characterizing the time needed to get ready for the corresponding maintenance 
activities. For example a logistic delay function (LDF) is specified to take into account the 
delay in supporting the activities. LDF is a subclass of DurationDistrib (Figure II.9). 
Types of maintenance station, such as main-base and outstation, can be used to categorize 
them. The tasks are done considering a Prioritization in the repair of the failures. Figure 
II.12 shows the corresponding features. 
 
Figure II.12 Meta-model features for maintenance related information representation 
The complete instantiation of the mission dependent meta-model, as a model, requires in-
operation information. Different scenarios of flight decompositions or maintenance 
strategy may be considered. A flight is basically considered as a sequence of phases. 
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Flights integrating possible choices of phases (contingency phases to cope with 
degradations for example) resulting in a complex profile may be considered. The mission 
profiles may also be similar. The mission dependent model obtained is composed with the 
core model based on the requirements to fulfill during the mission achievement.  
II.3.4 Concluding comment 
The meta-model is an abstraction aimed at defining features for the model construction. 
The attributes of the classes defined may be enriched with other specific information. The 
graphical representation, provided based on the Ecore meta-modeling means, is very 
convenient for an easy overview of the model content. The corresponding models will 
consist in a representation using instances of the components described and considering 
their relationship. The meta-model can also be used to build models for different purposes. 
The models can be built only based on a particular subsystem, or it can be built 
considering several subsystems. 
II.4  Conclusion 
The modeling approach concerns aircraft operational dependability assessment during its 
operation. The model is expected to deal with the dynamic evolution of the system 
behavior, its mission profile and maintenance activities, so as to produce accurate results 
for short-term operations. Given the complexity of current aircraft systems and the 
challenge related to the model update and dependability re-assessment during operation, it 
is necessary to carefully consider establishing a convenient approach to the operational 
dependability assessment.  
We have determined the relevant categories of information to be considered, and the 
changes that should require an update and adaptation of the model in order to make it 
consistent with the current situation in operation. The update of the model should not 
require the presence of modeling specialists.  
The adopted modeling approach consists in constructing a stochastic dependability model, 
based on a meta-model that represents a common basis for the construction of models 
corresponding to different types of aircraft. The model that is adapted to the current 
situation in operation, referred to as up-to-date model, is obtained by a parameterization of 
the stochastic model. 
Based on the relevant categories of information that must be considered, two major parts 
have been identified in the model; the model content is specified respecting these parts. 
The overall content is described together with the meta-model, which highlights the model 
components and structure. The major changes from an up-to-date model to another one are 
also analyzed.  
The proposed modeling approach encompasses the use of the model for safety analyses as 
well as for operational dependability analyses. The core model is especially designed to 
capture qualitative data such as the FMEA results that are involved in safety analyses. In 
this chapter, we emphasize on the use of the model during operation for dependability 
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assessment, as it represents a new application context of aircraft dependability assessment, 
that deserves a particular attention. 
The stochastic model can be built based on an appropriate dependability modeling 
formalism. The AltaRica formalism and the stochastic activity network formalism, two 
suitable formalisms, are examined in the next chapter. 
!!
!
III Model Construction Based on AltaRica and 
Stochastic Activity Network Formalisms 
The previous chapter addressed the specification of the detailed content of the model, 
which is to be built using a formalism that can be processed to obtain the assessment 
results. Different formalisms are used in the dependability analysis field to support model 
construction. State space based formalisms are the most appropriate to model complex 
systems thanks to their great expressiveness, especially their capacity in dealing with 
dependencies among components. Therefore it is worth choosing a state-space-based 
formalism to support the modeling tasks in our framework. Since Airbus and its 
collaborators have been successfully using the AltaRica formalism to support model-based 
safety analysis, it was chosen as a supporting formalism for the construction of the model. 
However, AltaRica and its available supporting tools are still more focused on qualitative 
analysis than quantitative analysis, and the stochastic analysis tool dedicated to our 
assessment framework, called EPOCH, is still under development [Teichteil-Königsbuch 
et al. 2011]. In order to proceed to quantitative evaluation during the implementation of 
the modeling approach in case studies, we have selected the Stochastic Activities Network 
(SAN) formalism that is well known for dependability and performability analyses. The 
SAN formalism intrinsically integrates stochastic behavior description features and is 
supported by an available tool that allows for quantitative evaluations. 
We present in this chapter a comparative analysis of the SAN and AltaRica formalisms, 
which shows their main characteristics and the modeling aspects on which they are 
interchangeable. Both formalisms claim their generalization of Petri nets, essentially the 
states/transitions mechanisms. They are developed to make model construction more 
flexible and easier to manage. The SAN formalism is closer to Petri Nets since it is based 
on the same concepts and graphical representation, whereas AltaRica is designed to make 
the system architecture more transparent through the model, by means of node connection 
mechanisms. Therefore, the two formalisms are compatible on their basic features, and 
model transformation from each one to the other one can be considered.  
A presentation of the two formalisms is given firstly. Then, we present a comparative 
overview of their characteristics. Methods to transform models from one of them to the 
other one are examined at the end. 
III.1 Presentation of the two formalisms 
The two formalisms are presented based on an example. We consider a simple system S 
composed of two components C1 and C2, which deliver a function f1. We assume that the 
components are either delivering correct service (state ok) or are failed. The function is 
delivered when at least C1 or C2 is ok.  
We present firstly the SAN formalism, then the AltaRica formalism. 
!"#$%$&'(!)*+$&(#),&-!$+-#&.#-#(/!0!"!1)2+-3.&4+2!&**$)&%5!&,2!%&4+!4(62#+4!
! 56 
III.1.1 Stochastic Activity Network (SAN) 
SAN is a stochastic modeling formalism using the basic notions of place, marking and 
transition of Petri nets. They can be seen as a natural extension of stochastic Petri nets 
with the distinction of instantaneous and timed transitions (activities), the use of input and 
output gates to model transitions preconditions and post conditions, as well as the 
possibility to model choices upon the firing of a transition by associating cases. Figure 
III.1 shows the different features of SAN. 
 
Figure III.1 SAN input gate definition 
The transitions are called activities and when an activity fires, it is said completed. A 
distribution function is associated to each timed activity. The distribution function 
determines the completion time of the activity when it is enabled. When an enabled 
activity act1 is preceded by another activity act2 in completion time, act1 may be 
reactivated, i.e. a new completion time may be determined for act1, depending on the new 
marking after the completion of act2. 
Input and output gates are introduced in SAN to offer greater flexibility in defining 
“activities enabling” and “completion rules”.  
An input gate has: 
! a finite set of inputs, each one associated to a place, and 
! one output, associated to an activity.  
It is internally defined by  
! an n-ary computable predicate, called enabling predicate, and  
! an n-ary computable partial function, called input function and defined for all 
values for which the enabling predicate is true.  
An output gate has: 
! one input, associated to an activity, and 
! a finite set of outputs, each one associated to a place.  
It is defined by an n-ary computable function over the markings of its output places, called 
the output function. 
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Cases represent uncertainty at the completion of an activity. Different configurations may 
be possible when an activity completes, and only one of these configurations must be 
chosen. Cases are used to represent these possible choices. A probability distribution is 
associated to the cases of each activity. The distribution defines the probability for each 
case to be chosen at the completion of the activity. 
Figure III.2 shows a SAN model of S. Places C1 and C2 represent the state of the 
components. Associated activities Failii=1,2 and Maii=1,2 model their failure and 
maintenance.  
 
Figure III.2 Example of SAN model  
Place F1 represents the state of function f1. IGM1 and IGM2 are input gates expressing 
the condition to activate maintenance activities and the markings update function. The 
output gate OG models the availability of function F1 depending on the marking of C1 
and C2. The function is unavailable when both components are failed. The specifications 
of the distribution function associated to the activities are shown in Figure III.2. The 
internal specifications of the gates are given in Table III.1. The predicates and the 
functions of the gates are expressed in C++ in the Möbius tool.  
 IGM1 IGM2 OG 
Predicate C1->Mark()==0  C2->Mark()==0;   -- 
Function C1->Mark()=1  C2->Mark()=1;  If(C1->Mark()==0 && C2->Mark()==0) 
           F1->Mark()=0;  
Else    F1->Mark()=1;  
Table III.1 Predicates and functions of the gates in the example of SAN model  
In the previous example, none of the activities has multiple cases associated. To illustrate 
the use of cases, let us consider that the components C1 and C2 integrate a fail-safe 
mechanism that disconnects the component when it is failed, otherwise the function is not 
delivered even if the second component is ok. Also, let us assume that following a failure 
there is 90% of chance for the component to be disconnected and 10% that it remains 
connected. This is represented using cases associated to activities Fail1 and Fail2, as 
shown in Figure III.3.  
Two cases are distinguished for each of the activities Fail1 and Fail2. The first one leads 
to the nominal determination of the function delivery, expressed based on the output gate 
OG1, and the second one to which is associated the output gate OG2, is the case in which 
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the component is not disconnected systematically, leading to the non delivery of the 
function f1. Probabilities of selection are associated to each of the cases. 
 
Figure III.3 Example of SAN model with cases 
The dynamic of the net is that an activity is activated when the predicates of all the 
associated input gates hold, and at the completion of the activity, the functions of the 
associated input gates are executed together with the functions of the output gates 
associated to the selected case.  
One can see that SAN models are very compact and manageable thanks to input and 
output gates. A single gate can be used to define predicates and functions involving 
several places.  
! Formal definition 
SAN is formally defined based on Activity Networks (AN) definition. Let P denotes the 
set of all the places of the network.  
If S is a set of places (S ! P), a marking of S is a mapping µ: S ! !2. The set of possible 
markings of S is the set of functions MS= {µ | µ: S! !}.  
An input gate is defined as a triple (G, e, f) such that: 
• G ! P is the set of input places associated to the gate; 
• e: MG ! {0, 1} is the enabling predicate of the gate; 
• f: MG ! MG is the input function of the gate.  
Similarly, an output gate is a pair, (G, f), where G ! P is the set of the output places 
associated to the gate and f: MG ! MG is the output function of the gate.  
An Activity Network is an eight-tuple AN = (P, A, IG , O, ! , " , #, o) such that : 
• P is a finite set of places; 
• A is a finite set of activities;  
• IG is a finite set of input gates;  
• O is a finite set of output gates;  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
A!The markings are considered to be positive integers but any type can be used provided that the functions 
defined in the gates are coherent with them.  
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• #: A ! !+ defines the number of cases for each activity; 
• $: A ! {Timed, Instantaneous} defines the type of each activity;  
• %: I ! A maps input gates to activities; 
• o: O ! {(a, c) | a $ A and c $ {1, 2, . . . # (a)}} maps output gates to cases of 
activities.  
It is noteworthy that the net structure is defined by the functions % and o. 
A stochastic activity network is a five-tuple SAN = (AN, µ0, C, F, H) such that:  
• AN is an activity network; 
•  µ0 is the initial marking; 
• C is the case distribution assignment, such that for any activity act, in a marking µ, 
the assignment of values over the set {1, . . . # (act)} of cases is a probability 
distribution called the case distribution of activity act in µ; 
• F is the activity time distribution function assignment, an assignment of continuous 
functions to timed activities such that for any timed activity act and marking µ in 
which activity act is enabled, Fact (µ, ·) is a continuous probability distribution 
function;  
• H is the reactivation function assignment, an assignment of functions to timed 
activities such that for any timed activity act enabled in µ, Hact (µ, . ) is a set of 
markings in which the activity act is reactivated if one of them is reached before 
activity act completes. 
AN is considered stabilizing in the initial marking µ0, i.e., there is no reachable marking 
leading to the firing of an infinite sequence of instantaneous activities. 
More details about the SAN formal definition can be found in [Sanders and Meyer 2001]. 
III.1.2 AltaRica language 
In contrast to SAN, AltaRica is a language with a set of keywords and a syntax. AltaRica 
is developed to facilitate the joint use by dependability analysis specialists and system 
developers. It was developed with the objective of helping create models that are very 
close to the system functional architecture. A system is considered composed of 
components connected to one another. An AltaRica model is a hierarchical description 
consisting in the system global functional architecture, which is detailed step by step 
considering its lower level components. The model is composed of nodes and instructions 
that are used to initialize and connect the nodes. A node may be composed of sub-nodes 
that can also be subdivided into lower level sub-nodes. The nodes are detailed using mode 
automata [Rauzy 2002]3 based on state variables and transitions. Flow propagation 
instructions are used to represent structural and functional links between the nodes 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
I A new version of AltaRica [PERROT et al. 2010] with considerable modifications of the version described 
here is being developed.  
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according to the system structure.  The following gives, in AltaRica, a description of the 
two components system, presented at the beginning of this section. 
node S 
 flow  
    F1:bool:out; 
 state  
    C1:{failed, ok}; 
    C2:{failed, ok}; 
 event  
    Fail1, Fail2, Ma1, Ma2; 
 trans  
    (C1 = ok) |- Fail1 -> C1 := failed; 
    (C1 = failed) |- Ma1 -> C1 := ok; 
 
    (C2 = ok) |- Fail2 -> C2 := failed; 
    (C2 = failed) |- Ma2 -> C2 := ok; 
assert  
    F1 =((C1 = ok) or (C2 = ok)) ); 
  init  
    C1 := ok, 
    C2 := ok, 
extern  
   law <event Fail1 > = exponential(2.0E-4); 
   law <event Ma1 > = Dirac(1); 
 
   law <event Fail2 > = exponential(2.0E-4); 
   law <event Ma2 > = Dirac(1); 
edon 
The keyword flow is used to declare the variables that represent the input and output 
information of the node. These variables can be linked to flow variables of other nodes; 
output variables of a given node are linked to input variables of other nodes. In this 
example, the variable F1 represents the availability of the function f1, provided by S and 
which can be used as input for other nodes at a higher level. Keyword state introduces the 
state variables representing the components states. Event is used to declare the events that 
may affect the system. Keyword trans introduces the section where the dynamics of the 
system (transitions enabling guards and state changes after the transitions fire) is 
described. The guard is expressed based on input variables and state variables. The 
transitions change only the value of the state variables. The corresponding changes in the 
flow variables (output variables) are done based on the statements of the assert part of the 
node. The assert statements are also used to make links between nodes. The init part is 
used to initialize the state of the components. The extern part is used to provide additional 
information devoted to assessment tools. The distribution laws of the events are provided 
in the extern part. 
The previous AltaRica representation of S is developed in such a way to be similar to the 
SAN model. The different components of S are not distinguished in the model. In fact, 
AltaRica is rather a component oriented modeling language. A convenient representation 
of S in AltaRica should consist in using sub-nodes for the component C1 and C2, and 
composing them according to the combination logic that leads to the availability of 
function f1. As the components are similar, a generic node Component should be created 





  stateOk : bool : out ;!
 state !
  status : {ok,failed} ;!
 event !
  Fail, Ma ;!
 init !
   status := ok ;!
trans!
  status=ok |-Fail -> status:=failed;!
  status=failed |-Ma ->  status:=ok;!
assert!
   stateOk=(status=ok); 
extern  
   law <event Fail > = exponential(2.0E-4); 
   law <event Ma > = Dirac(1); 
edon 
The global model is constructed using “instances” of Component, as follows. 
node S 
 flow 
    F1 : bool : out; 
  sub  
    C1: Component; 
    C2: Component; 
assert  
    F1=( C1.stateOk or C2.stateOk );  
edon 
Doing so, the different structural components of the system are distinguishable and one 
can associate a graphical representation that is more meaningful for non-specialists. Figure 
III.4 shows a graphical representation corresponding to the model of S. Each box 
represents a sub-node and the links between the boxes are represented based on input and 
output variables using assert statements. 
 
Figure III.4 Example of AltaRica model representation 
The features shown in the representation are not formalized; they are informal elements 






! Formal definition 
Several versions of AltaRica have been defined. We present here the formal definition of 
the AltaRica dataflow. 
An AltaRica node is formally defined based on mode automata. A mode automaton A is 
a 9-tuple A = (D, S, Fin, Fout, dom, E, $, %, I ) such that: 
• D is a finite or an infinite domain;  
• S, Fin and Fout are sets of variables (respectively state variables, input flow 
variables, and output flow variables); 
• dom : V ! 2D such that %v $ V= S ! Fin ! Fout, dom(v) &' determines the value 
domain of v. For any subset U ( V, we denote by VAL(U) the Cartesian product 
of its elements domains : VAL(U) =)v$U dom(v) ; VAL(U) is the set of all the 
possible assignments of values to the variables of U. 
• E is a set of event names; 
• $: VAL(S ) & VAL(Fin) & E !  VAL(S ), is a partial function that specifies the 
transitions corresponding to the events; 
• %: VAL(S) & VAL(Fin) ! VAL(Fout) is a total function that defines assertions 
over the variable values; 
•  I  $ VAL(S)  defines the initial state of the automaton.  
More details about mode automata in the scope of AltaRica formalism definition are 
provided in [Point and Rauzy 1999; Rauzy 2002].  
III.2 Characteristics and Comparison of the Two Formalisms 
The differences between the two formalisms are principally their aims. SAN was defined 
in the early eighties to facilitate systems with complex stochastic aspects modeling. 
AltaRica was defined in the mid-nineties to model fault propagation in complex systems. 
We examine firstly the basic features used to model systems.  
III.2.1 Basic features 
Both formalisms provide features to represent information related to the system state and 
events that affect this information.  
In SAN, places are used to represent the various parameters that characterize the system 
state. Places are basically marked with integer value but one can define extended places to 
represent any type of variable, especially when using the SAN version supported by the 
tool Möbius.  
AltaRica distinguishes two types of information, the internal state information (state 
variables) and flow data that represent information exchanged between the components. 
This distinction is well suited for the enhancement of the model’s modularity but it 
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complicates the representation of resources shared by several components. A module 
cannot modify the internal state variable of other modules and, therefore, the 
representation of shared resource, whose state is modifiable by several modules, is not 
straightforward. 
Concerning the representation of events that may modify the system state, both 
formalisms are based on the transitions firing schema: predicate - event - post condition. 
The predicate is a Boolean condition that must be fulfilled in order to allow the event 
occurrence.  
For the transition firing mechanism, the SAN formalism is mainly dedicated to stochastic 
modeling for performance and dependability assessment. The firings of the transitions are 
based on the notion of activities that complete after given durations when activated 
(predicate fulfilled). Instantaneous activities, which complete in a negligible amount of 
time, are thus distinguished from timed activities whose durations impact the system’s 
ability to perform its functions. SAN ability to model stochastic system is based on the 
assignment of time distribution functions to activities. Furthermore, the time distribution 
functions can be state dependent.  
Concerning AltaRica, it was not initially aimed at building stochastic models. It does not 
natively integrate the notion of time to fire when the transition is enabled. An AltaRica 
node is first of all an automaton aimed at exploring the possible states without a real 
notion of time duration. However, the possibility to associate probabilistic distribution 
laws to the events has been given via the use of statements introduced by the keyword 
extern. Priorities can be defined between AltaRica transitions in order to determine the 
firing order when several ones are in concurrence. Several events concerning different 
components can also be synchronized so that their occurrences happen simultaneously.  
For the events post conditions modeling, SAN provides a feature that can be used to make 
a probabilistic choice upon the firing of a transition: cases. That is, when there is an 
uncertainty about the outcome of an activity, one can represent all the possibilities and 
associate a probability of selection to each one.  
III.2.2 Modularity 
The formal definition of SAN does not include the management of models’ modularity. 
However some operators (Replicate and Join) have been defined in order to support the 
construction of composed models. The composition of the sub-models is based on a 
mechanism of place sharing i.e., the sub-models use jointly some places. The design of the 
different components is left to the model builder’s appreciation. The Replicate operator is 
used to create copies of models and to combine them into a single model. The Join 
operator is used to combine different models into one model. 
AltaRica intrinsically manages the modularity via the structuring of the model using 
instances of nodes. The definition of a node distinguishes the state variables, which are 
local to the node representing a component, from the flow variables, which are defined as 
connection points, forming the interface of the component with regard to other 
components. Every node manages locally its behavior and communicates with its 
environment via input and output variables. The mechanism of events synchronization 
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also facilitates the modular construction of the model. Synchronizations explicitly group 
and trigger simultaneously subsets of basic events. The synchronized events belong to 
different nodes and therefore, it is possible to separate two components that can be subject 
to effects of the same event into two nodes.  
III.2.3 Compactness 
One of the drawbacks of Petri Nets and their extensions is their complexity, especially the 
difficulty to model conditions and operations, integrating for example if-then-else 
operators, using the system variables. Therefore, it is worth to have a look at how SAN 
and AltaRica deal with this problem.  
For SAN, the condition enabling activities are expressed using input gates, which can 
integrate any kind of functions, defined using the markings of the nets places, in the 
condition expression. The change of the variables at the completion of an activity can also 
be expressed using predefined functions in the input gates and output gates. The Möbius 
tool allows the use of any function from the C/C++ libraries. 
As a language, AltaRica also allows the use of predefined functions in the expression of 
conditions and transitions, based on the variables. Functions can be defined as nodes of the 
model. The input variables of the node are used as parameters and the returned value is 
represented as an output variable. However, the AltaRica definition doesn’t include any 
condition-control loop statement, such as the “while” or “do – while” statements that are 
part of the C/C++ language, and thus, can be used in SAN. 
III.2.4 Robustness of the model 
While constructing a model, it may happen that the developed model presents some 
aspects that make it technically not solvable. Occurrences of infinite loops and non-
determinisms are some of the problems usually encountered. The features provided by the 
modeling formalism are the main sources where one can check their origin and their 
solution.  
The SAN formalism integrates the use of instantaneous activities, which can be at the 
origin of infinite loops, since there may be hidden sequences leading to a cyclic activation. 
There is no way to automatically detect all these kinds of situation but to process the 
model and check the processing traces. Actually, the problem doesn’t formally concern 
SAN models, since the formal definition states that the network must be stabilizing, but it 
is still not decidable whether an activity network is stabilizing [Sanders and Meyer 2001]. 
Non-determinism can also occur in a SAN model due to the possible presence of conflict 
between instantaneous activities. A solution is to define a priority order among them.  
AltaRica uses the priority mechanism to cope with conflicts between transitions. There is 
still the problem of loops, which is complicated by the use of flow variables. Indeed, two 
kinds of loops can happen. First, assertions can lead to a cyclic definition of the flow 
variables. This is not allowed in the so-called data-flow version of AltaRica. It can be 
detected by a preliminary model analysis before the execution. Then, one can built 
oscillating models with instantaneous urgent transitions, which are not stabilizing.  
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The non-stabilizing problem can be prevented by good modeling practices. It can be 
detected at run-time by the SAN modeling tool Möbius and some of the AltaRica 
modeling tools.  
III.2.5 Supporting tools and facilities 
Modeling formalisms are interesting insofar as they offer means to describe systems. 
However, a formalism is useful only if it is supported by a modeling tool. The following 
discusses the proposed tools to support SAN and AltaRica, together with the facilities that 
they offer.  
III.2.5.1 Supporting tools  
Several tools have been proposed to support modeling with SAN. METASAN [Sanders 
and Meyer 1986] was the first tool. Then UltraSAN [Couvillion et al. 1991; Sanders 1995] 
was developed to improve the model solving run-time complexity encountered with 
METASAN. The Möbius tool [Daly et al. 2000], designed as a multi-formalism 
supporting platform, firstly integrated the modeling facilities of UltraSAN. These tools are 
mainly devoted to quantitative analyses. The SharifSAN tool and its evolution 
SANBuilder [Azgomi and Movaghar 2005] were developed to support new extensions of 
SAN and integrate model checking based on temporal logic facilities.  
AltaRica models can also be developed and analyzed by various tools. The AltaRica 
project team proposes ARC and MEC [LABRI-Tools 2011] for AltaRica models 
checking. Dassault Aviation has developed an AltaRica model editor, called Cecilia Ocas, 
which integrates tools for stepwise simulation as well as failures sequences and cut-sets 
generation. Cecilia Ocas has a commercial version called BPA-DAS at Dassault System. 
These tools are mainly dedicated to qualitative analyses. The quantitative analysis is 
usually done based on the cut-sets generation and using for example the tool Aralia to 
compute the measure of interest. Other tools [Signoret et al. 2004] can be used to perform 
stochastic simulation based on AltaRica models. Finally, the tool SIMFIA from APSYS 
can be used to develop and analyze, inter alia, AltaRica models. 
Additionally to the formalism’s facilities, the supporting tools can provide means to 
facilitate the modeling tasks. Modeling tasks with Möbius and Cecilia Ocas, major 
supporting tools respectively for SAN and AltaRica, are presented in the following.  
III.2.5.2 Möbius and Cecilia Ocas 
Models construction with Möbius consists in the development of atomic models that can 
be composed together. Since the tool is designed to support multiple formalisms, sub-
models from different formalisms can be composed. Reward variables are then defined 
upon the models to specify the dependability measures. During the construction of the 
model, global variables can be used to parameterize the model. These variables are used to 
create studies, which are groups of evaluations corresponding to different assignments of 
values to them. Möbius provides model solvers based on two classes of solution 
techniques: discrete event simulation and state-space-based analytical/numerical 
techniques. Any model can be solved using simulation. 
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The tool Cecilia Ocas provides means to construct AltaRica models with an association of 
graphical representation to each AltaRica node. The modeling task consists of the 
construction or selection of the components, gathered in a library as reusable components, 
and their connection following the hierarchical architecture of the system. Then a variable, 
called observer, describing a given combination of the components outputs, is created to 
represent the global state to analyze. According to the initial values of the state variables, 
one can generate sequences and cut-sets of events that may lead to the state described by 
the observer. A step-by-step events simulation can also be done. It consists in a display of 
the transitions and the state variables, where one can select and fire the enabled transitions 
successively in order to analyze the model’s behavior. It is used for “what if” analyses. 
III.2.6 Summary 
Despite the difference in their form of presentation, the two formalisms are compatible on 
the essential modeling features.  
• The two formalisms are based on states and transitions firing mechanisms. SAN is 
still very close to stochastic Petri nets but defines new features that facilitate the 
expression of complex predicates and actions after events occurrences. AltaRica 
uses variables that can also be easily combined to express predicates and actions.  
• Distribution functions can be associated to events while using the two formalisms. 
It is systematic in SAN, while distribution functions are considered as external 
properties of the model in AltaRica.  
• AltaRica defines input/output variables and assertions that are used to build 
hierarchical models. Hierarchical models can be built in SAN using the Join 
operator and shared places. 
However, the possibility of associating priority to AltaRica events is not currently present 
in the definition of SAN. On the other side, the mechanism expressed by cases in SAN is 
not present in AltaRica, and it is not straightforward to represent shared data modifiable 
by several components as modeled by shared places in SAN. In addition, the 
expressiveness of AltaRica language is limited compared to the C/C++ language that is 
used to specify the gates in SAN. 
We analyze in the following, how models transformation can be achieved from each of the 
two formalisms to the other one whilst respecting as much as possible the model structure. 
The objective is to show that the features of the formalism, whether it is AltaRica or SAN, 
that will be used to experiment the modeling approach proposed in chapter II, can be 
equivalently found in the other formalism, and therefore the quantitative analysis can be 
performed using SAN, which is supported by an available and accessible quantitative 
analysis tool. Furthermore, as shown in Figure III.5, based on the transformation, 
equivalent models can be used to compare evaluation results derived from the Möbius tool 
that supports SAN, and the EPOCH tool that is being developed to process the AltaRica 
model, in order to validate the latter tool.  
The Möbius tool is an academic tool. Ultimately, it will be interesting to confirm the 
results obtained using the Möbius tool by analyses using other AltaRica supporting tools 




Figure III.5 Model transformation from AltaRica to SAN and vice versa 
We consider firstly model transformation from AltaRica to SAN, then from SAN to 
AltaRica. 
III.3 From AltaRica to SAN 
The transformation of the basic elements such as state variables and transitions from 
AltaRica to SAN is straightforward since they are part of both formalisms. An AltaRica 
state variable can be represented by a place, and guarded transitions by activities and 
input/output gates. The places can be defined with the same data as in AltaRica since it is 
possible to use user-defined types while modeling with the Möbius tool. A correspondence 
can be made between AltaRica discrete data types and integer representation for the place 
marking in SAN. The initialization of the state variables is merely the definition of the 
initial marking with the values stated in the AltaRica model. The basic elements, which 
cannot be directly represented, are the flow variables. 
Output variables are set by assertions stating an invariable relationship between the 
variable and a set of state and other input variables: outv =r (sv1, … svk, inv1, … invl). That 
is, if the value of svi or invi changes, the value of outv must automatically be updated to 
keep the relationship valid. The variable outv can be represented by a place, which must 
be updated in the gates of the transitions affecting each of the variable svi and invj. 
However, this does not keep the separation that AltaRica makes between the component 
behavior description and the calculation of output variables values. Instantaneous 
activities can also be used to represent the invariable relationship. The instantaneous 
activity will fire each time the relationship becomes invalid and the outcome will consist 
in updating the variable outv.  
The modularity of the model can be taken into account considering the same hierarchical 
structure and using the Replicate and Join operators. This is to remain close to the 
AltaRica model. In practice, it may be more useful to compact several components sub-
models into a single sub-model as the systematic transformation may generate a 
considerable number of small sub-models. AltaRica also integrates the notion of events 
synchronization between several nodes. A synchronization is a unification of several 
transitions. It can be represented by a unique activity combining the specifications of the 
transitions and using the variables (represented as shared places) involved. 
AltaRica allows the definition of priority between transitions. The notion of priority is not 
formally defined in SAN. It is also worth noting that only AltaRica with events 
distribution laws specified can be transformed into SAN model; the SAN definition 
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requires the definition of the quantitative attributes of the activities. However the 
transformation can still be applied if the model exploitation doesn’t require the 
quantitative aspect; e.g., to support qualitative analyses based on model checking as 
carried out with the SANBuilder tool. 
The guidelines for applying the transformation are concretely given, together with 
examples, in the following subsections. The transformation of an AltaRica node without 
sub-node is considered firstly. Then, we present the transformation of composed nodes. 
III.3.1  Basic features transformation  
Table III.2 gives the correspondences for transforming the basic AltaRica features into 
SAN.  
AltaRica element SAN correspondence Comments 
State variable  Place  A correspondence is made 
between discrete data type and 
integer marking; extended 
places are used for the other 
variable type. 
Flow (in, out) variable  
(v $ Fin ! Fout) 
Shared Place  
Event  SAN activity  All the activities are timed 
except those corresponding to 
events that have Dirac(0) as 
distribution law. 
Transition specification 
(guard grd, event evt, 
post-condition post ) 
Input gate, with predicate 
grd and a function specified 
by the expression of the 
post-condition post, 
associated to the activity 
corresponding to event evt.  
An output gate can be used to 
express the post-condition but 
the function of the input gate is 
sufficient  
Assertion  Input gate associated to an 
instantaneous activity 
 
Initialization Place marking  
Sub node SAN sub model  
Table III.2 AltaRica to SAN correspondence 
It is worth paying an attention to assertions as they are specific to AltaRica. An assertion 
stated in the form of outv =r (sv1, … svk, inv1, … invl) is represented by an input gate and 
an instantaneous activity such that: 
• the predicate of the input gate holds when the assertion becomes non-valid, so as to 
enable the update of the output variable value outv: 
 predicate:  




• the function of the input gate reassigns the correct value to outv ->Mark(): 
             outv->Mark() = r(sv1->Mark(), … svk->Mark(), inv1->Mark(), … invl->Mark()); 
the instantaneous activity is used to trigger the update of the output flow outv. 
Figure III.6 shows an example of a basic component transformation from AltaRica to 
SAN, following the rules given previously. 
 
Figure III.6 Basic transformation from AltaRica to SAN 
The models represent a component that, if powered, can be subject to a failure event. The 
current state information of the component is produced as output. Each of the flow and 
state variables is transformed into a place, and the event failure has given rise to an 
activity. The places power and stateOk are to be shared with the model of the components 
that set or use the value of their corresponding AltaRica variable. The particular data type 
consisting in the set of values {failed, ok} that is used to define the state variable status is 
replaced by the integer values {0,1} corresponding to the marking of this place. The input 
gate IG_assert and its corresponding instantaneous activity Assert_update are used to 
represent the assertion as described previously. 
III.3.2 Formal definition of the transformation 
The transformation can be defined formally using the formal definitions of SAN and 
AltaRica presented in section III.1. Each AltaRica node described by the 9-tuple (D, S, Fin, 
Fout, dom, E, &, ', IS) is transformed into an activity network AN= (P, A, IG , O, # , $ , %, o) 
such that: 
• S ! Fin ! Fout  *  P, each AltaRica variable corresponds to a place in the SAN. 
• E  * AE ( A; each event in AltaRica is transformed into an activity in SAN. AE is 
the set of SAN activities corresponding to events in AltaRica. AE = A if no extra 
instantaneous activity is defined in the transformation of the assertions. 
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In the followings, the variables of S ! Fin ! Fout are assimilated to their corresponding 
places and the events to their corresponding activity. The assignments of values to the 
variables of S ! Fin ! Fout are also assimilated to their corresponding SAN markings. 
• &: VAL(S) ( VAL(Fin) ( E ! VAL (S) defines input gates that must be associated 
to the activities of AE. For each event evt $ E, the restriction &evt of & on       
VAL(S) ( VAL(Fin) ( {evt} defines its corresponding transition. &evt is 
transformed using an input gate igevt= (Gevt, eevt, fevt) such that: 
o  Gevt* S ! Fin;  
o valS $ VAL(S), valin $ VAL(Fin), the concatenation valS • valin corresponds 
to a marking of Gevt and: 
!  if !(valS, valin, evt) is defined and !(valS, valin, evt) ! valS then 
 eevt(valS • valin) =1 and fevt (valS • valin) = !(valS, valin, evt) • valin, 
! otherwise eevt(valS • valin) =0;  
• +: VAL(S) ( VAL(Fin) ! VAL(Fout) defines an input gate ig" = (P, e", f") 
associated to an instantaneous activity that triggers the update of the output 
variables. e" and f" are defined as follows: 
o valS $ VAL(S), valin $ VAL(Fin), valout $ VAL(Fout),    
   e"(valS • valin • valout) =1 if +(valS, valin)! valout ;   
   e" (valS • valin • valout) =0 otherwise;  
The predicate of the input gate ig" holds so as to enable the update when 
the assertion no longer holds. 
o f"(valS • valin • valout) = valS • valin • +(valS, valin);  
The resulting activity network AN is obtained such that: 
• IG= {igevt, evt $ E} ! {ig+}.  
• O='; output gates are not needed; the functions of input gates are sufficient to 
express changes after transitions firings.  
• #(act)=1, % act $ A; there is no multiple choices at the completion of an activity. 
Cases are not needed since the notion is not present in AltaRica and output gates 
are not used in the transformation.  
• $ is defined based on the distribution property that is not part of the definition of 
AltaRica nodes as modes automata. Events distributions are considered as an 
external property that should be managed by quantitative evaluation tools. 
• The mapping % of the input gates to the activities is straightforward since each input 
gates is created based on an activity. 
A resulting SAN = (AN, µ0, C, F, H) is obtained considering µ0
s * Is, which defines the 
initial marking of the places corresponding to the AltaRica state variables. The marking of 
the flow variables are deduced based on their relationship with the state variables. F is 
defined by associating the probability distribution functions that are defined as external 
parameters in AltaRica. There is no need to define C since the transformation does not 
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integrate any multiple choices. Reactivation scenarios are not specified for the events in 
AltaRica. Additional information is needed to define H. A default reactivation policy 
consisting in not reactivating the activities can be considered.  
The transformation rules just presented deal with the content of a basic node that is not 
composed of sub-nodes. The transformation of a global model must cope with hierarchical 
compositions that integrate dependencies between basic components. 
III.3.3 Dealing with composed nodes 
An AltaRica node may be made of other sub-nodes with dependencies between them. A 
composed node uses instances of other nodes as sub-nodes and the dependencies are 
expressed based on assertions that connect the output variables with the input variables. 
We distinguish simple connections and complex connections.  
Figure III.7-a shows a simple connection of two AltaRica sub-nodes SN1 and SN2 based 
on the output variable outV of SN1 and the input variable inV of SN2.  
 
Figure III.7 AltaRica nodes connection 
The mechanism merely corresponds to SAN sub-models composition based on places 
sharing. The places corresponding to outV and inV must only be joined together into a 
shared place during the composition using the SAN’s Join operator. The only difference is 
that SN1 sets the values of the variable outV, which becomes an input for SN2, whereas 
both sub-models can, but not necessarily, modify the shared variable in case of SAN 
composition. Therefore, the SAN model corresponding to a node, composed of sub-nodes 
connected based on simple connections, is obtained by simply using the Join operator and 
specifying the connected variables as shared places. 
In case of a composition based on a complex relationship as shown in Figure III.7-b, an 
additional sub-model SNC is considered so as to break the complexity into simple 
compositions. SNC takes as input, all the variables SNjj=1..p.outV that should be combined 
to define the input of SNq. The content of the corresponding SAN sub-model consists in 
the transformation of the assertion that represents the complex connection. 
All complex connections transformations can be gathered in the same sub-model, which 
becomes the composer of the other sub-models. An AltaRica node N containing n sub-
nodes with complex connections between the sub-nodes is thus transformed into n+1 SAN 
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sub-models, whose composition forms the global SAN model corresponding to N.             
N = "SN1, . . .  SNn, SNC#, SNC represents the composition assertions. 
As an example, let us consider the component of Figure III.6. Assuming that its input 
power is provided by two different suppliers, we obtain an AltaRica model integrating 
three sub-nodes. We consider that the power suppliers can fail to deliver power at a given 
rate. The supplier 1 is described in AltaRica as follows. 
Node Supplier1 
  flow  
    power:bool:out; 
  state  
    status:{loss, ok}; 
  event  
    loss; 
  trans  
    (status = ok) |- loss -> status := loss; 
  assert  
    power = (status = ok); 
  init  
    status := ok; 
  extern  
    law <event loss> = exponential(2.0E-6); 
edon 
The description of the other supplier is the same except that the loss event occurrence rate 
is considered equal to 2.0E-4. The composition of these sub-nodes into a global model is 
given as follows. 
node main 
  sub  
    s2:Supplier1; 
    s1:Supplier2; 
    C: Component; 
  assert  
    C.power = (s1.power or s2.power); 
edon 
The SAN model corresponding to this model is presented in Figure III.8. Each sub-node is 
transformed into a sub-model. As the composition relationship between the sub-nodes is 
not a simple connection relationship, an additional sub-model Composer is created to 
express the composition relationship between them. Using this intermediate sub-model, 
the composition can be done based on simple connections. The places power of the sub-
models supplier1, supplier2 and Component are specified respectively to be the same with 
the places s1_power, s2_power, C_power of the sub-models composer. 
The transformation is done in such a way to respect the AltaRica model’s composition. In 
practice, it may be more tractable to compact some of the sub-models into a single sub-




Figure III.8 SAN model corresponding to the AltaRica composed model 
III.4 From SAN to AltaRica 
The transformation from SAN to AltaRica can also be made by transforming each sub-
model to an AltaRica sub-node. The composition is done taking into account the SAN 
model structure. It is worth mentioning that it is possible to define a parameter n 
specifying a number for replicating a SAN sub-model while using the Möbius tool. Such 
possibility is not integrated in AltaRica.  
For the transformation of a sub-model’s content, each place can be represented by either a 
state variable or an input variable. The place corresponds to a state variable if its marking 
can be modified by an activity in the model, otherwise, it corresponds to an input variable. 
Additional output variables can be defined for shared places. An activity can be declared 
as an AltaRica event to which must be associated a distribution law. The corresponding 
transition in AltaRica will have as guard, the conjunction of all the predicates of the 
activity’s related input gates, and as post condition, the composition of the activity’s input 
and output gates functions. In SAN, activities are explicitly specified as instantaneous or 
timed. Instantaneous transitions are specified in AltaRica by associating Dirac(0) as 
distribution. 
For activities with multiple cases, the notion of uncertainty in the action to choose after the 
occurrence of an event is not defined in AltaRica. However, from a technical viewpoint, 
an activity act to which n (n>1) cases are associated can be transformed to n activities 
act_1, … act_n, each activity corresponding to a case of act. Their distribution functions 
correspond to the products of the case probabilities and the distribution function of the 
activity act: Fact_i (µ, ·)= Cact (µ, i) * Fact (µ, ·), i=1, … n. Given this possibility of 
removing multiple cases in the model, the activities of the SAN model considered for the 
transformation are assumed to be without multiple cases. 
Shared places between the sub-models can be either represented using flow variables and 
assertions, or events synchronization. When the shared place’s marking is subject to 
modifications in only one of the sub-models (which correspond to information 
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communication to the other sub-models), the place is represented as a state variable and an 
output variable in the corresponding sub-node, and as input variable in the sub-nodes 
corresponding to the other sub-models. If the shared place can be modified by several of 
the sub-models, it becomes complicated to use input and output variables, due to the risk 
of occurrences of loops in the model. Therefore, one must consider using events 
synchronization. The place is represented by a state variable in a dedicated sub-node, and 
auxiliary transitions, synchronized with the transitions that may affect it, are used to set its 
value. The value of the variable is transmitted as input to the sub-nodes. It is worth noting 
that this is still fairly complicated since one has to identify all the transitions that may 
modify the shared place. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that extended places representing arrays of variables can be 
defined while using the Möbius tool to build SAN models. Variables of type array are not 
defined in AltaRica, and thus, are not considered for the transformation. Furthermore, the 
possible control flow statements that can be taken into account in AltaRica are the “if-
then-else” and “switch/case” statements. Therefore, SAN models using functions that 
include statements such as the “while” or “for” statements of the C/C++ language are not 
taken into account. 
The transformation rules are presented in the following. We consider firstly the 
transformation of the basic features, then the features involved in composed models. 
III.4.1 Basic features transformation  
Table III.3 gives the correspondence for transforming SAN features into AltaRica. The 
correspondence deals with the content of non-composed models.  
SAN Feature AltaRica correspondence Comments 
Place  State variable if the 
place’s marking can be 
changed by an activity in 
the model, 
Input variable otherwise 
For composed models, shared 
places require the consideration of 
all the sub-models involved, and 
output variables must be defined for 
the composition. 
Place marking Value assignment to the 
variable  
 
Activity  Event  Instantaneous activities are 
represented by associating Dirac(0) 
as distribution law of  the event. 
Input gates (Predicate 
,pre, function ft), and 
output gate  (function 
gt) associated to 
activity act 
Transition specification 
(guard ,pre, event evt, 
post-condition gt ° ft)  
evt is the event corresponding to 
act, ,pre is the conjunction of the 
input gates predicates, ft and gt are 
respectively the compositions of all 
the input gates and output gates 
functions. 
Activity distribution  Extern property law  
Sub model Sub node  
Table III.3 SAN to AltaRica correspondence 
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Figure III.9 illustrates the application of the transformation considering a basic component 
that can be subject to a failure event and maintenance activities. Figure III.9-a presents the 
SAN model and Figure III.9-b the corresponding AltaRica model. 
 
Figure III.9 Basic transformation from SAN to AltaRica 
Place c_state marking is affected by the completion of the failure and maintenance 
activities. Therefore, it is transformed into a state variable. As the marking of place m is 
not affected by the activities, it represents an input variable. Integer values are used to 
define the variables type since they are not extended places and their makings are of 
integer type. Actually, the marking of the places are bounded by 0 and 1. An event is 
created for each of the two activities, and their corresponding transitions are specified 
using their associated input gate predicates and functions. The failure event predicate 
consists in testing the presence of a token in place c_state, and it resets the place to zero at 
completion. The input gate igmact specifies the transition corresponding to the activity 
mact. The distributions of the activities are taken into account in the extern section of the 
AltaRica node. 
III.4.2 Formal definition of the transformation 
A SAN is formally defined as the tuple (AN, µ0, C, F, H) with AN = (P, A, IG, O, #, $, %, 
o) and an AltaRica node is defined as the tuple (D, S, Fin, Fout, dom, E, &, ', IS). The 
function $ that distinguishes timed activities from instantaneous activities, the distribution 
assignment function F, and the reactivation function H are not considered since these 
aspects are not included in the AltaRica formal definition. They have to be managed by 
the assessment tool, which must integrate them as additional parameters. 
The transformation is such that: 
• D is made of i) the integer set, to which belong the nominal places markings, and 
ii) the user-defined types that are used to create extended places.  
• S ! Fin * P, S * P \ Pin, Fin * Pin, Pin is the set of places whose markings are not 




• dom is implicitly defined, based on the association of the place marking type to the 
corresponding variable as its domain.   
• VAL(S) ( VAL(Fin) * MP, the set of the possible markings of P corresponds to the 
set of the possible assignment of values to the variables of S ! Fin. A marking µP 
of P defines an assignment of values to the variables of S ! Fin,  µP* val
S • valin. 
• E * A, each activity corresponds to an AltaRica event.  
• &: VAL(S) ( VAL(Fin) ( E ! VAL(S) is defined based on the activities, the input 
and output gates mapping functions %, o.  evt $ E, evt - act $ A, &(. , . , evt) is the 
composition of all the functions of the input gates and output gates associated to 
act, provided that all the predicates of the associated input gates hold. 
PRE= {e | . SP / P, . f: MSP0 MSP, and ig=(SP, e, f) $ %
-1(act)}, the predicates 
of the input gates associated to act; 
IF= { f | . SP / P, . e: MSP # {0,1}, and ig=(SP, e, f)  $ %
-1(act)}, the functions 
of the input gates associated to act; 
OF={ f | . SP / P, and og=(SP, f) $ o-1(act,1)}, the functions of the output gates 
associated to the unique case of act. 
The functions of these sets are defined on the markings of subsets of P. We must 
extend them to the markings MP of P in order to compose them.  
Every marking µP of P defines a marking µSP on any subset SP of P. Therefore,  
SP $ P, e: MSP # {0,1}: ext(e) : µP# e(µSP), the extension of the predicate e 
holds in µP -  e hold in µSP.  
Also, the change of markings, by a function f on SP, represents a change of 
marking on P for which the markings remain identical on the complement (P \ 
SP) of SP in P.  
SP $ P, f: MSP # MSP, if f(µSP) is defined, 
! 
ext( f ) :  µP    " f (µSP )•µP \ SP
M P"M P . 
Let consider ett="e%PRE ext(e), the conjunction of the predicates of the input 
gates, and let  ftt=(°f%OF ext(f)) ° (°f%IF ext(f)), the composition of the functions of 
the input gate and output gate associated to act; 
if valS $ VAL(S) and valin $ VAL(Fin) correspond respectively to values 
assignments to the variables of S and Fin, valS • valin corresponds to a marking of 
P,  
!(valS, valin, evt)= ftt(valS • valin) if ett(valS • valin)=1,  
otherwise !(valS, valin, evt) is not defined (! is a partial function). 
• Is is defined by µ0, which defines the initial marking of P and, therefore, an 
assignment of values to S.  
' is defined by the sub-models composition mechanisms based on shared places, since the 
data exchange mechanism used for SAN is based on shared places that are not formally 
specified in the SAN definition. The shared places also define the output variables (Fout) 
necessary for the sub-nodes interconnections.  
III.4.3 Dealing with composed models and shared places  
The objective is to transform a model composed of n sub-models into an AltaRica model 
composed of sub-nodes corresponding to these sub-models. The composition of SAN sub-
models is based on shared places that are the unifications of groups of places belonging to 
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different sub-models. Let us consider a place Psh shared by k sub-models SMwi, i=1, … k, 
which can modify its marking, and l sub-models SMrj, j=1, … l that only use it as input. 
According to Table III.3, the place is represented as a state variable in the transformation 
of SMwi, i=1, … k, and as an input variable in the transformation of SM
r
j, j=1, … l. One has to 
connect these representations of Psh. In the composition of SMwi, i=1, … k and    SM
r
j, j=1, … l, if: 
• k=0, the marking of Psh is used as an input value in all the sub-models, then its 
corresponding variable represents just an input variable in the global node that 
integrates the AltaRica sub-nodes corresponding to the sub-models.  
•  k=1, the marking of Psh is controlled by SMw1 and it is used as input in the other 
sub-models. Therefore, Psh is represented in the AltaRica sub-node corresponding 
to SMw1 by a state variable. A corresponding output variable Psh_out is created to 
make the connection with the other sub-nodes in which Psh corresponds to an 
input variable.  
•  k>1, Psh represents a resource that is affected by activities in several sub-models. 
The changes affecting its corresponding variable are managed in a dedicated sub-
node SN0. The state variable corresponding to Psh is created in the sub-node SN0, 
and it is replaced by an input variable Psh_ini, i=1, … k in the sub-nodes corresponding 
to the sub-models SMwi, i=1, … k. An output variable Psh_out0 is also created in the 
sub-node SN0 to make the connection with the other sub-nodes. To take into 
account the marking changes that affect Psh following activities completion in the 
sub-models SMwi, i=1, … k, for each activity act that can affect Psh, an auxiliary event 
auxi_evt is created in the sub-node SN0, which is synchronized with the event evt 
corresponding to act, so as to update Psh when evt fires. For that, an output 
variable Psh_chg_outevt is created in the sub-node of evt, to report the new value of 
Psh to SN0.  
To illustrate the transformation, let us consider the hypothetical SAN model shown in 
Figure III.10. It is composed of three sub-models. 
The sub-model1 describes a resource-consuming scenario in which the amount 
represented by P1 is decreased from time to time by activity act1a. P1 is reset by activity 
act1b based on the supplies represented by place Psh, respecting a reference maximum 
capacity represented by place Ref. Psh is shared by the three sub-models.  
The quantity represented by Psh is set in sub-model 2. Activity act2b of sub-model 2 
increases the quantity represented by Psh while activity act1b of sub-model1 absorbs the 
quantity by using it to increase the quantity represented by P1. Activity act2b of sub-
model2 can fire only if P2 is marked, representing the availability of the component 
necessary for the delivery of the supplies represented by Psh. P2 can be affected by 
activity act2a that nullifies its marking. When activity act2b fires, the marking of Psh is 
incremented by 1 if it was not null; otherwise the increment depends on the duration since 
the marking has become null. This duration is managed in sub-model 3, in which the 
activity act3a is enabled when the marking of Psh is null.  
The activity act3a of sub-model 3 fires periodically until Psh is set again, representing the 
delivery of alerts on the shortage of supplies. Place Pal counts the number of times act3 is 
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triggered and is used in sub-model 2 to set Psh as follows: Psh->Mark() = Psh->Mark() + 
1 + Pal->Mark().  
The three sub-models are composed based on place Psh which is shared by all of them, 
and place Pal, which is shared by sub-model 2 and sub-model 3. 
!
Figure III.10 Composed SAN model 
Considering the places in the sub-models, we have for: 
Sub model 1: P1 whose marking can be modified and therefore corresponds to a state 
variable; Ref whose marking is not affected by any activity in the sub-model and then 
corresponds to an input variable; and Psh that is shared and which can be affected by 
activities in sub-model1 and sub-model 2 (k=2). Thus, the state variable corresponding to 
Psh is to be managed apart in a sub-node SN0. A corresponding input variable must also 
be declared in the sub-node to get its values from SN0.  The change of Psh marking that 
results from the completion of activity act1b must be represented as an output variable that 
is to be used to set Psh in node SN0. 
Sub model 2: P2 whose marking can be modified and therefore corresponds to a state 
variable; Pal whose marking is not affected by any activity in the sub-model and then 
corresponds to an input variable; and Psh that is to be managed as in the case of sub-
model1. 
Sub model 3: Psh whose marking is not affected by any activity in the sub-model and 
then corresponds to an input variable, and Pal, which is shared with sub-model 2, but not 
affected by any activity in sub-model 2 (k=1). 
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The corresponding AltaRica sub-nodes are given in Figure III.11, together with the sub-
node 0 dedicated to the management of the shared place Psh. Apart from the 
transformation related to the shared places Pal and Psh, the content of each sub-model is 
transformed considering the correspondences presented in Table III.3.  
For place Pal, an output variable Pal_out is created in the sub-node 3 so as to transmit its 
value to the sub-node 2 in which it is defined as an input variable. For place Psh, the sub-
node 0 is created to centralize its changes. It is represented as a state variable only in this 
sub-node. Its value is transmitted to the other sub-nodes as input. The changes that affect 
its value in the sub-nodes 1 and 2 are reported to the sub-node 0 based on output variables 
(Psh_chg_out). 
 
Figure III.11 AltaRica model corresponding to the composed SAN model 
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The sub-node 0 contains in addition to the state variable Psh, an output variable Psh_out 
that is used to transmit the values of Psh to the other sub-nodes. The events act1b_auxi 
and act2b_auxi are respectively used to set the change that should affect Psh when the 
events act1b of sub-node 1 and act2b of sub-node 2 fire. The input variables Psh_chg_in1 
and Psh_chg_in2 are respectively used to get from the sub-nodes 1 and 2, the new value 
that must be given to Psh when act1b and act2b fire. 
In the sub-nodes 1 and 2, Psh is replaced by the input variable Psh_in in the instructions 
that require its values. Values assignments to Psh, in the specification of the transitions 
corresponding to the events act1b and act2b, are transformed into assertions that define 
the output variables Psh_chg_out, which are used to make the connection with the input 
variables Psh_chg_in1 and Psh_chg_in2 of sub-node 0. 
The main node describing their composition is presented as follows: 
node main 
  event  
    SincAct1b, 
    SincAct2b; 
  sub  
    sn0:SN0; 
    sn1:SN1; 
    sn2:SN2; 
    sn3:SN3; 
  assert  
    sn0.Psh_chg_in2 = sn2.Psh_chg_out, 
    sn0.Psh_chg_in1 = sn1.Psh_chg_out, 
    sn1.Psh_in = sn0.Psh_out, 
    sn2.Psh_in = sn0.Psh_out, 
    sn2.Pal = sn3.Pal_out, 
    sn3.Psh = sn0.Psh_out; 
  sync  
    <SincAct1b , sn0.act1b_auxi , sn1.act1b>, 
    <SincAct2b , sn0.act2b_auxi , sn2.act2b>; 
  extern  
    law <event SincAct1b> = Dirac(12.0); 
    law <event SincAct2b> = exponential(0.15); 
edon 
The events act1b_auxi and act2b_auxi of sub-node 0 (sn0) are respectively synchronized 
with the events act1b of sub-node 1 (sn1) and act2b of sub-node 2 (sn2) so as to update 
Psh exactly at the firing time of the events act1b and act2b. 
III.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have presented a comparative overview of Stochastic Activities 
Network (SAN) and AltaRica, two formalisms used in dependability modeling. Both 
formalisms are based on states and transitions firing mechanisms. The SAN formalism 
was developed in the early eighties and still provides strong features to model todays’ 
systems performances. The AltaRica formalism development started in the mid-nineties 
and was mainly aimed at systems qualitative behavior analyses. The AltaRica formalism, 
issued as a language, has been upgraded to support stochastic events modeling. Its main 
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characteristics are the flow propagation mechanism and the intrinsic modularity support. It 
supports events synchronization that consists in allowing several transitions to fire jointly. 
The language is currently used to develop models to which can be associated graphical 
representations so as to have a presentation close to the system architecture, thanks to its 
supporting tool Cecilia Ocas. The SAN formalism, which is a direct extension of Petri 
Nets, is almost completely based on graphical representation. Its main characteristics are 
the intrinsic stochastic modeling and its quantitative analyses oriented aspects; the 
dynamics of the model is completely specified probabilistically. It supports the definition 
of cases, which represent probabilistic choices of actions at the firing of an activity. It is 
also possible to specify places belonging to different sub-models as the same and unique 
place. 
Despite the specificities of each one of them, models can be transformed between each 
other. We have considered transformations that preserve, as much as possible, the model 
structure. Both formalisms incorporate the basic features that are states, and transitions, 
with firing enablement determined by predicates. Based on these basic features, one can 
transform the content of basic models that serve as sub-models in composed models. 
However, the distribution functions, which are integrally part of the activities specification 
in SAN, are taken into account in AltaRica as external parameters of the model, and thus 
cannot be state dependent. The two formalisms also manage differently model 
composition. Sub-models are composed in SAN using the Join operator based on shared 
places. AltaRica uses assertions, based on input and output variables, and events 
synchronizations. Nonetheless, the composition features of each one give place to the 
composition features of the other one thanks to some adjustments. 
Considering the transformation from AltaRica to SAN, respecting the AltaRica model 
structure, the SAN model obtained may be composed of very small sub-models due to the 
fact that every system component leads to the creation of a sub-node in the AltaRica 
model. It may be more interesting to aggregate some of them into sub-models 
corresponding to intermediate levels in the AltaRica model, in order to reduce the number 
of sub-models obtained.  
The SAN formalism is used in the next chapter to develop case studies experimenting the 
modeling approach presented in the previous chapter. The implementation using AltaRica 





IV Case Studies 
This chapter presents two case studies to illustrate the implementation of the modeling 
approach presented in chapter II, using the SAN formalism presented in chapter III. The 
first case study concerns the A340 rudder control subsystem [Bernard et al. 2007]. A 
corresponding model is presented in [Tiassou et al. 2011b] which highlights the different 
categories of information to be included in the models. The second case study concerns 
the A320 electric supply subsystem, which is characterized by several reconfiguration 
mechanisms. Examples of evaluation results are presented in each case study. Also, based 
on the model corresponding to the rudder control subsystem, we investigate the need of 
updating the model during operation, especially the impact of changes on the assessments. 
We consider the major changes identified in chapter II, and proceed to hypothetical 
experimentation of their impact on the mission reliability. 
The chapter is presented as follows. The necessary information for modeling the rudder 
control system is given firstly; we present the subsystem description together with its 
related operational requirements, and an informal description aimed at giving detailed 
information for the description with a modeling formalism. We then present the SAN 
corresponding model. We set the parameters of the model to give examples of evaluation 
results. The examples of evaluation results are extended by the study of the valuable role 
of re-assessing the operational dependability after major changes during missions’ 
achievement. Finally, the case study corresponding to the electric supply subsystem is 
presented. 
IV.1 Modeling the Rudder Control Subsystem 
The rudder is a movable surface located at the rear of the aircraft. It is used to control the 
movement of the aircraft around its vertical axis. The following describes the subsystem 
that is used to command its movement. 
IV.1.1 Presentation of the rudder control subsystem 
The subsystem is, as illustrated in Figure IV.1, composed of three primary computers (P1, 
P2, P3), a secondary computer S1, three servo-controls (ServoCtrl_G, ServoCtrl_B and 
ServoCtrl_Y), a backup control module (BCM) and two backup power supplies (BPS_B 
and BPS_Y).  
The computers are connected to the servo-controls, which move the rudder. S1 and P1 are 
connected to the servo-control ServoCtrl_G, P2 is connected to ServoCtrl_B, and P3 is 
connected to ServoCtrl_Y. The connection between a computer and a servo-control form a 
control line that can act on the rudder. Thus, four control lines can be distinguished: 
• P1 control line (PL1): formed by the connection between P1 and ServoCtrl_G, 
• P2 control line (PL2): formed by the connection between P2 and ServoCtrl_B, 
• P3 control line (PL3): formed by the connection between P3 and ServoCtrl_Y, 
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• S1 control line (SL): formed by the connection between S1 and ServoCtrl_G.  
We have also a backup control line (BCL), which is based on BCM, BPS_B, BPS_Y, 
ServoCtrl_Y and ServoCtrl_B. 
 
Figure IV.1 The rudder control system 
Initially the secondary computer S1, the backup control module BCM and the backup 
power supplies BPS_B and BPS_Y are inhibited. The rudder is then controlled by the 
three primary control lines (PL1, PL2, PL3). When the three primary control lines fail, S1 
is activated and the system switches to SL. If the latter also fails, BCM, BPS_B and 
BPS_Y are activated enabling the backup control. Therefore, three control modes can be 
distinguished: the primary control (PC), the secondary control (SC) and the backup control 
(BC). Figure IV.2 summarizes the control modes. 
 
Figure IV.2: The control modes and associated control lines 
The subsystem uses electric and hydraulic power to control the rudder. The computers use 
electric power from two different distribution sources (ElecP1S1 and ElecP2P3) as shown 
in Figure IV.1. Each of the three servo-controls uses hydraulic power from a different 
distribution line, namely hyd_G, hyd_B, hyd_Y. The hydraulic power inputs are not 
shown on Figure IV.1 since their behaviors are not analyzed. They are considered always 
available. 
Related operational requirements: According to [MMEL 2008]4,  
• OR1: the failure of any component among P2, ServoCtrl_G, ServoCtrl_Y, 
ServoCtrl_B, BCM, BPS_B or BPS_Y leads to “No-Go” status.  
• OR2: the failure of any component among P1, P3 and S1 is “Go-If”: 
! P3 and S1 must be operational if P1 is failed 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 [MMEL 2008] is actually a Master MEL (MMEL). MELs result from the completion of MMELs with 




! P1 and S1 must be operational if P1 is failed. 
! P1, P2 and P3 must be operational if P1 is failed5. 
There is no mission profile requirement related to the subsystem in the Flight Crew 
Operating Manual (FCOM) that we have consulted. 
Based on the system description, one can build the core model that represents the basic 
part of the stochastic model. We present in the following an informal description 
highlighting the kinds of data that should be used while developing the model using the 
meta-model.  
IV.1.2 The core model specification 
The meta-model that serves as basis for the core model development is defined in section 
II.3.2 of chapter II. This specification uses its features. 
 All the components have similar behaviors and are represented using the features related 
to the Eclass SysComponent. As identifier (id), the component name or an identification 
number can be defined. A state variable with a domain defined by the set {ok, failed} is 
considered; the initial value is ok.  
For the related events, we consider a failure event, which changes the state from “ok” to 
“failed”, and a maintenance event that restores the state to “ok”. We assume that the 
failure event occurs while in flight, since it is usually characterized by a rate per flight 
hour. For this, we use an interfacing object CP (instance of CurrentProcess - Figure II.11), 
between the core and the mission dependent models, which represents the period of the 
mission profile that is being achieved. For the expression of the guard of the maintenance 
event, authorization information (CP_M) from the mission dependent model is needed to 
enable the event. For example, the events are defined as follows for P1: 
Failure event: 
  Name: P1_failure 
 guard: state=ok and CP-type=flight; effect state=failed 
 TTOdistrib: distribLaw=exponential, parameter: lambda=2E-4 
Maintenance activity: 
 Name: maintainP1 
 guard: state= failed and id % CP-M; effect state=ok 
 TTOdistrib: distribLaw=deterministic, parameter: t=1 
For the secondary computer and the backup control components, the activation and 
deactivation scenarios are represented. The activation and deactivation depend on the state 
of the primary control lines (PL1, PL2, PL3). The primary control lines are represented 
using instances of Dependency. Instances PL1, PL2, and PL3 represent respectively the 
state of the connection between P1 and ServoCtrl_G, the state of the connection between 
P2 and ServoCtrl_B, and the state of the connection between P3 and ServoCtrl_Y. The 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
=!These are not actually the full conditions, we only consider the conditions related to the components 
involved in the subsystem described.!
!"#$%$&'(!)*+$&(#),&-!$+-#&.#-#(/!0!"!1)2+-3.&4+2!&**$)&%5!&,2!%&4+!4(62#+4!
! 86 
resulting state variables, named PL1-state, PL2-state and PL3-state, have the set {ok, 
failed} as domain and their values are determined by the following combination function 
(relation), using PL1 as example.  
 PL1-state = ok  
if P1-state=ok and ServoCtrl_G-state=ok and  
ElecP1S1 and hyd_G   
otherwise PL1-state = failed 
 
(IV-1) 
ElecP1S1 and hyd_G are input data from other subsystems. As we are considering the 
rudder control subsystem alone, ElecP1S1 and hyd_G are considered always available. 
The requirements expressed at the end section IV.1.1 are not dependent on any mission 
profile. They are part of the minimum requirements (Min_Sys_R), to which may be added 
requirements specific to a given mission profile. They are expressed using the features 
defined in the meta-model of Figure II.10. 
The attribute reference is not used here since it is used only during model updates in 
operation. The requirements are considered initially satisfied, i.e., status=satisfied. The 
expression of Min_Sys_R is formulated as the conjunction of OR1 and OR2 (see section 
IV.1.1): 
OR1: The condition related to the “no go” components is as: 
P2 =ok # ServoCtrl_G =ok # ServoCtrl_Y =ok # ServoCtrl_B =ok # 
BCM =ok # BPS_B =ok # BPS_Y =ok 
OR2: The operational conditions related to the “go if” components are expressed as 
follows: 
! (P1=ok) & (S1=ok ' P3=ok);  
! (P3=ok) & (S1=ok ' P1=ok);  
! (S1=ok) & (P1=ok ' P2=ok ' P3 =ok). 
The conjunction of the conditions of OR2 and the expression of OR1 gives Min_Sys_R.  
Min_Sys_R= { P2=ok ' ServoCtrl_G =ok ' ServoCtrl_Y =ok ' ServoCtrl_B=ok 
' BCM=ok ' BPS_B=ok ' BPS_Y =ok '  
(P1 =ok & (S1 =ok ' P3 =ok)) ' 
(P3 =ok & (S1 =ok ' P1 =ok)) ' 
(S1 =ok & (P1 =ok ' P2=ok ' P3 =ok)) } 
 
(IV-2) 
The conditions are actually derived from high-level constraints based, in our case, on the 
ability to control the rudder in case of failure during a flight. They are rather dependent on 




Min_Sys_R = ( PL2 =ok ' (PL1 =ok & (PL3 =ok ' SL =ok)) ' 
(PL3 =ok & (PL1 =ok ' SL =ok)) ' BCL =ok ' 
(SL =ok & (PL1 =ok ' PL3 =ok))  ). 
 
(IV-3) 
This means that the requirements are satisfied as long as (PL2, BCL and at least two of 
PL1, PL2 and SL) are operative. 
The core model is to be composed with a mission dependent model in order to take into 
account the mission profile characteristics. For this, one has to define a mission profile. 
IV.1.3 A mission dependent model 
Different mission dependent models may be defined to represent different mission 
profiles. Different ways of decomposing the flights into phases can be considered, with 
each scenario leading to a different flight profile. For the case studies, we consider a 
parametric mission dependent model. It can be tuned to obtain different scenarios of 
mission profile.  
A mission is composed of a sequence of a number (NbFlights) flights, as defined in the 
meta-model (Figure II.11). Each of them is represented based on CompleteFlight, which is 
in turn represented by instances of GroundPeriod and FlightPeriod. For their 
identification (id), they are numbered.  
All the ground periods have the same structure, i.e., composed of 3 instances of 
GroundActivity: scheduled maintenance, unscheduled maintenance and the other activities 
during the flight preparation. A duration pgd is considered as associated planned duration. 
The ground period comprises a period of scheduled maintenance activities whose duration 
SM_Time is considered deterministic. The unscheduled maintenance is an extension of the 
scheduled maintenance. It takes place when the dispatch requirements are not satisfied. 
The other activities are considered to have a given duration oad. 
The flight periods are divided into three phases denominated Taxing_to_Takeoff, In_Flight 
and Landing. They are characterized as follows: 
Taxing_to_Takeoff 
 duration: distribLaw=deterministic, parameter: t=ttd 
In_Flight 
 duration: distribLaw=deterministic, parameter: t=ifd 
Landing 
 duration: distribLaw=deterministic, parameter: t=ld 
The variables tttd, ifd and ld are the estimated duration of these phases. For illustration 
purpose, we consider that Min_Sys_R is the requirement related to these phases. 
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Maintenance policy: We assume that the maintenance activities take place at the main-
base-station, and therefore no logistic delay time is considered. For the prioritization of 
maintenance, “no-go” components are considered primarily during unscheduled 
maintenance. A predefined ordered list of failed components is considered for scheduled 
maintenance. The priorityList is thus a simple ordered list of the id of the components to 
maintain. 
The following section presents an implementation of this description as a concrete model 
using the SAN formalism. 
IV.2 The Model Using SAN Formalism 
We consider the Stochastic Activity Network formalism and the associated Möbius tool, 
which provide compositional operators that are convenient to master the complexity of the 
model. 
IV.2.1  The core model 
The core model consists of the subsystem and its related requirements representation. In 
AltaRica, the model distinguishes each basic system component by using a sub-node for 
each of them. In SAN, the representation of a basic system component is too small to be 
considered as a sub-model. Figure IV.3 shows for example the representation of the 
primary computer P2, in AltaRica and SAN. The complete AltaRica model of the case 
study is given in annex. Considering a sub-model for each basic component will lead to a 
considerable number of very small sub-models to manage separately. 
 
Figure IV.3 Primary computer P2 model 
To simplify the presentation, we consider a decomposition into three sub models 
corresponding to the control modes given in Figure IV.2. Figure IV.4 shows the 
corresponding core model structure.  The subsystem interface is composed of the control 
lines states information that is used to explicitly express requirements, as represented in 




Figure IV.4 The core model structure of the rudder control subsystem 
Also, to ease the understanding of the model, the representations of the system 
components are based on their name as presented in Figure IV.1, rather than using a 
particular identification number. The marking of their corresponding places represents 
their state value (ok or failed).  
Activities named xxx_failure represent failure events. Activities Maintainxx represent 
maintenance activities and are enabled based on the extended place CP. CP provides 
information about the phase of the mission that is being achieved. CP is essentially used to 
determine whether a flight is ongoing or whether maintenance activities are allowed. It is 
controlled by the mission dependent model. Places ElecP1S1, ElecP2P3, hyd_G, hyd_B, 
and hyd_Y represent the electric and hydraulic power supply inputs to the model.  
For clarity purpose, some places involved in the predicate or function of the input gates 
are not explicitly linked to them; this is allowed by the modeling tool Möbius.  
Primary control (PC) model is given in Figure IV.5.  
 
Figure IV.5: PC sub model 
The transitions representing the maintenance activities (Maintainxx) are at the left side and 
the failure events (xxx_failure) at the right side of the places representing the basic 
components. Their associated input gates control their firings according to the guards and 
effects specified in subsection IV.1.2. Transition P1(3)deferExpire represents the 
expiration of the deadline before which the computer must be maintained after being 
!"#$%$&'(!)*+$&(#),&-!$+-#&.#-#(/!0!"!1)2+-3.&4+2!&**$)&%5!&,2!%&4+!4(62#+4!
! 90 
failed. This doesn’t concern P2 since its maintenance is not deferrable (“no go” 
component).  
Places PLi represent the state of the lines PLi. The places PLi are set according to 
expression (IV-1), given as example for PL1 in subsection IV.1.2. CP is used in the 
predicates of the input gates to enable the failure and maintenance activities as explained 
above. 
Secondary control (SC) is represented in Figure IV.6. Place S1Active represents the 
activation state of S1. That is when PC fails, the instantaneous activity S1_active fires in 
order to mark place S1Active, representing the failover to SL. S1_inhib models the 
inhibition event. It fires when one of PL1, PL2 and PL3 becomes marked again, removing 
the token from S1Active. 
 
Figure IV.6: SC sub model 
PL1, PL2 and PL3 are shared with the PC sub model, which controls their makings. They 
are only used in the predicates of IGS1A and IGS1I to express whether PC is failed or not. 
S1_hidden_failure and S1_active_failure model respectively the failure events of S1 while 
inhibited and activated.  
SL represents the functioning state of the secondary control line. It holds when S1, 
ServoCtrl_G, hyd_G and ElecP1S1 hold. ServoCtrl_G is shared with PC sub model. 
The Backup control (BC) model is depicted in Figure IV.7. BPS_BActive and 
BPS_YActive describe the inhibition and the activation of BPS_B and BPS_Y. That is, 
when PL1 and SL are inoperative, BPS_B and BPS_Y are activated to supply power to 
BCM. They are inhibited when PL1 or SL is operative. BPS_BActive and BPS_YActive are 
updated by their associated instantaneous transitions, which fire according to the marking 
of PL1 and SL as described above.  
ActivateBCM represents the use of the BCM to control the surface; when none of the 
primary and secondary control lines is operative and BPS_B or BPS_Y supply the BCM 
with electric power, the BCM is activated to attempt to control the surface via 
ServoCtrl_Y or ServoCtrl_B. B_YCoutput and B_BCoutput represent respectively the use 
of power from BPS_Y and BPS_B.  
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BCL represents the fulfillment of the requirements concerning the components of the line. 
It is marked when BCM, BPS_B, BPS_Y, ServoCtrl_B, ServoCtrl_Y, hyd_B and hyd_Y are 
marked. Places PL1, PL2, PL3, ServoCtrl_B and ServoCtrl_Y are shared with PC sub 
model; and SL with SC sub model. Their marking are used as input to the BC sub model 
as they are involved in the activation and inhibition of the BC. 
 
Figure IV.7: BC sub model 
As only one subsystem is considered in this case study, the composition of PC, SC and BC 
sub models correspond to the system description. The place representing the states of the 
control lines are used to express the related requirements. Figure IV.8 shows the core 
model with an explicit representation of the requirements expression.  
 
Figure IV.8: The core model with an explicit representation of the requirements expression 
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Place Min_Sys_R models the fulfillment of the requirements. The firings of the 
instantaneous activities Fulfilled and Not_ Fulfilled update the place according to the 
satisfaction of the expression (IV-3). 
The underlying principle of the requirements expression is to use the state information of 
the different system functions and components to model the different constraints related to 
the mission without having to change the core model content. Therefore, other 
requirements can be expressed similarly, provided the corresponding Boolean expression 
on which will be based the predicate of the gates is given. 
The core model is the basic part of the initial model. The updates that will affect it during 
operation concern the component states changes, the failures distribution and the 
maintenance activities duration’s distribution.  
Min_Sys_R is used to make the connection with the mission dependent model that is 
described in the following. 
IV.2.2 The mission dependent model  
As the supporting tool Möbius allows the construction of parametric models, the mission 
dependent model is based on a generic structure that is to be set by specifying the number 
of flights for each mission and the duration parameters of each flight.  
The mission dependent model is shown in Figure IV.9. It is composed of two parts. The 
upper part represents a flight and the lower part represents the activities on ground at a 
stop.  
 
Figure IV.9: The generic mission dependent model 
A flight is represented by three phases Taxing_to_TakeOff, In_Flight and Landing as 
defined in section IV.1.3. During the Taxing_to_TakeOff the flight can be aborted and it 
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can be diverted during the In_Flight phase. The input gates AbortCondition and 
DiversionCondition represent the conditions under which these interruptions can occur 
(in-flight requirements fulfillment). The conditions are stated using the marking of 
Min_Sys_R, which is assumed to be the related requirement for illustration purpose. Place 
CP_Flight indicates whether a flight is ongoing or not.  
The sub model of a ground period consists of the representation of the preparation for the 
next flight and the readiness for departure on time. The beginning of the preparation for 
the upcoming flight is represented by the marking of places Ground_Preparation and 
Scheduled_maintenance, stating that the scheduled ground period is ongoing and the 
system is under scheduled maintenance) When the scheduled maintenance is finished 
(activity SM_Time fires), the place Dispatchability then holds and the instantaneous 
activity Allow can fire if the dispatch requirements, stated in the predicate of 
Dispatch_condition, are fulfilled. Otherwise the instantaneous activity 
Require_maintenance fires if the corrective action requires maintenance tasks (stated by 
the predicate of No_Dispatch), place Dispatchability still holds until the corrective action 
succeeds (predicate of Dispatch_condition becomes true) and the flight is allowed.  
The management of the maintenance is that the extended place MProg is made of lists that 
determine, for each ground period, the failed components to consider firstly for the 
maintenance. Place CP_M is set with a number that identifies the component to maintain 
and it is used in the core model to allow the corresponding maintenance activities. 
In the current illustration, the dispatch requirements fulfillment consists of testing the 
marking of DR, which is assumed to be the same as Min_Sys_R. The non-fulfillment of 
the dispatch requirements may require longer duration for the accomplishment of the 
ground activities since unscheduled maintenance activities may be required. Until the end 
of the ground activities, the scheduled ground duration may have elapsed (firing of activity 
OnGround_duration moving the token to place Pending_Departure) and the tolerable 
delay (Max tolerated time) may be running out. A delay or cancellation occurs if the 
tolerated time to dispatch is exceeded. The timed transition Next_flight_preparation 
represents the other activities (passengers and baggage processing …) that may consume 
time, causing delay. Place Prof (at right) is an extended place representing the parameters 
of the list of flights to be achieved. The input gate linked to this place indicates whether 
there is a next flight to achieve or not (end of the mission or not).  
The global model results from the composition of the core and the mission dependent 
models, based on Min_Sys_R and CP (CP is represented by CP_M and CP_Flight in the 
mission dependent model). The obtained model is used to assess hypothetical scenarios 
whose results are presented in the following. 
IV.2.3 Example of assessment results 
To process the model and get the evaluation results, one has to set the initial markings and 
the parameters such as the distribution laws of the timed activities, using data collected 
during operation. In order to provide examples of evaluation results, hypothetical values 
are assumed for the parameters. We assume that all the failure events corresponding to the 
system components have exponential distributions. The default failure rates used are given 
in Table IV.1. It is worth mentioning that, in order to preserve the industrial 
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confidentiality, the values used have been selected to form a consistent set, without 
disclosing industrial properties. These values are used to set the core model by default. 
Changes of the rates or the failure distributions will be given by the prognosis module in 
operation.  

















Table IV.1 Default failure rates for the rudder control subsystem 
All the system components are also considered operational by default. The failed 
components will be identified by the diagnosis module during operation. 
IV.2.3.1 System reliability 
The system reliability concerns only the core model. SR corresponds to the probability 
that Min_Sys_R holds during a given period. It can be used to characterize the duration of 
the mission to assign to the aircraft. Curve 1 of Figure IV.10 shows the corresponding 
reliability curve computed with 95% of confidence level. All the system components are 
initially operative. This evaluation can be used while defining the mission to assign to the 
aircraft. From the evaluation, the maximum number of flight hours that can be achieved, 
with the reliability remaining above a given threshold can be determined. For example, 
considering 0.98 as the reliability threshold, the mission duration, without maintenance 
activities, is about 80 flight hours.  
 
Figure IV.10: System Reliability  
Case of a failed component: Curve 2 of Figure IV.10 shows the system reliability 
considering the failure of the primary computer P1; P1 state is set failed in the initial state 
of the model.  
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Curve 2 together with curve 1 of Figure IV.10 illustrate a situation where for example one 
has to decide on whether it is preferable to maintain the primary computer before 
considering a new mission or not. For a mission of 80 flight hours for example, the 
reliability decreases from 0.98 to 0.955 in case of P1 failed. To have a reliability of 0.98 in 
case of P1 failed, the maximum number of flight hours is about 35. 
The SR measure helps to estimate the length of mission to assign. To deal with the actual 
ability to succeed a given mission, its reliability MR must be evaluated taking into account 
the mission profile. After for example a failure, the MR measure of the remaining part of 
the mission can also be evaluated to ensure that the mission can successfully be completed 
without causing any disruption for the subsequent mission. Examples of mission reliability 
measures are presented in the following. 
IV.2.3.2 Mission reliability 
For the parameters of the mission dependent model, we consider a mission of 4 flights per 
day over a week. We assume that the timed activities of the mission dependent model have 
deterministic durations. Table IV.2 gives the default values used to set the mission 
dependent model.  






8.25 - end of day 




Table IV.2 Mission dependent model default parameters 
It is noteworthy that different distributions can be specified. Each flight takes 3 hours. The 
planned duration gpd of a ground period is 1.25 hours during the day and 8.25 hours at the 
end of the day (after 4 flights).  
The mission reliability MR is the probability to have no tokens in places 
Delay_Or_Cancellation, Back_to_Ramp and Diversion of Figure IV.9. We assume that, as 
long as MR is larger than a threshold, referred to as Minimum MR Requirement (MMRR), 
the mission can be continued. MMRR is to be set by the airline company, in agreement 
with the aircraft manufacturer. 
Figure IV.11 shows the mission reliability considering two initial states of the primary 
computer P1: P1-OK (P1 is ok at the starting of the mission), and P1-KO (P1 is failed at 
the starting of the mission), the other components are assumed OK at the start of the 
mission.  
Based the results, the time from which the reliability becomes lower than a given 
threshold can be determined. For example, considering 0.975 as MMRR, one has to 
consider strengthening its ability to maintain after 120h (end of the 5th day) in case of P1-
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KO. The curves also illustrate a situation where one has to decide on whether it is 
preferable to defer the maintenance of computer P1, knowing that there is one week 
remaining mission to achieve. With the assumed parameters, the reliability of the one-
week mission (t = 168h) will increase from 0.952 to 0.978 if P1 is repaired before 
achieving the mission. 
 
Figure IV.11: Mission Reliability  
Maintenance during the mission achievement: In the case that P1 is failed (P1-KO) 
before the mission, one can consider scenarios of maintenance during its achievement. 
Figure IV.12 shows the reliability measure corresponding to two scenarios of the 
maintenance deferment: 
- M1: Accomplishment of the maintenance the first day at night, 
- M2: Accomplishment of the maintenance the second day at night. 
These are taken into account in the model, through the authorization of the maintenance at 
the corresponding stations. Curve No-M corresponds to the case without maintenance 
authorization. 
 
Figure IV.12 Maintenance during the mission 
The reliability threshold of 0.975 is fulfilled in case M1 and not in case of M2. However, 
these are still estimations that are close, and since the magnitude of the difference is not so 
much considerable, one can decide to defer the maintenance if other factors like the cost 
are to be privileged.  
The examples show assessment results that analyze whether the reliability requirement of 
a given mission during a given period of time can be achieved or not. The assessment is 
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intended to be done again each time a major event occurs during the mission achievement. 
We examine in the next section the valuable role and the impact of the re-assessment in 
regard to the previous initial assessment. We also show how to use the assessment results 
to manage the mission and its associated maintenance activities. 
IV.3 Impact of Re-Assessments During Missions 
As the system will be continuously monitored, diagnosis and prognosis information will 
be notifying major changes in the system components’ functional state, their failure rates 
and distributions. For instance, the failure distribution of a computer may be initially 
following an exponential law and prognosis may denote, during the mission achievement, 
an increasing likelihood of failure, suggesting a failure distribution that is following a 
Weibull law. As these changes may affect the predicted mission reliability, the model 
must be updated with the new failure distribution in order to reevaluate the reliability.  
The major changes that we consider are the changes in the state of system components, the 
changes in components’ failure rates and the changes in mission profile. We firstly 
consider the impact of a failure occurrence during the mission, and show how the 
assessment results will help to determine when to repair this component. Then we show 
the impact of a failure distribution change before analyzing the impact of mission profile 
changes. We consider that MMRR = 0.975.  
IV.3.1 Component failure occurrence 
The single failures of P1 or S1 do not affect safety and do not prevent mission 
achievement. However, the failures of both components lead to a “No-Go” condition. 
Therefore the mission reliability can be assessed considering both cases. 
IV.3.1.1 Failure of primary computer P1 
Curve 0 of Figure IV.13-a shows the mission reliability, MR, as assessed before the 
beginning of the mission, with the assumption that all components are OK at the starting 
of the mission. It can be seen that at the end of the mission, MR is above MMRR. 
Curve 1 of Figure IV.13-b corresponds to the case where P1 has been diagnosed as 
inoperative at the end of day 4. MR is thus re-assessed, considering i) as initial time (t=0) 
day 5, and ii) P1 is inoperative at t=0. MR is thus equal to 1 for each re-assessment, as the 
system is in an operative global state at the time the model execution is performed (the 
system is inspected and the global operational state is ensured). It can be seen that the new 
assessed measure is still above MMRR at the end of the whole planned mission. The 
mission can be continued without maintenance until its end, unless a new event occurs, in 
which case a new re-assessment will be needed.  
Curve 2 of Figure IV.13-c corresponds to the case where P1 has been diagnosed as 
inoperative at the end of day 2. As for the previous case, MR is re-assessed, considering i) 
as initial time the next day (i. e., day 3), and ii) P1 is inoperative at t=0. It can be seen that 
MR is below MMRR from day 5. This result shows that P1 has to be repaired no later than 









Figure IV.13 Impact of P1 failure during mission achievement 
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Of course, the earlier P1 is repaired the earlier the remaining mission reliability will be 
improved. However, spares are not available at all destinations, and one has to find the 
right time to repair P1, according to resource availability, while ensuring an MR above 
MMRR. Three situations are possible at this stage, considered below:  
• S3: P1 is repaired at the end of day 3,  
• S4: P1 is repaired at the end of day 4,  
• S5: P1 is repaired at the end of day 5.  
Figure IV.13-d, Figure IV.13-e and Figure IV.13-f correspond respectively to the three 
above situations. Curve X, X = {3, 4, 5}, is related to situation SX. It corresponds to the 
result of MR re-assessment, at end of day 2, assuming that P1 will be repaired at the end of 
day X. It can be seen that for S3 and S4, MR is above MMRR for the whole mission, while 
S5 leads to an MR below MMRR, at day 7. S5 improves MR but not enough to avoid an 
MR below the threshold. This means that P1 should be repaired either in day 3 or day 4, 
depending where and when the maintenance can take place. 
It can be seen that curves 1 and 2 have the same slope but shifted in time, which is not 
surprising, as they have been obtained from the same model, with the same initial states of 
the components and the same exponential distributions. Indeed, we have assumed 
exponential distributions for all components to show that the operational changes will 
induce perceptible changes in the results. 
With the modeling approach used and the available tools, it is possible to consider other 
distributions and to take into account the age of the other components involved in the 
analysis. However, aging is a long-term variation process, the granularity of changes is 
much larger than one day or one week (the duration of a mission). In addition, very small 
variation of the failure rates of the components during a mission induces a non-perceptible 
variation in the reliability curves. However, we will see in the subsection IV.3.2 that 
changes in components’ distributions can have a significant impact. 
IV.3.1.2 Failure of secondary computer S1 
Curves 6 and 7 of Figure IV.14 show the re-assessment of MR after the secondary 
computer S1 failure, respectively during day 4 and day 2. These curves are to be compared 
to curves 1 and 2 of Figure IV.13-b and Figure IV.13-c. Curve 0 is the same for all 
figures.  
 
Figure IV.14 Impact of S1 failure during mission achievement  
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Curve 6 is below curve 1 and Curve 7 is below curve 2. This means that S1 has a more 
negative impact on the remaining mission reliability than P1. This is due to the fact that P1 
failure rate is greater than S1 failure rate. The requirements are that one of computers P1 
and S1 must be operative in order to achieve the mission. Therefore the risk of interrupting 
the mission is higher when S1 is inoperative than when P1 is inoperative. 
IV.3.2 Changes in failure distribution 
The prognostic is based on long-term observations of specific parameters during the whole 
life of multiple aircraft of the same family. It is based on statistics as well as on other 
approaches that provide an acceptable confidence. Prognostic results are usually made 
available from time to time (that can be of the order of magnitude of few months to few 
years), without any synchronization with mission achievements.  
The aim of this analysis is to check the impact of the distribution change when the 
notification is received. This does not mean that the distribution has suddenly changed 
during the mission. This corresponds to the case where the notification of the distribution 
change takes place during the mission. 
The impact of the primary computer P2 failure on mission reliability is larger than the 
impact of P1 or S1 failures, because the failure of P2 leads directly to an inoperative state. 
Let us assume that, based on the various observation means used by the prognostic 
process: 
• P2 failure has been first identified as following an exponential distribution, with a 
mean time to failure, MTTF0 = 5000 flight hours.  
• During day 2, a new distribution is notified.  
For purpose of illustration, we consider two possible distributions for the failure rate of 
P2, D1 and D2: 
• D1: is a conditional Weibull distribution with shape parameter 1=2.5 (1>1 
represents an increasing failure rate), scale parameter 2=5635 and elapsed time 
Te=5000.  
• D2: is also an exponential distribution, with a mean time to failure,              
MTTF1 = MTTF0 / 2 (on average 4 failures per year instead of 2 failures per year).  
Figure IV.15 shows the impact of the distribution change from exponential (curve 0) to 
Weibull (curve 8). Curve 8 corresponds to a prognostic issued at day 2 of the mission. The 
rapid reliability decrease of curve 8 compared to curve 0 results from the increasing failure 
rate of computer P2.  
Curve 8 shows in particular that with a Weibull distribution, MR is almost equal to MMRR 
at the end of the mission.  
The curve corresponding to distribution D2 is very similar to curve 8. It is slightly below 
this curve from day 5, due to the fact that the failure rate of D2 is on average higher than 
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that of D1. It is in particular below MMRR for day 7. As a result, the mission should be 
modified, most probably shortened, to satisfy the MMRR condition. 
 
Figure IV.15 Failure distribution change, notified and integrated at day 2 
These results show that for some impacting parameters, taking into account the newly 
identified distribution, as soon as it is notified, is very important, while it is less important 
for some other parameters. Such analyses should be performed during the building of the 
model to identify the most sensitive parameters for which mission reliability re-assessment 
is recommended as soon as a new distribution is notified.  
IV.3.3 Change in the mission profile 
Aircraft operations depend on various external factors. In particular, some unforeseen 
events, that do not necessarily affect directly the aircraft itself, may lead to a change of the 
initial mission. For example, an aircraft may be assigned new flights with different 
durations, or additional flights that were initially assigned for another aircraft that should 
undergo a repair. Such changes require the re-assessment of the mission reliability.  
To illustrate the impact of changes in mission profile, we have considered four profiles, 











Figure IV.16 Mission profiles (number and duration of flights per day) 
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• PR0: the initial assignment, 4 flights per day during 7 days, the duration of each 
flight is 3 hours. PR0 corresponds to the case considered for the previous 
assessments. 
• PR1: 5 flights per day from day 2 (corresponds to a mission change after day 1), 
same durations of flights. 
• PR2: 2 flights per day from day 2, the duration of each flight is 9 hours. 
• PR3: 2 flights per day from day 2 to day 4, the duration of each flight is 9 hours, 
then again 4 flights per day, 3 hours each, from day 5. 
Figure IV.17 gives MR for PR0 and PR1. One can see that the reliability values for PR1 is 
lower than the values for PR0 after 6 days. However, the minimal mission reliability 
requirement (MMRR = 0.975) is still satisfied.  
 
Figure IV.17 Mission changes from PR0 to PR1 
Figure IV.18 gives MR for PR0, PR2 and PR3. For PR2, MR becomes lower than MMRR. 
One can consider adjusting this new profile in order to improve the mission reliability. A 
possible mission adjustment could correspond to PR3. The mission reliability with the 
adjusted profile PR3 becomes approximately the same as the initial one, and the MMRR is 
again satisfied. 
 
Figure IV.18 Mission adjustment from PR2 to PR3  
These examples show the magnitude of online changes impact on the assessment, using 
the rudder control subsystem. In the next section, we consider another subsystem, the 
electrical power supply subsystem. 
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IV.4 Modeling the Electric Supply Subsystem 
In the case study previously presented, we have assumed that the electrical power 
provided through ElecS1P1 and ElecP2P3 in Figure IV.1 is always available. In this 
section, we build the core model corresponding to the electric supply subsystem and 
compose it with the generic mission dependent model proposed in Figure IV.9. The 
composition of the electric supply subsystem and the rudder control subsystem has also 
been considered; its resulting analysis is briefly described in the assessment results. The 
following subsection presents the description of the electric supply system. 
IV.4.1 Description of the electric supply subsystem 
The electrical subsystem, which is presented in Figure IV.19, includes generators, bus 
bars, contactors, Transformers/Rectifiers Units and junctions.  
 
Figure IV.19 Electric supply subsystem  
The delivery of the electric power is based on two main nominal generators GEN1, GEN2, 
and an emergency generator CSM_G, which is automatically deployed in case of the main 
generators loss. The subsystem includes essential components (xx_ESS) based on which 
the electricity is still supplied when the emergency generator CSM_G is deployed. The 
electricity is supplied to the electrical loads through four nominal distribution bus bars 
AC1, DC1, AC2, DC2 and two essential bus bars AC_ESS and DC_ESS. AC1, AC2 and 
AC_ESS are alternative current distribution bars. DC1, DC2 and DC_ESS are direct 
current distribution bars. The alternative current is converted to direct current by the 
transformers TR1, TR2 and TR_ESS. Based on the segregation of the subsystem 
components, three electrical supply lines can be identified in the system: 
• Side1, composed of the generator GEN1, the distribution bus bars AC1 and DC1, 
and the transformer TR1. 
• Side2, composed of the generator GEN2, the distribution bus bars AC2 and DC2, 
and the transformer TR2. 
• SideESS, composed of the generator CSM_G, the distribution bus bars AC ESS 
and DC ESS, and the transformer TR ESS. It is the essential line. 
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These lines are connected to each other by junctions (Jxx) so as to enable various 
reconfigurations. Various contactors (xxct), installed between the components, are used to 
control the reconfigurations corresponding to different scenarios of closing and opening 
the contactors, implemented by a controller. Any nominal generator (GEN1 or GEN2) can 
be used to provide electricity to all the distribution bus bars. This case study focuses on 
failure-based reconfigurations that can be automatically triggered.  
Initially, GEN1 supplies the components of Side1 and SideESS with current. GEN2 
supplies side2. If GEN1 fails, the contactors GEN12ct and AC2ESSct, initially opened, 
are closed and GEN2 is used to supply all the bus bars. Similarly, GEN1 supplies the 
whole system if GEN2 fails. If both nominal generators are lost, the emergency generator 
CSM_G only provides power to the essential bus bars AC_ESS and DC_ESS. 
The failure of AC1 blocks the transmission of the power provided by GEN1 to the rest of 
the system. GEN2 is used in this case to supply the whole system. In the case of GEN2 
failure, contactor GEN12ct, which makes the connection between the two nominal lines, is 
closed so as to use the power provided by GEN1 to supply the system, through AC2. The 
failure of AC2 is similarly managed by a switch to Side1. In case of the failure of both 
AC1 and AC2, contactor CSM_Gct is closed so as to use power from the emergency 
generator CSM_G. Only AC_ESS and DC_ESS are supplied in that case. 
The failure of a nominal transformer is managed by the use of power from the other line to 
feed the corresponding DC. The failure of both of them leads to the use of the essential 
transformer TR_ESS, which is not used in nominal case, to supply the direct bus bars. The 
power is then transmitted from the nominal generators via AC_ESS and J4 to TR_ESS. 
Concerning the requirements, all the components of the emergency line SideESS are No-
go. For the nominal part of the system, the Go-If requirement can be summed up as 
electricity distribution must be possible via DC1 or DC2. 
IV.4.2 The model of the electric supply subsystem  
The characteristic of the electrical system is that the transmission of the power introduces 
dependencies between the components. A component can deliver its function only if it is 
powered, and it can be powered only if the intermediate transmitting components are 
functional. Therefore the power transmitting mechanism must be fully represented. The 
links ensuring the transmission between the components may be bidirectional, due to the 
various possible reconfigurations. For instance, the current is directed from DC1 to DC2 
when GEN2 is not operational and it is the inverse when GEN1 is not operational. The 
approach to model such behavior is based on representing, in addition to the components 
state, the status of the links between them. This was already implemented [Kehren et al. 
2004] to build a corresponding model for safety analysis, using the AltaRica formalism, 
which naturally manages flow propagation mechanisms. The following concerns a 
representation using the SAN formalism. 
IV.4.2.1 Basic features of the subsystem model 
The data specification for the represented electric supply subsystem is similar to the case 
of the rudder control subsystem (in subsection IV.1.2). The basic components (generators, 
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bus bars, and transformers) are represented as instances of the meta-model Eclass 
SysComponent, using state variables and activities corresponding to the maintenance and 
failure events. For the representation of the status of the links, instances of meta-model’s 
Eclass Dependency are used. Each portion of link, between the basic components, the 
contactors and the junctions, is represented as a variable (or two if both directions are 
possible) representing the presence of the current. Figure IV.20 gives the principle, taking 
as example the transformer TR1 and the link with the contactor TR1ct, which bears its 
output.  
 
Figure IV.20 Example of component and link representation 
The portion of the system is shown at the left side of Figure IV.20 and the model of the 
component TR1 together with the state of the link TR1-TR1ct is at the right side. 
Place TR1_State represents the state the component TR1. TR1_M and TR1_Fail represent 
respectively the maintenance and the failure activities. Place TR1_TR1ct represents the 
status of the link between TR1 and TR1ct i.e., whether power is being transmitted on this 
portion of link or not. The link TR1-TR1ct is powered if TR1 is powered and still 
operational, i.e., the link J9-TR1 is powered and TR1 state is ok. The instantaneous 
activity setTR1_TR1ct is used to update place TR1_TR1ct according to changes of TR1 
state and the powering of J9-TR1. The use of a separate instantaneous activity to update 
TR1_TR1ct is necessary, otherwise one has to cope with the complexity of determining the 
events that are involved in the powering of J9-TR1, in order to reflect changes. It is worth 
noting that TR1_TR1ct represents a directed transmission from TR1 to TR1ct. For some 
links, depending on the configuration that is being used, the power transmission may use 
the inverse direction. The states of both directions are represented in those cases. 
Figure IV.20 shows the representation of a basic component and the use of its input link 
status to represent the status of the link that bears its output.  The status of the links related 
to the junctions and the contactors are depicted using the same principle. The difference 
from a junction is that there is no state variable and two input links statuses are used to 
determine the status of an output link. The difference from the case of a contactor is that 
the state variable represents whether the contactor is closed or not, and it is determined 
based on the reconfiguration policy.  
Figure IV.21 gives an example of a contactor representation considering the contactor 
DC1ct. Place DC1ctClose represents whether DC1ct is closed or not, and it is set based on 
the reconfiguration policy specified as a condition in the input gate IGSetDC1ctClose. For 
this particular case of failure-based reconfiguration, DC1ct is closed only when i) at least 
one of the nominal generators (GEN1 or GEN2) is operational, and ii) the bus bar DC1 is 
powered. Place DC1ct_J10 represents the status of the output link of the contactor. It 




Figure IV.21 A contactor output representation 
Figure IV.22 shows an example of a junction output representation. The current flow is 
supposed to be directed from DC1ct or DC2ct to J10, and the output of the junction, 
supported by J10-DCESSct. Place J10_DCESSct is thus updated by the instantaneous 
activity setJ10_DCESSct when the relation J10_DCESSct = DC1ct_J10 or DC2ct_J10 no 
longer holds. The verification of this relation is controlled by the input gate 
IGSetJ10_DCESSct, 
 
Figure IV.22 Output of a junction 
These examples describe the basic principle to model the subsystem. The overall model 
corresponding to the electric supply subsystem is presented in the following subsection. 
IV.4.2.2 The overall model  
In order to simplify the construction of the core model, it is decomposed based on the 
three lines presented in section IV.4.1. Figure IV.23 shows the overall structure of the core 
model. 
 
Figure IV.23 Structure of the core model corresponding to the electric subsystem  
Side 1 and Side 2 are derived from the same sub model, since they are similar. A sub-
model is devoted to SideESS as it behaves differently. An additional sub model is used to 
represent the components that make the connection between the lines, and the conditions 
to close and open the contactors so as to reconfigure the system as a result of a component 
failure. It also expresses the requirements related to the subsystem. The SAN sub-models 
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are presented in the following. For clarity, all the links between the input gates and their 
input places are not shown. However, all the links with places, whose markings are 
controlled by the input gate, are shown. 
Figure IV.24 shows the sub-model associated to Side1 and Side2. The component names 
used are rather appropriate to side1. For the correspondence with side2, J2 and J9 must be 
replaced respectively by J3 and J7.  
 
Figure IV.24 Basic model for Side1 and Side2 
The understanding of the items contained in the sub-model is already given through the 
examples presented previously. The squares are intended to help distinguish the related 
components. Place DCSupply in the bottom right square represents whether the component 
DC1 (DC2 for side2) can distribute current or not. It is especially used in requirement 
verification as functional status of the line. It will be also used in the composition with the 
model of other subsystem. 
SideESS sub-model is shown in Figure IV.25. Place LineESS represents the global state of 
the line. It holds when all the components of the line are operational. The other standalone 




Figure IV.25 SideESS sub-model 
The sub-model representing the connection points and the control of the reconfiguration is 
shown in Figure IV.26.  
!
Figure IV.26 Connection and control sub-model 
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GEN12ct makes the connection between Side1 and Side2, AC1ESSct between Side1 and 
SideESS, AC2ESSct between Side2 and SideESS, and J10 between the three lines.  
Figure IV.26 also shows, at its bottom, place ElecSysReq, which models the satisfaction of 
the system requirement related to the whole electrical supply system. This place is set 
based on the global state of SideESS (all its components have to be operational), 
represented by place LineESS, and the ability to supply power via DC1 or DC2, 
represented by places DC1Supply and DC2Supply. LineESS is shared with SideESS sub-
model. DC1Supply and DC2Supply are shared respectively with Side1 and Side2 sub-
models.  
ElecSysReq is used in the composition with the mission dependent model, as a shared 
place, via an internal interface as shown in Figure IV.27. ElecSysReq corresponds to 
Min_Sys_R as the electric supply subsystem is considered alone in the core model. 
 
Figure IV.27 Connection with the mission model 
IV.4.3 Example of assessment results 
As for the rudder control system, we consider a coherent set of values, presented in Table 
IV.3, as default failure rates for the electric supply subsystem components.  









Table IV.3 Default failure rates for the electric supply subsystem components  
We firstly use the core model to analyze the system reliability. Then, we consider the 
mission reliability assessment. 
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IV.4.3.1 System Reliability Assessment  
Curve 1 of Figure IV.28 shows the system reliability corresponding to the electric 
subsystem. The reliability is above 0.99 for the horizon of 100 flight hours considered. 
 
Figure IV.28 System reliability  
Curve 2 of Figure IV.28 shows an example of result in case of failure, especially TR1 
failure. TR1 is selected because missions can be achieved with TR1 failed, provided that 
TR2 is operational. The reliability decreases of about 10-3 when TR1 is failed. The failure 
of TR2 gives the same results. 
Compared to the assessment with the rudder control subsystem, the reliability with regard 
to the electric supply subsystem is significantly better. The unreliability for 100 flight 
hours is in the range of 10-3 whereas it is 10-2 for the rudder control subsystem. This is due 
to the fact that the failure rates of the electric supply subsystem components are lower, and 
the subsystem includes several reconfiguration mechanisms that make it possible to keep 
the required DC supply available in different failure situations. Therefore, it may not be 
necessary to consider reliability with regard to the electric supply subsystem in the case 
that the failure rates of the rudder control subsystem components are significantly higher 
than those of the electric supply subsystem components. 
Considering failure rates of the same order of magnitude (#’=#*10 for the electric supply 
subsystem components) as for the rudder control subsystem leads to a notable decrease of 
the reliability. Curve 2 of Figure IV.29 shows the corresponding results; curve 1 
corresponds to the normal condition as in Figure IV.28. However, the reliability is still 
better compared to the rudder control subsystem, thanks to the reconfiguration 
mechanisms.  
 
Figure IV.29 SR with higher failure rates for the electric supply subsystem components 
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IV.4.3.2 Mission Reliability Assessment  
We consider the same basic mission profile parameters given in subsection IV.2.3.2. 
Figure IV.30 shows results of the mission reliability assessment based on the electric 
supply subsystem.  
Curve All-OK of Figure IV.30 shows the mission reliability considering that all the 
subsystem components are operational at the beginning of the mission. The mission 
reliability is above 0.999. Considering a case of failure, especially the case of TR1 failure 
represented by curve TR1-KO of Figure IV.30, the reliability is decreased of about 10-3, 
but is still higher than a threshold of 0.99, for example.  
 
Figure IV.30 Mission reliability 
TR1 maintenance scenarios: Figure IV.31 shows the reliability curves while considering 
the maintenance of TR1 during the mission achievement.  
 
Figure IV.31 MR considering TR1 maintenance during the mission 
Curve M2 shows the results for TR1 maintenance after two days, and curve M4 shows the 
results for the maintenance after 4 days of mission. Curve No-M corresponds to the case 
without maintenance. The difference in the mission reliabilities is not high (10-4 of 
magnitude) between the two cases of maintenance. Therefore, the maintenance can be 
further deferred, from case M2 to case M4, without significantly impacting the resulting 
mission reliability.  
It is worth mentioning that, as the electric supply subsystem is more reliable compared to 
the rudder control subsystem, the reliability results, obtained while composing their 
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corresponding models, do not significantly change in regard to the results corresponding 
to the latter subsystem. Nonetheless, notable decreases of the reliability are observed while 
increasing the failure rates of the electric supply subsystem components. 
IV.5 Conclusion 
The aims of this chapter are to illustrate the modeling approach that is presented in chapter 
II, to experiment scenarios of reliability assessments and to consolidate the need of re-
assessing, during missions achievement, the operational dependability after major events. 
The modeling approach that has been proposed is intended to support both qualitative and 
quantitative analyses. In this chapter, we concentrated on the quantitative analysis aspect 
to build the operational dependability model, using the SAN formalism. Several model-
based safety analysis studies, aimed at design improvement, have already experimented 
qualitative analysis aspects, by means of events cut-set generations and stepwise 
simulation. 
The quantitative analysis consists of system and mission reliability measures assessment. 
We have used at first the rudder control subsystem to build the model. The subsystem is 
composed, inter alia, of computers and servo-controls that form different lines capable of 
controlling the rudder. The different components and their dependencies are represented 
considering the features defined in the meta-model proposed in chapter II. A resulting core 
model is obtained. It corresponds to the basic part of the stochastic dependability model. 
The core model is to be composed with a mission dependent model that is best suited to 
the mission to achieve. We have defined a generic mission profile and have developed a 
corresponding mission dependent model that is parametric and allows for the analysis of 
different scenarios based on parameter tuning. The composition of this mission dependent 
model with the core model corresponds to the stochastic model.  
In order to provide quantitative results, the obtained stochastic model is set with 
illustrative parameters, and examples of numerical results have been obtained. The 
examples illustrate the valuable role that stochastic model-based dependability can play in 
the context of aircraft operation. Through more elaborated examples of illustration, we 
have given insights about the impact of reported changes on the reliability measure for the 
remaining mission time, that should be useful to adjust the mission if needed. 
We have secondly considered the electric supply subsystem. The corresponding core 
model is developed and composed with the generic mission dependent model previously 
developed. The obtained results shows higher reliability trends compared to the case of the 
rudder control subsystem, even while considering failure rates of the same order of 
magnitude. The electric supply subsystem includes several reconfiguration scenarios that 
ensure the power delivery in different failure cases. 
Considering the composition of the two models, the impact of the electric supply 
subsystem is significant only when it is degraded (components failure or increased failure 
rates). This consolidates the idea of considering only the subsystems that are affected by 
relevant degradations, instead of all the subsystems, when the assessment is subjected to a 
high time constraint.  
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Finally, it is worth noting that, in addition to the reliability measure, other criteria such as 
the cost may be determinant in the selection of the best solution for maintaining failed 
components. Nevertheless, the solution should comply with the reliability target defined.  
The solution may involve an adaptation of the mission profile so as to include an airport 
that is best suited for achievement of the maintenance activities. Modifying a mission 
profile may involve the reassignment of flights to other aircraft, extending the problem to 





Conclusion and Perspectives 
Dependability assessment, during aircraft design, is of common practice, and has been 
very useful for defining appropriate architectures satisfying the dependability 
requirements set for a given system. The assessments are based on techniques, such as 
model-based analyses, that capture the essential aspects of the system for forecasting its 
behavior. Nevertheless, the studies performed during the design phase are led by 
considerations that cover the whole operational life of the system, and therefore, are based 
on assumptions addressing the average behavior of the system. Additional assessments in 
service, considering the current online functional state and operational scenarios, for short-
term behavior characterization, become necessary for getting results more suitable to 
system operation. In the aircraft operation context, the development of efficient means for 
updating the dependability models and assessment results during the aircraft mission is 
clearly needed since the stakeholders are searching for a continuous improvement in the 
service delivery. 
In this dissertation, we have addressed the problem of aircraft operational dependability 
modeling for an assessment while in service, so as to support mission and maintenance 
planning as well as their successful achievement. The ultimate goal is to contribute to 
aircraft operability improvement by reducing economical losses due to failures and 
unsuitable planning for promptly accomplishing maintenance activities. The challenge 
related to the problem is the complexity of aircraft systems and the fact that the model 
must be suitable to the systems actual states and the specific operational situation. The 
assessment is to be done by the aircraft operation team, which is not necessarily familiar 
with sophisticated modeling formalisms and tools.  
The main contribution of this thesis concerns the development of a dependability 
assessment approach based on stochastic state-space-based models that can be easily 
updated during the aircraft operation, considering the information related to the current 
specific situation.  
We have identified the system behavior description, the mission profile information, the 
related requirements, and the maintenance accomplishment information as the relevant 
types of information to consider in the model. The model adaptation to the situation online 
is managed by updating the information in the model. The update is the result of an event 
or a change during the aircraft operation. Indeed after a major change, one has to check if 
its impact is significant or not. A re-assessment of the operational dependability is 
consequently required so as to have the up-to-date result. The aircraft will be monitored by 
prognosis and diagnosis modules that will provide information on the states of the system 
components and on the trends in their likelihood of failure. The mission profile and 
maintenance information is also accessible. 
Based on the analysis of the major changes that can happen during mission achievement, 
we have proposed an approach to manage the model update. Accordingly, the 
dependability model is designed to be a generic and parametric, with default operational 
information. Thus, the updates consist of tuning the model with the data resulting from the 
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changes. Model updates should not require any modeling task that the aircraft operator, 
who will perform the dependability assessment, is not qualified for. 
The stochastic dependability model is intended to be developed by the system designer, 
who is the only entity knowledgeable about the system. The proposed model results from 
the composition of two main parts: a core model dedicated to the description of system 
behavior and its system minimal requirements, and a mission dependent model based on 
the mission profile. To support the construction of these models, we have provided a meta-
model that specifies their content at a high-level of abstraction. The meta-model provides 
common features for the construction of models corresponding to different types of 
aircraft. Moreover, other modules, like the prognosis and the diagnosis modules that are 
involved in the assessment framework, will be communicating data for model update. The 
proposed meta-model features define the kind of data needed. 
Following the model content specification, we have investigated two formalisms to 
implement the model: AltaRica and Stochastic Activity Network (SAN). The AltaRica 
formalism is widely used in the industrial context in France, including at Airbus for safety 
analysis, and thus has been selected for the ultimate construction of the operational 
dependability model. It provides features for fault propagation analysis. It can be used for 
stochastic model construction, but its supporting tools are still limited for stochastic 
analyses. The SAN formalism is more known in academia and provides features for 
complex stochastic behavior modeling. For our modeling problem, the SAN formalism 
and its supporting tool Möbius have been considered as experimental means for the 
illustration of the modeling approach. The operational dependability model will be used 
for quantitative assessment during aircraft operation. 
Examining the two formalisms, we have shown that they are interchangeable on the basic 
features and even most of the model aspects represented using their specific features can 
be described using the features of the other formalism. We have proposed guidelines for 
transforming models between the two formalisms whilst respecting as much of the model 
structure as is possible. These transformation guidelines should be useful in doing 
comparative analyses while validating quantitative model processing tools for AltaRica. A 
prototype tool is being developed to support the implementation of the ultimate 
operational dependability model that will be developed in AltaRica.  
Meanwhile, we have used the SAN formalism and its associated tool Möbius to model 
firstly the A340 rudder control subsystem, and secondly, the electric supply subsystem. 
We have built the core model corresponding to the subsystems, and composed it with a 
mission dependent model that has been defined for the illustration purpose. Examples of 
hypothetical evaluation results have been presented. 
Since the proposed approach to the assessment consists in re-evaluating the operational 
dependability after relevant changes have occurred so as to obtain an up-to-date result, we 
have investigated the impact of the re-assessment in regard to the previous initial 
assessment. The results show that, for example, a failure of a primary computer, whose 
availability is not mandatory for the achievement of a flight, can significantly decrease the 
reliability of a 7-day mission. The analyses also indicate how to use the assessment results 
to manage the mission and its associated maintenance activities. 
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The performed quantitative analyses represent a preliminary experimentation of the 
approach, which should be extended by other experimentation using the dedicated tool 
that is under development. Also, as the input data processed by the models may be 
provided with a given impreciseness, the assessment result will be provided with an 
indication of the induced uncertainty. A research study [Jacob et al. 2011; Jacob et al. 
2012] is being carried out to provide methods for the computation of such uncertainties.  
Regarding the future development of the research study carried out, and which is reported 
in this dissertation, several orientations are possible. 
The model is to be developed using the features defined by the meta-model. However, the 
model construction task is still fully manual, unless means are provided to facilitate the 
task. Indeed, the model or parts of the model could be generated based on the meta-model. 
Meta-models are considerably used in model driven engineering for model and software 
source codes generation. Therefore it will be very useful to investigate the automatic 
generation of the model based on the meta-model. The operational dependability model 
construction can be fully integrated in the aircraft development process, and information 
about the aircraft system could be automatically used to generate the model. 
Concerning the transformation of models between AltaRica and SAN, it would be very 
appropriate to develop a dedicated tool to automate the transformation. 
The dependability assessment considering several aircraft represents also an extension of 
our approach. Indeed, airlines manage a fleet of aircraft and the unavailability of an 
aircraft can be dealt with by replacing it with other aircraft. Furthermore, the aircraft may 
share maintenance resources, such as spare components and technicians. It can be valuable 
to assess the ability to achieve the global airline mission planning with regards to failures 
and maintenance issues. 
We have focused on the aircraft operation context to develop the modeling approach. 
However, dependability assessment in service could concern any system whose service 
delivery is subject to a significant attention. Other systems operational context could be 
targeted and investigated. Automotive and telecommunication systems could also benefit 
from dependability assessment, in real time, during their operation. The development of 
generalized modeling features for online assessment will be definitely worth. 
The achieved work represents, thus, an important basis for the development of new means 
that should be essential in ensuring success during aircraft operation. Moreover, the 





Appendix A: The AltaRica model based on the 
rudder control subsystem 
This appendix presents the AltaRica model resulting from the implementation of the 
modeling approach, based on the rudder control subsystem. The model is developed using 
the AltaRica data flow version. A mission of 4 flights is considered for simplification 
purpose. Figure A.1 gives a global overview of the model. The model is composed of a 
core part and a mission dependent part as proposed in chapter II.  
     
Figure A.1 The AltaRica model global representation 
An additional component (DefaultInput) is used to set the default inputs of the core model. 
These are principally the electric and hydraulic power input. 
The reminder of this appendix provides the overall AltaRica code of the different nodes 
composing the model. 
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o The core model 
The AltaRica nodes corresponding to the different system components are developed 
together with the node that manages the dependency information between them. 
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A first version of the models of the system components was developed to support the 
safety assessment of the rudder control subsystem. The interested reader may found more 
details about the modeling approach for failure modes and failure events in [Bernard et al. 
2007]. In the core model, the novelty is the introduction of repair events to enable the 
connection of the system model with the maintenance model, and the expression of the 
operational requirements. 
In all the nodes, the variable M represents maintenance authorization, flightOn indicates a 
flight period, and Status represents the component state. 
! The components included in the core model 
&"!8'7!"#$!%&'#()*+!'
' !"#$#%&'()&*#+,(%-./&#&/%&/0/1.).',12#34/#1,5/#'1+6-5/0#)1#'1%-.#
78/&9,:.68.).-0;# .4).# '0# )# <//5=)+># )=,-.# .4/# ,%/&).',1)6# 0.).-0#
<&,(# .4/# 0/&9,?+,1.&,6# .,# @4'+4# '.# @'66# =/# +,11/+./52# 34'0#

































!"# $# 8/&9,?+,1.&,6# &/%&/0/1.).',12# 34/# ,-.%-.# 9)&')=6/#





















''''''' ' ' ' 8=)8'<$%=8!'
























!"# D0/5# .,# &/%&/0/1.# .4/# 5/%/15/1+*# '1<,&().',1# 1/+/00)&*# '1# .4/#







































''''OO.+$+/)' 0' "4F' $&!' O&"+' 79%#$9;N"&+9"=2D<<F' $&!' <=%>-+D&F' PJ'
-%!!8&2<$%=/98'JQ'.+$+/)'H0'-)6'
''''OO.+$+/)'0'-)F'$&!'LF'PJ'L$%&+$%&'JQ'.+$+/)'H0'"46'
''''OO.+$+/)' 0' -)F' $&!' O&"+' !8<89#8&+KC*%98!FF' PJ' !8<89#8&+KC*%9$+%"&' JQ'
!8<89#8&+KC*%98!'H0'+9/86'
''$))89+''

















!"# D0/5# .,# &/%&/0/1.# .4/# 5/%/15/1+*# '1<,&().',1# 1/+/00)&*# '1# .4/#













!"# H)+>-%# %,@/&# 0-%%6'/&2# 3)>/0# 4*5&)-6'+# %,@/&# )0# '1%-.# )15#
































!"# H)+>-%# +,1.&,6# (,5-6/2# A.# %&,9'5/0# +,(()15# '1%-.# .,# /'.4/&#

















































































! The core model composition 
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o The mission dependent model 
The mission dependent model represents the sequence of flights to achieve, as a sequence 
of CompleteFlight instances. CompleteFlight is composed of an instance of GroundPeriod 
and an instance of a FlightPeriod. It also includes a component that manages the order of 
maintaining the failed components during scheduled maintenance. Four instances of 
CompleteFlight are considered here for simplification reason. 
The mission dependent model also includes a component Filter that is used to synthesize, 
from the instances of CompleteFlight, the current mission achievement information 
(instance CP of CurrentProcess) that is necessary in the core model.  
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o Component to set the default of the core model 
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Le transport aérien est devenu un moyen de déplacement usuel pour un nombre de plus en 
plus croisant de personnes. Avec cet accroissement d’intérêt et le besoin de compétitivité 
dans le secteur aéronautique, il est essentiel pour les avionneurs et les compagnies 
aériennes de développer des moyens pouvant aider à une exploitation optimale des avions. 
De nouvelles approches doivent être développées pour aider dans la réalisation des 
opérations, de façon à atteindre et à maintenir un niveau élevé de prestation de services, 
réduire les interruptions, et éviter les pertes économiques dues à l'indisponibilité des 
avions et à l’insatisfaction des clients. 
Le projet @MOST (Airbus Operations Maintenance Solutions & Technologies) a été mis 
en place par Airbus pour examiner de nouvelles approches, à l'opération et à la 
maintenance des avions, qui peuvent aider à une meilleure exploitation des avions et à la 
réduction des coûts. Le projet a pour principal objectif le développement de moyens de 
prévision assurant une gestion efficace de la réalisation des opérations, et capable d'aider à 
effectuer les activités de maintenance juste au bon moment. 
Dans le contexte de @MOST, le projet DIANA (Decision Impact ANAlysis) vise à 
développer un cadre d'évaluation de sûreté de fonctionnement, basé sur les modèles, qui 
peut être utilisé pour analyser et assurer la fiabilité opérationnelle des avions, et ainsi, 
assurer le succès et l'efficacité dans la réalisation des opérations vis-à-vis des perturbations 
liées aux défaillances. Pour cela, les approches actuelles d'analyse de sûreté de 
fonctionnement en phase de conception des avions ne peuvent être considérées comme 
suffisantes. L'analyse en phase de conception ne concerne généralement que l'évaluation 
de la sécurité innocuité et, lorsque la fiabilité opérationnelle est abordée, l'analyse porte 
sur le gain en fiabilité perceptible d'une technologie à une autre. En outre, dans le cadre de 
DIANA, l'évaluation de la sûreté de fonctionnement aura lieu lorsque l'avion est en 
service, de sorte à prendre en compte les informations courantes pour pouvoir obtenir des 
résultats de fiabilité adaptés à la situation. A notre connaissance, l'évaluation de la sûreté 
de fonctionnement basée sur les modèles, en temps réel, en cours d’opération, n'a pas 
encore été beaucoup abordée. Pourtant, le constant besoin en terme de meilleur rendement 
et le caractère évolutif des systèmes actuels requièrent l'utilisation de données plus 
précises en phase opérationnelle, pour obtenir une évaluation adaptée, afin d’aider à faire 
de meilleurs choix. 
Cette thèse fait partie du projet DIANA et concerne l’élaboration du cadre d'évaluation de 
sûreté de fonctionnement basé sur les modèles. Elle se concentre en particulier sur la 
construction du modèle et son utilisation pendant la réalisation des missions. L'objectif de 
la thèse est donc la mise en place du modèle de sûreté de fonctionnement sur lequel peut 
se baser l’évaluation de la sûreté de fonctionnement en opération.  
Pour identifier le rôle que peut jouer l'évaluation de sûreté de fonctionnement lors de 
l'opération des avions, et comprendre son importance dans la planification de la 
maintenance, il est nécessaire d'avoir un aperçu des différentes façons dont les opérations 
d'avion peuvent être réalisées, et connaitre les principes de base des pratiques de 
maintenance. La construction du modèle de sûreté de fonctionnement nécessite, en plus 
des techniques d'analyse de sûreté de fonctionnement, d’avoir un aperçu sur l'opération et 
la maintenance des avions, ainsi que sur la façon dont elles sont organisées. Les 
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connaissances de base pour pouvoir effectuer le travail sont données dans le chapitre I. 
Nous présentons les concepts et méthodes d'analyse de sûreté de fonctionnement, donnons 
un aperçu sur l'opération des avions et présentons les principes sous-tendant les politiques 
de maintenance des avions. Nous présentons également une revue des travaux visant à 
améliorer l'opérabilité des avions, des travaux de modélisation qui contribuent au 
renforcement de la sécurité innocuité, aux travaux portant sur la gestion des perturbations 
opérationnelles, en passant par les études s’appuyant sur la conception des systèmes et la 
planification de la maintenance pour améliorer la fiabilité opérationnelle. L'objectif est de 
mettre en exergue la place que l'évaluation de sûreté de fonctionnement basée sur des 
modèles aura dans le processus d'amélioration de l'opérabilité des avions et de réduction 
des interruptions opérationnelles. 
Le champ d'application de l'évaluation de sûreté de fonctionnement basée sur des modèles 
est présenté à la fin du chapitre I. Comme différents types de missions avec des exigences 
différentes peuvent être attribués à un avion donné, l’outil d'évaluation de sûreté de 
fonctionnement donnera des estimations de la probabilité de réussir les missions ou le 
risque de rencontrer une situation indésirable, en considérant les informations 
opérationnelles courantes. L'évaluation porte sur l'adaptation du profil de la mission et des 
activités de maintenance planifiées à l'état opérationnel courant de l'avion. Les missions et 
les planifications de maintenance peuvent être ajustées en utilisant l'évaluation. 
L'évaluation peut être effectuée suite à l’occurrence d'événements majeurs en opération. 
Le deuxième chapitre vise à présenter l'approche de modélisation mise en place. Les 
difficultés liées à la mise en place du modèle y sont traitées. Outre la complexité des 
systèmes avion, la prise en compte des informations en cours d’opération, afin d'avoir un 
modèle adapté à la situation courante, doit aussi être traitée. Par ailleurs, comme différents 
types d'avions existent, et afin d'harmoniser la construction des modèles correspondants, il 
convient d'établir une base commune pour leur construction. Nous avons établi la base 
commune pour la construction des modèles en utilisant la méta-modélisation.  
L’approche de modélisation est développée en se basant sur les techniques de 
modélisation stochastique à espace d'état. Ainsi, tout formalisme de modélisation 
stochastique basé sur les techniques à espace d'état peut être utilisé pour construire le 
modèle. Le langage AltaRica, utilisé par Airbus pour développer des modèles pour des 
analyses sécurité innocuité, a donc été considéré pour la construction du modèle. 
Cependant, étant donné qu’AltaRica et ses actuels outils de traitement ont été 
principalement développés pour faire des analyses qualitatives, nous avons également 
choisi les réseaux d'activités stochastiques (SAN) pour mettre en œuvre les aspects 
d'analyse quantitative. Le projet DIANA envisage de développer un outil pour prendre en 
compte le traitement du modèle en AltaRica pour obtenir des résultats quantitatifs. Nous 
présentons une analyse comparative des deux formalismes dans le chapitre III. Des 
méthodes de transformation de modèles entre les deux formalismes sont également 
examinées. 
Les formalismes sont utilisés pour développer des cas d’études basés sur des sous-
systèmes d'avion. Nous présentons ces cas d’études, développés en utilisant le formalisme 
SAN, dans le chapitre IV. La mise en œuvre de l'approche de modélisation à l'aide 
d’AltaRica est donnée en annexe. 
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Nous avons considéré premièrement le sous-système de contrôle de la gouverne de 
direction. En se basant sur les exigences, nous avons analysé différents scénarios de 
défaillances, de changements de distribution de défaillance à cause de l'usure, et de 
modifications de profil de mission. Nous avons ensuite considéré le sous-système 
d'alimentation électrique pour analyser son impact sur la réussite des missions. 
Les résultats de l'évaluation montrent que les événements, comme les défaillances qui 
n'empêchent pas l'autorisation d’un vol, peuvent avoir un impact significatif sur la 
probabilité de succès d’une mission. 
Nous avons conclu en rappelant la problématique abordée, et nos principales réalisations. 
De possibles orientations, pour le futur développement de la recherche menée, sont 
également présentées. 
Nous présentons dans ce qui suit l’essentiel du contenu de chaque chapitre.  
I Contexte et Notions de Base 
Ce chapitre présente le contexte général du travail de thèse. La thèse porte sur l'évaluation 
de la sûreté de fonctionnement dans le contexte de l’opération des avions, en utilisant des 
modèles. Les concepts et les techniques d'analyse de sûreté de fonctionnement sont 
présentés, de même que les principes de base de l’opération d'un avion, de sorte à donner 
une base de connaissances appropriée au sujet et à mettre en exergue le champ 
d’application de l'évaluation de la sûreté de fonctionnement. L'évaluation cible les 
défaillances et les problèmes de maintenance qui peuvent entraîner des perturbations 
d’opération. Les principes fondamentaux de la maintenance des avions sont aussi 
présentés. 
I.1 Concepts et méthode d’évaluation de la sûreté de fonctionnement 
Les concepts de la sûreté de fonctionnement sont définis dans [Avizienis et al. 2000; 
Laprie et al. 1995]. La sûreté de fonctionnement est définie comme la propriété d’un 
système permettant à ses utilisateurs de placer une confiance justifiée dans le service qu’il 
leur délivre. Elle englobe trois classes de concepts : les attributs, les entraves et les 
moyens pour atteindre. Les principaux attributs sont la fiabilité, la disponibilité, la 
sécurité, l’intégrité, et la maintenabilité. Les entraves se déclinent en fautes, erreurs et 
défaillances. Les moyens sont classés en quatre grandes catégories : la prévention des 
fautes, la tolérance aux fautes, l’élimination des fautes et la prévision des fautes. 
La thèse concerne la prévision des fautes au cours de l'utilisation des systèmes, en 
particulier dans le cadre de l’opération des avions. La prévision des fautes est réalisée en 
effectuant une évaluation du comportement du système par rapport à l’occurrence et à 
l'activation des fautes. L’évaluation peut consister en une analyse qualitative ou 
quantitative, et peut être effectuée en utilisant un modèle. La construction du modèle est 
de nos jours effectuée en utilisant des formalismes de haut niveau permettant la prise en 
compte de comportements complexes. Ce sont les formalismes AltaRica [Arnold et al. 
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1999; LABRI 2010] et SAN [Meyer et al. 1985; Sanders and Meyer 2001] qui ont été 
considérés dans le cadre de cette thèse. 
L'approche développée dans cette thèse concerne la construction de modèles en 
considérant les systèmes avion, leur opération et leur maintenance.  
I.2 Les systèmes avion, réalisation des opérations et maintenance 
Le travail de modélisation fait intervenir des connaissances sur les systèmes avion, sur la 
planification et la réalisation des opérations, et sur la maintenance en ligne.  
I.2.1 Les systèmes avion 
Un avion est constitué de plusieurs sous-systèmes, qui assurent ses fonctions de haut 
niveau. Les sous-systèmes sont conçus de manière à éviter les défaillances 
catastrophiques. En général, leur conception détaillée présente plusieurs redondances et 
des scénarios de reconfiguration complexes qui visent à éviter les défaillances 
catastrophiques et à assurer la délivrance continue des fonctions. Les sous-systèmes sont 
constitués de composants, remplaçables en service (Line Replaceable Unit, LRU), qui 
interagissent pour assurer les fonctions nécessaires à la réalisation des misions. 
I.2.2 Réalisation des opérations  
Une mission d’avion consiste en une liste prédéfinie de vols à effectuer sous certaines 
conditions opérationnelles et de maintenance. La réalisation de la mission est telle que 
chaque vol est suivi par une escale où l'avion est apprêté pour le prochain vol. A chaque 
escale, l'avion est inspecté et les anomalies observées lors du vol précédent sont 
examinées. Si une défaillance est détectée, une décision doit être prise quant à l’aptitude à 
effectuer le prochain vol. Les agents se référent à un document (appelé Minimum 
Equipment List, MEL) où les composants sont répertoriés avec le statut Go, Go-If ou No-
Go. 
Le statut Go représente le cas où l'avion peut voler avec le composant défaillant. Pour le 
statut Go-If, le vol peut être effectué à condition qu’un certain nombre d’autres 
composants soient opérationnels et que certaines procédures opérationnelles ou de 
maintenance soient possibles. Le statut No-Go empêche l'avion de voler. Dans ce cas, la 
défaillance doit être réparée avant tout vol. Le vol est autorisé s’il n'y a pas de No-Go et si 
toutes les conditions Go-If sont réalisables. Lorsqu’il est autorisé, le vol peut être 
interrompu ou dérouté si l’aptitude de l’avion est considérablement dégradée. Des 
procédures décrites dans le manuel de vol servent de support pour déterminer si le vol peut 
continuer ou doit être dérouté. 
Les situations indésirables pendant la réalisation d’une mission entraînent des 
interruptions de mission telles que les retards de vol, les annulations, les demi-tours et les 
déroutements. Notre travail prend en compte principalement les interruptions causées par 





Un programme de maintenance est requis pour l'exploitation de tout avion et doit être 
approuvé par l'autorité de régulation. Le programme de maintenance définit les politiques 
de maintenance à appliquer aux divers composants système de l'avion. On distingue 
diverses tâches de maintenance préventive qui doivent être effectuées sur des bases 
régulières. Du point de la réalisation des travaux, il y a, entre autres, les activités réalisées 
en ligne, pendant lesquelles l’avion reste en service (au sol, non pas en vol). Ces activités 
concernent les inspections aux escales, les inspections journalières et les activités de 
réparation ne nécessitant pas l’utilisation d’un hangar de maintenance. 
La thèse considère les activités de maintenance en ligne, puisque l'objectif est d’aider à 
gérer les problèmes opérationnels au cours de la réalisation des missions. 
I.3 Les travaux connexes 
Plusieurs études ont été menées dans le contexte abordant les problèmes de sécurité 
innocuité, la prédiction de fiabilité principalement pendant la phase de conception, la 
planification et l'optimisation de la maintenance, et la gestion des perturbations 
opérationnelles. Cependant, elles sont plutôt concentrées sur des aspects spécifiques, 
comme l’amélioration de la sécurité innocuité et la l’établissement de programmes de 
maintenance, qui ne couvrent pas la nécessité d'évaluer continuellement la sureté de 
fonctionnement en opération. Les travaux les plus proches concernent une analyse globale 
portant sur toute la période de vie du système 
I.4 Orientation de la thèse 
L'approche adoptée dans cette thèse consiste à évaluer, au cours des opérations de l'avion, 
sa capacité à satisfaire les exigences opérationnelles en présence de fautes, et l’aptitude à 
entreprendre des actions adaptées aux situations indésirables. Il y a besoin d'avoir un bon 
contrôle sur le comportement de l'avion en service, et d'être en mesure de prédire, avec un 
bon niveau de précision, les situations indésirables qui peuvent être rencontrées. La 
solution requiert une capacité à gérer des événements aléatoires et la capacité à faire en 
sorte que les solutions adoptées soient appropriées. L'évaluation de la sûreté de 
fonctionnement basée sur un modèle peut bien aider dans ce processus. 
Ainsi, notre travail de recherche vise le développement d'un modèle qui permette 
l'évaluation de la fiabilité opérationnelle des avions, à tout moment où cela peut être 
nécessaire. Lors de la planification des missions et de la maintenance, une évaluation est 
réalisée afin d'aider à choisir la meilleure solution en conformité avec l’aptitude 
opérationnelle de l'avion, en tenant compte d'autres conditions l’impactant. A l’occurrence 
d'un événement majeur au cours de la réalisation d'une mission, la fiabilité est réévaluée 
afin d'évaluer l'impact de la nouvelle situation sur la réussite de la mission. 
Le travail comprend donc, comme élément essentiel de la construction du modèle sur 
lequel est basé l'évaluation, la prise en compte de la situation au moment de l'évaluation. 
Ce qui peut nécessiter une adaptation du modèle afin de prendre en compte les 
caractéristiques de la situation courante. Cet aspect concerne la manière de gérer le modèle 
au moment de l'exécution afin d'obtenir des résultats adaptés. 
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II Approche de Modélisation et Contexte d’Evaluation 
Ce chapitre vise à présenter l'approche de modélisation globale proposée. La construction 
du modèle nécessite une analyse qui aide à traiter les spécificités des avions et les 
problèmes liés à l'évaluation au cours des missions.  
Le processus de construction du modèle et de l'évaluation en opération implique: i) le 
développement d'un modèle stochastique en utilisant un méta-modèle, et ii) l'utilisation de 
ce modèle stochastique pour obtenir un modèle intégrant les informations courantes, et qui 
est prêt à être utilisé pour l'évaluation. Nous avons choisi de baser la construction du 
modèle sur un méta-modèle afin de fournir une base commune standardisant des modèles 
pouvant être  différents à cause des particularités des systèmes avions. Le méta-modèle 
représente également une référence donnant un aperçu du contenu du modèle à un haut 
niveau d'abstraction. 
II.1 Elaboration du modèle 
Cette section établit les éléments de base de notre approche de modélisation. Pour les 
besoins de l’évaluation en opération, nous avons défini deux types de mesures: la mesure 
de fiabilité système (SR) qui est à utiliser pendant la définition d’une mission pour 
déterminer la durée de mission la plus appropriée, et la mesure de fiabilité mission (MR), 
qui correspond à la probabilité d’accomplir la mission sans interruption.  
Nous considérons les informations relatives au profil de mission, aux exigences 
opérationnelles, aux systèmes avion, et à la maintenance comme principales informations 
devant être prises en compte dans le modèle. Les informations contenues dans le modèle 
seront sujettes à des changements en opération. Les changements majeurs pouvant avoir 
lieu en opération et qui doivent être pris en compte sont les changements dans les états des 
composants système, les changements dans les distributions de défaillance et les 
changements dans le profil de la mission. Ces changements devraient donner lieu à une 
mise à jour du modèle stochastique, et une réévaluation de la fiabilité devrait être 
effectuée. La mise à jour est principalement basée sur l’ajustement de paramètres de 
modèle. Nous considérons que les systèmes avion ne subissent pas de modification 
pouvant entrainer une modification de la structure initiale du modèle. Quant aux profils de 
mission, Nous proposons une structuration du modèle en deux grandes parties : une partie 
de base (appelée core model) liée aux systèmes avion, et une partie liée au profil de 
mission. La partie liée au profil de mission vient se greffer à la partie de base de sorte à 
pouvoir être déclinée sous plusieurs versions prenant en charge d’éventuelles mises à jour 
structurelles que pourrait entrainer un changement de profil de mission. 
Concernant la construction du modèle stochastique, comme le même type de modèle sera 
utilisé pour plusieurs familles d'avions d'un même fabricant, il est important de suivre une 
procédure harmonisée pour construire les modèles correspondant aux diverses familles 
d'avions, de sorte à obtenir une vue unifiée facilitant à la fois le processus de construction 
et la mise à jour. Ainsi, nous avons décidé d'établir une base commune pour la 
construction du modèle, en mettant en place un méta-modèle. Le méta-modèle est une 
représentation abstraite des modèles finaux grâce à l'analyse des éléments pertinents qui 
doivent être représentés.  
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II.2 Le méta-modèle 
Le méta-modèle est développé en utilisant les éléments de méta-modélisation défini 
d’EMF (Eclipse Modeling Framework) [Griffin 2003], plus précisément les notations de 
Ecore. Nous  présentons, dans ce qui suit, les différentes parties correspondant aux 
catégories d’information à inclure dans le modèle. 
La partie pour la description des informations relatives aux composants système est 
présentée à la Figure 32. Les composants du système sont abstraits par l’EClass 
SysComponent. La représentation d'un composant système est caractérisée par son 
identifiant (id), ses variables d'état (stateVars) et les événements pouvant l’impacter. 
 
Figure 32 Méta-modèle pour la représentation des éléments système 
Plusieurs variables d'état peuvent être utilisées dans la description d'un composant. Une 
EClass Variable est définie pour les abstraire. Une variable possède un nom (name), un 
domaine qui définit les valeurs possibles que peut prendre l'état, et une valeur initiale 
(initialValue) qui correspondra à son initialisation dans le modèle. 
Pour les événements liés au composant, on distingue les événements de défaillance et de 
maintenance car ils représentent les principaux événements à considérer. Un événement 
est décrit par son nom (name), la garde conditionnant son occurrence, l'effet exprimant le 
changement dans l'état du système suite à son occurrence, et la distribution caractérisant le 
temps jusqu’à son occurrence (TTOdistrib). TTOdistrib est un objet de DurationDistrib, 
qui vise à représenter la loi de distribution du temps passé dans une situation donnée. La 
distribution est décrite par le nom de la loi de distribution (distribLaw - par exemple, 
exponentielle, Weibull, …) et ses paramètres distribParams, qui sont de l’EClass 
Parameter. Un paramètre de distribution est caractérisé par son nom (name) et une valeur 
value. 
Il est important d'exprimer les dépendances entre les composants. Concrètement, un 
composant peut avoir à utiliser les valeurs d’attributs d'autres composants dans la 
description de son comportement. Dans ce cas, soit la valeur d'attribut est directement 
accessible, soit la valeur est obtenue par l'intermédiaire d'un objet, qui décrit les liens entre 
les composants. C’est le rôle de Dependency, qui vise à combiner les informations 
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provenant de différents composants, en utilisant une fonction conditionnelle (dénommée 
ici relation). La valeur retournée (stateInfo) par la fonction relation correspond à 
l’information de dépendance, qui peut être utilisée dans la description de comportement du 
composant dépendant des autres. Les fonctions (Function) délivrées par les composants du 
système sont également représentées comme un cas particulier de dépendance, car la 
valeur de la variable d'état d'une fonction est également déterminée par la combinaison des 
variables d’état des composantes qui contribuent à sa délivrance. 
Les fonctions, ainsi que les valeurs des variables d'état des composants système, sont 
utilisées pour définir les exigences relatives au système. La Figure 33 présente les 
éléments intervenant dans la définition des exigences. 
Une exigence est une contrainte liée à une partie du système ou au profil de la mission, et 
qui doit être satisfaite pour réussir dans la réalisation d’une partie donnée de la mission. 
Elles sont abstraites par Requirement et se caractérisent par: i) l’attribut reference, un 
identificateur qui peut être utilisé pour faire référence à la même exigence dans différentes 
situations, ii) une variable booléenne status qui indique si l'exigence est satisfaite ou non, 
et iii) une contrainte ou une expression booléenne. L'expression booléenne formule une 
condition, impliquant des variables d’états de composants système et de fonctions, qui doit 
être satisfaite, sans quoi, une interruption peut advenir au cours de la réalisation de la 
mission. Une exigence peut résulter de la combinaison d'autres exigences. 
 
Figure 33 Méta-modèle concernant les exigences 
Les exigences qui ne nécessitent pas d'information particulière liée au profil de la mission 
sont exprimées dans le modèle de base. Toute exigence ou information portant sur le 
système et qui pourrait être nécessaire dans la définition d’un profil de mission est 
représentée de façon à faciliter l'expression d'autres exigences spécifiques en cas de 
besoin. 
La Figure 34 présente la partie du méta-modèle pour la représentation des informations 
concernant le profil de mission. Un profil de mission est défini par un nombre (NbFlights) 
de vols à effectuer en séquence. 
Pour la réalisation de chaque vol, une période au sol (GroundPeriod) pour préparer le vol, 
et une période de vol (FlightPeriod), qui consiste en l'exécution proprement dite du vol, 
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sont distinguées. L'ensemble du processus pour réaliser le vol est dénommé 
CompleteFlight. 
La période au sol GroundPeriod précède la période de vol et est composée de la 
description des activités (GroundActivity) réalisées au sol jusqu'à l'autorisation de départ. 
Les activités au sol sont caractérisées par leur dénomination (denomination) et leur durée 
(duration). La durée peut être caractérisée par une distribution probabiliste. 
La période de vol est décomposée en différentes phases en fonction des exigences qui 
doivent être satisfaites. Une phase de vol est caractérisée par sa dénomination 
(denomination), sa durée (duration) et des informations additionnelles (AdInfo) qui 
pourraient être nécessaires dans la définition des exigences. 
 
Figure 34 Méta-modèle pour la partie concernant la mission 
Comme le profil de la mission est décomposé en une séquence de périodes et phases, une 
EClass Sequenced est définie pour représenter leurs caractéristiques communes, qui sont 
l'identifiant (id) et l’attribut execState. L’attribut execState indique si la partie 
correspondante de la mission est dans son état réalisation. L'information sur la partie de la 
mission en cours de réalisation est transmise à la partie de base du modèle en utilisant un 
objet de CurrentProcess. L'information concerne le type de la partie de mission (période 
au sol ou phase de vol), l'identifiant de la phase de vol (FPhase) s'il s'agit d'une phase de 
vol ; l'information d'autorisation de maintenance si c'est une période au sol. Les objets 
dérivés de CurrentProcess feront partie de l'interface entre la partie de base du modèle et 
la partie relative au profil de mission. 
Avant tout vol, l'état opérationnel du système est testé par rapport aux exigences 
d'autorisation de vol (DR), qui représente une synthèse de la MEL. DR correspond à 
Min_Sys_R s'il n'y a pas d'exigence spécifique à la mission. Les activités de maintenance 
sont telles qu'elles ne peuvent pas être considérées comme terminées si les conditions 
d'autorisation du vol, liées à l'état du système ne sont pas satisfaites. La réussite de la 
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période au sol est déterminée par la réalisation des activités correspondantes durant la 
période de temps allouée. La réussite de la période de vol est déterminée par la réussite de 
ses différentes phases. Une phase est réalisée avec succès si les exigences correspondantes 
sont satisfaites durant la réalisation. 
La réalisation des activités de maintenance dépend des moyens logistiques adéquats à 
l’escale considérée. Une station de maintenance est associée à chaque période au sol et la 
dépendance est prise en compte en considérant une distribution de probabilités 
caractérisant le temps nécessaire pour prendre en charge les activités correspondantes. Par 
exemple, une fonction LDF est définie pour prendre en compte le retard dans la prise en 
charge des activités. LDF est une sous-classe de DurationDistrib (Figure 32). Des types de 
station de maintenance, comme base principale et hors base, peuvent être utilisés pour les 
catégoriser. Les tâches sont effectuées en considérant un ordre de priorité dans la 
réalisation. La Figure 35 présente les éléments correspondants. 
 
Figure 35 Partie pour la représentation des informations relatives à la maintenance 
Le méta-modèle est une abstraction visant à définir les éléments pour la construction du 
modèle. Les attributs des classes définies peuvent être enrichis avec d’autres informations. 
Les représentations graphiques, basées sur les notations Ecore, sont très pratiques pour 
avoir un aperçu du contenu du modèle. Le modèle correspondant consistera en une 
représentation utilisant des instances des éléments décrits. Le méta-modèle peut également 
être utilisé pour construire des modèles à différentes fins. Le modèle peut être construit en 
se basant sur un sous-système particulier, ou il peut être construit en considérant plusieurs 
sous-systèmes. 
III Modélisation avec les Formalismes AltaRica et Réseaux d’Activités 
Stochastiques  
Divers formalismes sont utilisés dans le contexte de l'analyse de sûreté de fonctionnement 
pour aider à la construction des modèles. Les formalismes basés sur les méthodes à espace 
d'état sont les plus appropriés pour modéliser les systèmes complexes car ils offrent une 
grande expressivité. Ainsi, notre choix porte sur un formalisme à espace d'état pour la 
construction des modèles stochastiques. Comme Airbus et ses collaborateurs utilisent avec 
succès le formalisme AltaRica pour construire des modèles destinés à des analyses de 
sécurité, AltaRica a été choisi comme formalisme de support. Cependant, AltaRica et ses 
!!
! 148 
outils de support disponibles sont encore très focalisés sur l'analyse qualitative, l'outil 
d'analyse quantitative (appelé EPOCH) prévu dans le cadre du projet est encore en cours 
de développement [Teichteil-Königsbuch et al. 2011]. Afin de procéder à des évaluations 
quantitatives lors de la mise en œuvre de l'approche de modélisation, nous avons choisi le 
formalisme des réseaux d’activités stochastiques (SAN) qui est bien connu pour effectuer 
les analyses quantitatives. Le formalisme SAN intègre intrinsèquement des éléments pour 
la description de comportement stochastiques et est supporté par un outil disponible 
(Möbius) qui permet de faire les évaluations quantitatives.  
Nous analysons les caractéristiques des deux formalismes considérés et proposons des 
règles de transformation de modèles entre eux. 
III.1 Caractéristiques et comparaison des deux formalismes 
Le formalisme SAN a été développé dans les années quatre-vingt et permet de modéliser 
des systèmes pour des fins d’analyse de sûreté de fonctionnement et de performance. Le 
développement du formalisme AltaRica a commencé au milieu des années quatre-vingt-
dix et concernait principalement des analyses qualitatives de systèmes. 
Les deux formalismes sont basés sur les mécanismes d’états et de transitions. Le 
formalisme SAN reste très proche des réseaux de Petri stochastiques, mais définit de 
nouveaux éléments qui facilitent l'expression des prédicats et des actions liés aux 
événements. AltaRica utilise des variables qui peuvent être facilement combinées pour 
exprimer les prédicats et actions. 
Le formalisme AltaRica, qui est un langage, prend en compte les aspects de description 
stochastique comme attributs externes du modèle. Ses principales caractéristiques sont le 
mécanisme de propagation du flux et le support intrinsèque de la modularité. Il prend en 
charge la synchronisation des événements qui consiste à lier plusieurs transitions de façon 
à ce qu’elles soient tirées simultanément.  
Le formalisme SAN est presque entièrement basé sur des représentations graphiques. Ses 
caractéristiques principales sont la prise en compte intrinsèque des aspects stochastiques et 
son orientation vers les aspects d’analyses quantitatifs; la dynamique du modèle est 
complètement décrite de façon probabiliste. Il prend en charge la définition des cas, qui 
représentent des choix probabilistes d’actions au franchissement d'une transition. Il est 
également possible de spécifier des places partagées, i.e., une place peut être définie 
comme appartenant à plusieurs sous-modèles. 
L’analyse des deux formalismes montre qu’ils sont interchangeables sur les aspects 
essentiels de modélisation qui concernent cette étude. Il existe toutefois quelques 
spécificités à mentionner. La possibilité d'associer des priorités aux événements en 
AltaRica n'est pas actuellement présente dans la définition de SAN. De l'autre côté, le 
mécanisme exprimé par les cas en SAN n'est pas présent en AltaRica, et il n'est pas facile 
de représenter des données partagées, modifiables par plusieurs composants comme 
représentées par les places partagées en SAN. En outre, l'expressivité du langage AltaRica 
est limitée par rapport au langage C++ qui est utilisé pour spécifier les prédicats et les 
actions en SAN. 
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Nous avons proposé des règles de transformation de modèle entre les deux formalismes. 
L'objectif est de montrer que les éléments du formalisme, que ce soit AltaRica ou SAN, 
qui sera utilisé pour illustrer l'approche de modélisation proposée, peuvent être trouvés de 
façon équivalente dans l'autre formalisme, et donc l'analyse quantitative peut être 
effectuée en utilisant le formalisme SAN, qui est supporté par un outil d'analyse 
quantitative disponible. En outre, grâce aux règles de transformation, des modèles 
équivalents peuvent être utilisés pour comparer des résultats d'évaluation provenant de 
l'outil Möbius qui traite les modèles SAN, et de l'outil EPOCH qui est en cours de 
développement pour traiter les modèles AltaRica, dans le but de valider ce dernier. 
III.2 De AltaRica vers SAN 
La transformation est basée sur les correspondances respectives des variables et des 
événements AltaRica avec les places et les activités SAN.  Une variable AltaRica peut être 
représentée par une place, et les transitions gardées par des activités et des portes d'entrée / 
de sortie. Une correspondance peut être faite entre les types de données discrètes AltaRica 
et le marquage de type entier des places SAN. Les autres types de données peuvent être 
pris en compte en utilisant des places étendues.  
La modularité du modèle est prise en compte en respectant la structure hiérarchique du 
modèle et en utilisant les opérateurs « Replicate » et « Join ». Il s'agit de conserver le plus 
possible la structure du modèle AltaRica. Dans la pratique, il peut être plus utile de 
compacter plusieurs sous-modèles en un seul, plutôt que de procéder à la transformation 
systématique qui peut générer un nombre considérable de petits sous-modèles.  
Le Tableau 1 donne les correspondances pour transformer les éléments essentiels de 
AltaRica vers SAN. 
Élément AltaRica  Correspondance en SAN  Commentaire  
Variable d’état  Place  Les variables de type non 
discret correspondent à 
des places étendues  
 Variable de flux  
(v $ Fin ! Fout) 
Place partagée  
Événement  Activité SAN  Toutes les activités sont 
temporisées, sauf celles 
correspondant à des 
événements ayant Dirac(0) 
comme loi de distribution. 
Transition (garde 
grd, événement evt, 
post-condition post) 
Porte d'entrée (prédicat grd et 
fonction spécifiée par l'expression 
post-condition) associée à l'activité 
correspondant à l'événement evt. 
 
Assertion  Porte d'entrée associée à une 
activité instantanée 
 
Initialisation Marquage des places  
Sous nœud Sous modèle SAN   
Tableau 1 De AltaRica vers SAN 
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Il convient de mentionner qu’AltaRica intègre la notion de synchronisation d’événements 
entre plusieurs nœuds. Une synchronisation est une unification de plusieurs transitions. 
Elle est représentée en SAN par une activité unique qui combine les caractéristiques des 
transitions impliquées. 
III.3 De SAN vers AltaRica 
La transformation de SAN à AltaRica peut également être faite en transformant chaque 
sous-modèle SAN en un sous-nœud AltaRica. La composition est faite en suivant la 
structure du modèle SAN.  
Pour la transformation du contenu d’un sous-modèle, chaque place est représentée soit par 
une variable d'état, soit par une variable d'entrée. La place correspond à une variable d'état 
si son marquage peut être modifié par une activité du sous-modèle. Dans le cas contraire, 
elle correspond à une variable d'entrée. Des variables de sortie supplémentaires peuvent 
être définies pour représenter les places partagées. Une activité peut être déclarée comme 
un événement AltaRica auquel est associée une loi de distribution. La transition 
correspondante en AltaRica a comme garde la conjonction de tous les prédicats des portes 
d'entrée de l'activité, et comme post-condition, la composition des fonctions des portes 
d'entrée et de sortie de l'activité. En SAN, les activités sont explicitement spécifiées 
comme étant instantanée ou temporisée. Les transitions instantanées sont exprimées en 
AltaRica en y associant Dirac (0) comme loi de distribution. 
Pour les activités avec de multiples cas, la notion de choix probabiliste de l'action à 
accomplir après le franchissement d’une transition n'est pas présente en AltaRica. 
Cependant, d'un point de vue technique, une activité act à laquelle n (n> 1) cas sont 
associés peut être transformée en n activités act_1, ... act_n, chaque activité correspondant 
à un cas donné. Leurs lois de distribution correspondent aux produits de la loi de 
distribution de l’activité act avec les probabilités associées aux cas:                               
Fact_i ($, ·) = Fact (*, ·) *Cact($, i), i = 1, ..., n.  
Les places partagées entre les sous-modèles peuvent être représentées à l'aide de variables 
de flux. Lorsque le marquage de la place partagée ne peut être modifié que dans un seul 
des sous modèles (ce qui correspond à la communication d'informations aux autres sous 
modèles), la place est représentée par une variable d'état et une variable de sortie dans le 
sous-nœud correspondant. Elle est représentée comme une variable d'entrée dans les sous-
noeuds correspondant aux autres sous modèles. Si le marquage de la place partagée peut 
être modifié par plusieurs sous modèles, il devient difficile d'utiliser uniquement des 
variables de sortie et d'entrée, en raison du risque d'apparitions de boucles dans le modèle. 
Il faut utiliser le mécanisme de synchronisation d’événements. La place est représentée par 
une variable d'état dans un sous-nœud dédié et des transitions auxiliaires, synchronisées 
avec les transitions qui peuvent l'affecter, sont utilisées pour mettre à jour sa valeur. La 
valeur de la variable est transmise comme entrée aux autres sous-nœuds. Il est à noter que 
cette transformation nécessite  l’identification de toutes les transitions affectant la place. 
Le Tableau 2 donne l’essentiel des règles de transformation de modèles SAN en AltaRica. 
Il convient de mentionner que des places étendues représentant des tableaux de variables 
peuvent être définies en utilisant l'outil de Möbius pour construire le modèle SAN. Les 
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variables de type tableau ne sont pas définies en AltaRica. Elles ne sont donc pas 
considérées pour la transformation. D’autre part, les structures de contrôle possibles en 
AltaRica sont les structures « if-then-else » et « switch / case ». En conséquence, les 
modèles SAN qui utilisent des fonctions incluant les structures telles que « while » ou 
« for » du langage C/C++ ne sont pas pris en compte. 
Des exemples illustrant la mise en œuvre des règles de transformation sont proposés dans 
le chapitre. A terme, un outil implémentant ces règles devrait faciliter l’application des 
transformations. 
Élément SAN  Correspondance AltaRica  Commentaire 
Place  Variable d’état si le 
marquage de la place 
peut être changé par une 
activité du modèle, 
Variable d’entrée sinon. 
Pour les modèles composés, 
les places partagées requièrent 
la considération de tous les 
sous modèles concernés, et des 
variables de sortie doivent être 
définies pour la composition. 
Marquage de place  Affectation de valeur à la 
variable correspondante 
 
Activité Événement Les activités instantanées sont 
spécifiées par l'association de 
Dirac(0) comme loi de 
distribution de l'événement. 
Portes d'entrée (prédicat 
%pre, fonction ft), et 
portes de sortie de la 
porte (fonction gt) 
associé à l'activité act 
Spécification de 
transition  
(garde (pre, événement 
evt, post-condition gt ° ft)  
evt est l'événement qui 
correspond à act, +pre est la 
conjonction des prédicats des 
portes d'entrée, ft et gt sont 
respectivement les 
compositions des fonctions de 
toutes les portes d'entrée, et de 
toutes les portes de sortie, 
associées à act. 
Distribution associée à 
une activité 
Instruction « extern - 
law » 
 
Sous modèle Sous nœud  
Tableau 2 De SAN vers AltaRica 
IV Cas d’étude 
Ce chapitre présente des études de cas pour illustrer la mise en œuvre de l'approche de 
modélisation présentée dans le chapitre II, en utilisant le formalisme SAN. Le premier cas 
d’étude concerne le sous-système de commande de la gouverne de direction de l’A340 
[Bernard et al. 2007]. Le deuxième cas d’étude concerne le sous-système d'alimentation 
électrique de l’A320, qui se caractérise par plusieurs mécanismes de reconfiguration. Des 
résultats d'évaluation quantitative ont été obtenus dans chaque cas d’étude.  
Grâce au modèle correspondant au sous-système de commande de la gouverne de 
direction, nous avons analysé la nécessité de mettre à jour le modèle en opération, en 
particulier l'impact des changements sur les évaluations. Nous avons considéré les 
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changements majeurs identifiés dans le chapitre II et avons procédé à d’hypothétiques 
expérimentations de leur impact sur la fiabilité de mission. 
Les résultats obtenus dans le cas du sous-système d'alimentation électrique montrent des 
valeurs de fiabilité plus élevées par rapport au cas du sous-système de commande de la 
gouverne de direction, même en considérant des taux défaillance de même ordre de 
grandeur.  Les changements par rapport aux événements de défaillance non critique ne 
sont pas significatifs. D’ailleurs la composition avec le modèle du sous-système de 
commande de la gouverne de direction donne un impact minime par rapport aux résultats 
obtenus avec le sous-système de commande de la gouverne de direction seul. 
Nous présentons dans les paragraphes suivants, le cas d’étude sur le système de 
commande de la gouverne de direction et les résultats obtenus. 
IV.1 Cas du sous-système de commande de la gouverne de direction  
Le système de commande de la gouverne de direction, présenté en Figure 36, est composé 
de trois calculateurs primaires (P1, P2, P3), d’un calculateur secondaire S1, de trois 
servocommandes (ServoCtrl_G, ServoCtrl_B et ServoCtrl_Y), d’un module de contrôle 
secours (BCM) et de deux composants (BPS_B et BPS_Y) permettant d’alimenter le 
module de secours en énergie. 
 
Figure 36 Sous-système de commande de la gouverne de direction 
Les calculateurs sont connectés aux servocommandes, qui font mouvoir la surface. La 
connexion entre un calculateur et une servocommande forme une ligne de commande qui 
peut agir sur la surface. Il y a les lignes de commande primaire correspondant à P1, P2 et 
P3, la ligne secondaire correspondant à S1, et la ligne de commande secours 
correspondant à BCM. 
Initialement S1, BCM, BPS_B et BPS_Y sont inhibés, et la surface est contrôlée par les 
trois lignes de commande primaire. Lorsque les lignes de commande primaire sont 
défaillantes, S1 est activé et la surface est contrôlée par S1. Si la commande secondaire 
devient défaillante, les composants BCM, BPS_B et BPS_Y sont activés pour contrôler la 
surface. Trois modes de contrôle peuvent ainsi être distingués : le contrôle par les 
calculateurs primaires (PC), le contrôle par S1 (SC) et le contrôle par les composants de 
secours (BC).  
Exigences opérationnelles associées: Selon [MMEL 2008]: 
! OR1: la défaillance d'un des composants P2, ServoCtrl_G, ServoCtrl_Y, 
ServoCtrl_B, BCM, BPS_B ou BPS_Y conduit à une situation de « No-Go ». 
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! OR2: les défaillances de P1, P3 et S1 sont « Go-If »: 
o P3 et S1 doivent être opérationnels en cas de défaillance de P1. 
o P1 et S1 doivent être opérationnels en cas de défaillance de P3. 
o P1, P2 et P3 doivent être opérationnels en cas de défaillance de S1. 
IV.1.1 Construction du modèle  
La Figure 37 montre la structure globale du modèle. Dans la partie relative aux 
composants système, nous distinguons des sous modèles correspondant aux trois modes de 
contrôle. Comme proposé dans l’approche de modélisation, le modèle est à construire en 
utilisant le méta-modèle. Nous présentons, en guise d’exemple, une spécification utilisant 
les éléments du méta-modèle pour décrire le contenu de la partie de base du modèle. Nous 
présentons ensuite un aperçu du modèle en SAN donnant plus détail sur la partie liée au 
profil de mission. 
 
Figure 37 Structure du modèle 
IV.1.2 Spécification de la partie de base du modèle  
Tous les composants système ont des comportements similaires et sont représentés à l'aide 
des attributs relatifs à SysComponent (Figure 32). 
Le nom de chaque composant est utilisé comme identifiant (id). Pour chaque élément x, 
une variable d'état est considérée, avec un domaine défini par l'ensemble {ok, failed}, la 
valeur initiale est « ok ». 
Pour les événements à associer, nous considérons un événement de défaillance qui modifie 
l'état de « ok » vers  « failed », et un événement de maintenance qui restaure l'état à « ok ». 
Nous supposons que l'événement de défaillance  se produit en vol, étant donné qu’il est 
généralement caractérisé par un taux d’occurrence par heure de vol. Pour cela, nous 
utilisons un objet d’interface CP (instance de CurrentProcess - Figure 34) entre les deux 
parties du modèle, qui donne des informations sur la partie de la mission en cours 
d’exécution. Il est aussi utilisé dans l'expression de la garde de l’événement de 
maintenance pour spécifier l’information d'autorisation de la maintenance (CP_M). Par 
exemple pour le composant P1, les événements sont définis comme suit: 
Evénement de défaillance : 
  name: failure 
 guard: state=ok and CP-type=flight; effect state=failed 
 TTOdistrib: distribLaw=exponential, parameter: lambda=2E-4 
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Evénement de maintenance: 
 name: maintainP1 
 guard: state= failed and id % CP-M; effect state=ok 
 TTOdistrib: distribLaw=deterministic, parameter: t=1 
Pour le calculateur secondaire et les composants de commande de secours, les scénarios 
d'activation et de désactivation sont représentés. L'activation et la désactivation dépendent 
de l'état des lignes de commande primaires. Les lignes de commande primaires sont 
représentées en utilisant des instances de Dependency. PL1, PL2, PL3 représentent 
respectivement l'état de la connexion entre P1 et ServoCtrl_G, l'état de la connexion entre 
P2 et ServoCtrl_B, et l'état de la connexion entre P3 et ServoCtrl_Y. Les variables d'état 
associées (PL1-stateInfo, PL2-stateInfo et PL3-stateInfo) ont l'ensemble {ok, failed} 
comme domaine et leurs valeurs sont déterminées par la fonction de combinaison suivante 
(relation), en utilisant PL1 comme exemple : 
PL1-stateInfo = ok   si P1-state=ok et ServoCtrl_G-state=ok et ElecP1S1 et hyd_G   
PL1-stateInfo = failed  sinon  
ElecP1S1 et hyd_G sont des entrées provenant d’autres sous-systèmes. Lorsqu’on 
considère le sous-système de commande de la gouverne de direction seul, ElecP1S1 et 
hyd_G sont considérées comme étant toujours disponibles. 
Les exigences opérationnelles exprimées à la fin du §IV.1 sont relatives aux composants 
système et sont applicables quel que soit le profil de mission. Nous les exprimons comme 
exigences minimales système (Min_Sys_R), auxquelles peuvent s’ajouter des exigences 
spécifiques au profil de la mission. Elles sont exprimées en utilisant les éléments définis 
dans la Figure 33. 
L'attribut reference  n'est pas utilisé ici car il est à utiliser uniquement dans le contexte des 
mises à jour du modèle. Les exigences sont considérées comme satisfaites initialement 
(status=satisfied). L'expression de Min_Sys_R est formulée comme la conjonction de OR1 
et OR2 (voir section IV.1). L’expression finale, basée sur les lignes de contrôle, est 
donnée comme suit : 
Min_Sys_R = {  PL2 =ok # BCL =ok #  
(PL1 =ok 3 (PL3 =ok # SL =ok)) # 
(PL3 =ok 3 (PL1 =ok # SL =ok)) #  
(SL =ok 3 (PL1 =ok # PL3 =ok))  }. 
(1) 
Min_Sys_R, exprimée dans la partie de base du modèle (core model) est utilisée pour faire 
la composition avec la partie liée au profil de mission. 
IV.1.3 Le modèle global en SAN 
La Figure 38 présente le modèle global en SAN. Nous décrivons la partie liée au profil de 
mission et sa connexion avec le modèle de base. Le marquage de la place Min_Sys_R est 
mis à jour par le tir des activités instantanées Fulfilled et Not_Fulfilled conformément à la 
condition exprimée par l’expression donnée en fin du §IV.1.2. Il est à noter que dans cet 
exemple, nous ne considérons pas les exigences spécifiques au profil de mission qui 
pourraient être associées à chaque vol. 
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Considérant la partie liée au profil de mission, elle est basée sur une structure générique 
qui doit être paramétrée en spécifiant le nombre de vols pour chaque mission et les 
paramètres de durée de chaque vol et des activités au sol.  
La partie supérieure représente un vol et la partie inférieure représente les activités au sol, 
lors d’une escale. Un vol est représenté par trois phases Taxing_to_TakeOff, In_Flight et 
Landing. Pendant la phase Taxing_to_TakeOff le vol peut être annulé et il peut être 
dérouté pendant la phase In_Flight. Les portes d'entrée AbortCondition et 
DiversionCondition définissent les conditions conduisant à l’occurrence de ces 
interruptions. 
 
Figure 38 Le modèle globale en SAN 
Le modèle de la partie au sol décrit la préparation pour le prochain vol. Les activités au sol 
(SM_Time, Next_flight_preparation) sont décrites en parallèle avec le respect du temps 
prévu pour la phase au sol OnGround_duration) et celui du délai de retard maximum 
tolérable (Max_tolerated_time). Scheduled_maintenance représente une période de 
maintenance planifiée et Unscheduled_maintenance représente le prolongement des 
activités de maintenance au cas où les exigences en disponibilité des composants système 
ne sont pas satisfaites (No_Dispatch). La gestion de la maintenance est telle que la place 
MProg représente des listes qui déterminent, pour chaque période au sol, les composants à 
réparer. La place CP_M identifie le composant à réparer et  elle est utilisée dans le modèle 
de base pour autoriser la maintenance. Next_flight_preparation représente les autres 
activités (embarquement des passagers, traitement des bagages ...) qui peuvent consommer 
du temps, occasionnant un retard. La place Prof (à droite) est une place étendue 
représentant la liste des vols à effectuer. La porte d'entrée reliée à cette place indique s’il y 
a un prochain vol à effectuer ou non.  
IV.2 Résultats d’évaluation et analyse de l’impact de la réévaluation en 
opération 
L'approche de modélisation proposée dans le chapitre II est destinée à être utilisée pour 
faire des analyses qualitatives et quantitatives. Dans ce chapitre, nous nous sommes 
!!
! 156 
focalisés sur l’analyse quantitative pour construire le modèle stochastique. Des études 
d'analyse de sécurité innocuité visant à renforcer la conception ont déjà mis en œuvre les 
aspects d'analyse qualitative. 
L'analyse quantitative consiste en l’évaluation des mesures de fiabilité système et mission. 
Pour obtenir des résultats illustratifs, nous avons paramétré le modèle avec des valeurs 
hypothétiques.  
IV.2.1 La mesure SR  
La mesure de fiabilité du système, SR, correspond à la probabilité que la place 
Min_Sys_R soit marquée pendant une période de temps donnée. Elle ne concerne que le 
modèle de base. Cette mesure peut être utilisée pour aider à l'attribution d'une mission à 
l'avion, en considérant qu’elle ne doit pas être inférieure à un seuil acceptable donné.  
 
Figure 39 Mesure SR 
La courbe 1 de la Figure 39 montre la fiabilité du système. Elle montre que la durée 
maximale de mission, sans les activités de maintenance, doit être inférieure à 95 heures de 
vol, pour respecter le seuil de 0,975. Cette évaluation suppose que tous les composants du 
système sont initialement opérationnels. La courbe 2 suppose que le calculateur P1 est 
défaillant au début de la mission. La seule défaillance de P1 n’empêche pas la réalisation 
d’une mission. La courbe montre que, pour respecter le seuil de 0,975, la durée maximale 
de la mission, sans activités de maintenance, doit être inférieure à 45 heures de vol. 
IV.2.2 La mesure MR 
Nous considérons donc une mission typique, d’une durée de 84h, composée de 4 vols 
identiques (3h chacun) par jour, durant 7 jours. La courbe 0 de la Figure 40-a montre la 
fiabilité de mission, MR, évaluée avant la mission, en supposant que tous les composants 
sont opérationnels au début. Nous supposons que, tant que MR est supérieure au seuil, 
dénommé MMRR, la mission peut être réalisée. On peut voir qu'à la fin de la mission, MR 
reste supérieure à MMRR.  
Dans ce qui suit, nous analysons l’impact de la défaillance du calculateur P1 durant la 
réalisation de la mission, en considérant le jour de la défaillance. La courbe 0 est la même 
dans toutes les figures de 9-a à 9-d. 
La courbe 1 de la Figure 40-b correspond au cas où P1 a été diagnostiqué comme 
défaillant à la fin du jour 2. MR est réévaluée en considérant i) comme temps initial le jour 
suivant (i.e., jour 3), et ii) P1 défaillant à l'instant t = 0. On peut voir que MR est inférieure 
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à MMRR à partir du jour 5. Ce résultat montre que P1 doit être réparé avant la fin de la 
mission afin de respecter l'exigence MMRR. Trois cas peuvent être envisagés: P1 est 
réparé à la fin du jour 3, à la fin du jour 4, ou à la fin du jour 5. La Figure 40-c correspond 
au cas où P1 est réparé à la fin du jour 4. On peut constater que MR reste supérieure à 
MMRR pour l'ensemble de la mission. Le cas où la réparation a lieu à la fin du jour 5 
conduit à une MR inférieure à MMRR, en jour 7. Par conséquent, en cas de défaillance de 
P1 au jour 2, P1 doit être réparé avant le cinquième jour, en fonction du lieu et le moment 
où la maintenance peut avoir lieu. 
La courbe 3 de la Figure 40-d correspond au cas où P1 a été diagnostiqué comme 
défaillant à la fin du jour 4. MR est donc réévaluée en considérant i) comme temps initial 
(t = 0), le jour 5, et ii) P1 défaillant à l'instant t = 0. On peut voir que la nouvelle 
évaluation est toujours supérieure à MMRR à la fin de la mission prévue. La mission peut 
être poursuivie sans maintenance jusqu'à son terme, à moins qu'un nouvel événement se 






Figure 40 MR- Impact de la défaillance et de la maintenance de P1 
Les résultats ci-dessus méritent deux commentaires majeurs: 
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! Nous avons supposé des distributions exponentielles pour tous les évènements de 
défaillances des composants pour montrer que les changements opérationnels 
induiront des changements perceptibles dans les résultats. Avec l'approche de 
modélisation utilisée et les outils disponibles, il est possible d'envisager d'autres 
distributions et de prendre en compte le vieillissement des composants impliqués 
dans l'analyse (voir [Tiassou et al. 2012b]). Cependant, le vieillissement est un 
processus changement sur un long terme ; la granularité des changements est 
beaucoup plus grande qu’un jour ou une semaine (la durée de la mission). En 
outre, de très faibles variations des taux de défaillance des composants lors d'une 
mission induisent une variation non perceptible dans les courbes de fiabilité. 
! MR est égale à 1 au début de chaque nouvelle évaluation, car le système est 
complètement inspecté après la détection d'une défaillance d'un composant, et il est 
globalement dans un état opérationnel au moment où la mission est reprise. 
Conclusion et Perspective 
Dans cette thèse, nous avons abordé la problématique de modélisation de sûreté de 
fonctionnement des avions pour une évaluation en opération, de façon à aider à la 
planification des missions et de la maintenance, ainsi qu’à leur bonne réalisation. Le but 
ultime est de contribuer à l'amélioration de l'opérabilité des avions en réduisant les pertes 
économiques liées aux défaillances et aux planifications ne permettant pas de réaliser 
promptement les activités de maintenance. L'évaluation doit être faite par l'équipe menant 
les opérations, équipe qui n'est pas nécessairement familière avec les formalismes et les 
outils de modélisation. 
La principale contribution de la thèse concerne le développement d'une approche 
d'évaluation basée sur les modèles stochastiques à espace d’état, qui peuvent être 
facilement mis à jour en cours d'opération, en tenant compte des informations relatives à la 
situation courante. 
Nous avons identifié les types d'informations pertinentes à considérer dans le modèle. 
L'adaptation du modèle à la situation courante est gérée par la mise à jour de l'information 
correspondante dans le modèle. La mise à jour est le résultat de l’occurrence d'un 
événement ou d'un changement au cours de l'opération de l’avion. En effet, après tout 
changement majeur, on doit vérifier si son impact est significatif ou non. Une réévaluation 
de la sûreté de fonctionnement est par conséquent nécessaire afin d'avoir des résultats 
adaptés. L'avion sera surveillé par des modules de pronostic et de diagnostic qui fourniront 
des informations sur l'état des composants système et sur l’allure de la distribution 
caractérisant leurs défaillances. Des informations sur les profils de mission et la 
maintenance seront aussi accessibles. 
En se basant sur l'analyse des principaux changements qui peuvent survenir pendant la 
réalisation des missions, nous avons proposé une approche pour gérer la mise à jour du 
modèle. Le modèle est conçu pour être générique et paramétrique avec des valeurs par 
défaut. Ainsi, la mise à jour consiste à ajuster les paramètres avec les données résultant 
des changements observés. La mise à jour du modèle ne devrait pas exiger des tâches de 




Le modèle est destiné à être construit en phase de conception des systèmes avion. Pour 
aider à la construction des modèles, nous avons proposé un méta-modèle qui spécifie leur 
contenu à un haut niveau d'abstraction. Le méta-modèle fournit les éléments pour la 
construction de modèles correspondant à différents types d'avions. Par ailleurs, d'autres 
modules, comme le pronostic et les modules de diagnostic qui sont utilisés dans le cadre 
de l'évaluation, devront communiquer des données pour la mise à jour du modèle. Le 
méta-modèle définit le genre de données à communiquer. 
Après la spécification du contenu du modèle, nous avons étudié deux formalismes pour 
mettre en œuvre l’approche de modélisation: AltaRica et les réseaux d’activités 
stochastiques (SAN). Le formalisme AltaRica est très utilisé dans le contexte industriel en 
France, notamment chez Airbus pour réaliser des analyses de la sécurité. Il a donc été 
retenu pour la construction des modèles finaux. Il peut être utilisé pour la construction du 
modèle stochastique, mais ses outils de support restent limités en analyse stochastique. Le 
formalisme SAN est plus connu dans le milieu universitaire et fournit des éléments pour la 
modélisation de comportements stochastiques complexes.  
En analysant les deux formalismes, nous avons montré qu'ils sont interchangeables sur les 
aspects de modélisation de base et que même la plupart des aspects représentés à l'aide de 
leurs caractéristiques spécifiques peuvent être décrits en utilisant les éléments de l’autre 
formalisme. Nous avons proposé des règles pour la transformation de modèles entre les 
deux formalismes. Ces règles de transformation devraient être utile dans la réalisation 
d’analyses comparatives lors de la validation des outils de traitement quantitatifs de 
modèles en AltaRica. Un prototype d’outil est en cours de développement pour traiter les 
modèles finaux qui seront développés en AltaRica. 
En attendant, nous avons utilisé le formalisme SAN et son outil associé Möbius pour 
modéliser le sous-système de commande de la gouverne de direction de l’A340, et le sous-
système d'alimentation électrique de l’A320. Des exemples illustratifs de résultats 
d’évaluation ont été donnés. 
Etant donné que l'approche proposée pour l'évaluation consiste à réévaluer la fiabilité 
opérationnelle à chaque changement majeur, afin d'obtenir un résultat à jour, nous avons 
analysé l'impact que pourrait avoir la réévaluation par rapport à l'évaluation initiale. Les 
résultats montrent que, par exemple, la défaillance d'un calculateur primaire, dont la 
disponibilité n'est pas indispensable à la réalisation d'un vol, peut réduire 
considérablement la fiabilité d'une mission de 7 jours. Les analyses indiquent aussi 
comment utiliser les résultats de l'évaluation pour gérer la réalisation de la mission et des 
activités de maintenance. 
Les analyses quantitatives effectuées représentent une validation préliminaire de 
l'approche. Elle devrait être complétée par d'autres analyses en utilisant l'outil dédié, qui 
est en cours de développement. D’autre part, comme les données en entrée des modèles 
finaux seront fournies avec une certaine imprécision, l’outil d'évaluation donnera une 
indication de l'incertitude induite sur le résultat obtenu. Des études [Jacob et al. 2011; 
Jacob et al. 2012] sont en cours pour développer les méthodes de calcul de ces 
incertitudes. 
En ce qui concerne la suite de cette thèse, plusieurs orientations sont possibles. 
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Les modèles finaux vont être développés en utilisant les éléments du méta-modèle. Les 
modèles ou des parties de modèle pourraient être générés automatiquement en utilisant le 
méta-modèle. Ainsi, il serait intéressant de mener des études sur la génération automatique 
des modèles à partir du méta-modèle.  
Concernant la transformation de modèles entre AltaRica et SAN, il serait très approprié de 
développer un outil dédié, qui ferait la transformation automatiquement. 
L'évaluation de sureté de fonctionnement en tenant compte de plusieurs avions représente 
également une extension de notre travail. En effet, les compagnies aériennes opèrent des 
flottes d'avions et l'indisponibilité d'un avion peut être gérée en utilisant un autre avion 
disponible. En outre, les avions peuvent avoir des ressources de maintenance, telles que 
les composants de rechange et les techniciens, en commun. Il serait ainsi intéressant de 
couvrir cette dépendance en considérant tous les avions impliqués. 
Nous nous sommes placés dans le contexte d’exploitation des avions pour développer 
notre approche de modélisation. Toutefois, l'évaluation de fiabilité opérationnelle en 
service pourrait s'appliquer à tout système dont l’opération nécessite une certaine 
surveillance. D'autres contextes opérationnels pourraient être ciblés et étudiés. Le 
développement de moyens génériques de modélisation pour l'évaluation en ligne ne peut 
qu’être utile. 
Le travail réalisé représente, par conséquent, une base importante pour le développement 






AHMADI, A. AND SODERHOLM, P. 2008. Assessment of Operational Consequences of 
Aircraft Failures: Using Event Tree Analysis. Proc. 2008 IEEE Aerospace Conf., 
1–14. 
AJMONE MARSAN, M., CONTE, G., AND BALBO, G. 1984. A class of generalized stochastic 
Petri nets for the performance evaluation of multiprocessor systems. ACM 
Transactions on Computer Systems 2, 2, 93–122. 
ARGÜELLO, M., BARD, J., AND YU, G. 1997. A Grasp for Aircraft Routing in Response to 
Groundings and Delays. Journal of Combinatorial Optimization 1, 3, 211–228. 
ARNOLD, A., POINT, G., GRIFFAULT, A., AND RAUZY, A. 1999. The AltaRica formalism for 
describing concurrent systems. Fundamenta Informaticae 40, 2-3, 109–124. 
ATA MSG. 1993. MSG-3 - Maintenance program development Document. 
http://www.7ts0.com/manuals/faamech/8300/Appendix5.pdf. 
AVIZIENIS, A., LAPRIE, J.-C., AND RANDELL, B. 2000. Fundamental concepts of 
dependability. Proceedings of the 3rd Information Survivability Workshop (ISW-
2000), 7–12. 
AVIZIENIS, A., LAPRIE, J.-C., RANDELL, B., AND LANDWEHR, C. 2004. Basic concepts and 
taxonomy of dependable and secure computing. IEEE Transactions on Dependable 
and Secure Computing 1, 1, 11–33. 
AZGOMI, M. AND MOVAGHAR, A. 2005. A modelling tool for hierarchical stochastic 
activity networks. Simulation Modelling Practice and Theory 13, 6, 505–524. 
BALABAN, H.S., BRIGANTIC, R.T., WRIGHT, S.A., AND PAPATYI, A.F. 2000. A simulation 
approach to estimating aircraft mission capable rates for the United States Air 
Force. Proceedings of the 2000 Winter Simulation Conference, Society for 
Computer Simulation International, 1035–1042 vol.1. 
BENNETTS, R.G. 1982. Analysis of Reliability Block Diagrams by Boolean Techniques. 
IEEE Transactions on Reliability R-31, 2, 159–166. 
BÉOUMES, C., KANOUN, K., AGUERA, M., ET AL. 1993. SURF-2: A Program for 
Dependability Evaluation of Complex Hardware and Software Systems. 23th IEEE 
International Symposium on Fault-Tolerant Computing, IEEE Comput. Soc. Press, 
668–673. 
BERNARD, R., AUBERT, J., BIEBER, P., MERLINI, C., AND METGE, S. 2007. Experiments in 
model-based safety analysis: flight controls. . 
BETOUS-ALMEIDA, C. AND KANOUN, K. 1997. Méthode des états fictifs dans les modèles 
de sûreté de fonctionnement. LAAS, 65p. 
!!
! 162 
BETOUS-ALMEIDA, C. AND KANOUN, K. 2004. Dependability modelling of instrumentation 
and control systems: A comparison of competing architectures. Safety Science 42, 
5, 457–480. 
BIEBER, P., BOUGNOL, C., CASTEL, C., ET AL. 2004. Safety Assessment with Altarica 
Lessons learnt based on two aircraft system studies. IFIP International Federation 
for Information Processing, 505–510. 
BINEID, M. AND FIELDING, J.P. 2006. Development of an aircraft systems dispatch 
reliability design methodology. The Aeronautical journal 110, 1108, 345–352. 
BISWAWS, P. AND SHRIMALI, S.C. 2001. Safety assessment of modern aircraft-a case study. 
Reliability and Maintainability Symposium, 2001. Proceedings. Annual, 365–371. 
BOUISSOU, M. 1993. The FIGARO dependability evaluation workbench in use: Case 
studies for fault-tolerant computer systems. Fault-Tolerant Computing, 1993. 
FTCS-23. Digest of Papers., The Twenty-Third International Symposium on, 680 –
685. 
BOUISSOU, M., BOUHADANA, H., BANNELIER, M., AND VILLATTE, N. 1991. Knowledge 
modeling and reliability processing: Presentation of the FIGARO language and 
associated tools. Proc. Safety of computer control systems  (SAFECOMP’91), 69–
82. 
BOWLES, J.B. 1998. The new SAE FMECA standard. Reliability and Maintainability 
Symposium, 1998. Proc., Annual, 48 –53. 
CHENEVIER, P. 2001. Les programmes de maintenance aéronautique!: méthodologie de 
création et cadre réglementaire. La Jaune et la Rouge - Revue de la communauté 
polytechnicienne. http://www.lajauneetlarouge.com/article/les-programmes-de-
maintenance-aeronautique-methodologie-de-creation-et-cadre-reglementaire. 
CHEW, S.P., DUNNETT, S.J., AND ANDREWS, J.D. 2008. Phased mission modelling of 
systems with maintenance-free operating periods using simulated Petri nets. 
Reliability Engineering & System Safety 93, 7, 980 – 994. 
CHIOLA, G., FRANCESCHINIS, G., GAETA, R., AND RIBAUDO, M. 1995. GreatSPN 1.7: 
Graphical editor and analyzer for timed and stochastic Petri nets. Performance 
Evaluation 24, 1-2, 47–68. 
CLARKE, L.W., HANE, C.A., JOHNSON, E.L., AND NEMHAUSER, G.L. 1996. Maintenance 
and Crew Considerations in Fleet Assignment. Transportation Science 30, 3, 249–
260. 
CLARKE, M.D.D. 1998. Irregular airline operations: a review of the state-of-the-practice in 
airline operations control centers. Journal of Air Transport Management 4, 2, 67–
76. 
CLARKE, M.D.D. AND NARYADI, Y. 1995. The Airline Operation Control Centre!: an 
overview of Garuda’s Operation Control (EM) at Cengkereng Jakarta, Indonesia !: 
!!
! 163 
final report to PT Garuda Indonesia. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
Flight Transportation Laboratory, Cambridge, Mass. 
CLAUSEN, J., LARSEN, A., LARSEN, J., AND REZANOVA, N.J. 2010. Disruption management 
in the airline industry—Concepts, models and methods. Computers & Operations 
Research 37, 5, 809–821. 
COUVILLION, J.A., FREIRE, R., JOHNSON, R., ET AL. 1991. Performability modeling with 
UltraSAN. IEEE Software 8, 5, 69–80. 
DALY, D., DEAVOURS, D.D., DOYLE, J.M., WEBSTER, P.G., AND SANDERS, W.H. 2000. 
Möbius: An Extensible Tool for Performance and Dependability Modeling. 
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Computer Performance 
Evaluation: Modelling Techniques and Tools, Springer-Verlag, 332–336. 
ECSS. 2001. Failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA). European 
cooperation for space standardization, Noordwijk, The Netherlands. 
ERICSON, C.A. 1999. Fault Tree Analysis – A History. Proceedings of The 17th 
International System Safety Conference, System Safety Society, 87–96. 
FAA. 1978. AC 120-17A - Maintenance control by reliability methods. 
http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS108499. 
FILAR, J., MANYEM, P., AND WHITE, K. 2001. How Airlines and Airports Recover from 
Schedule Perturbations: A Survey. Annals of Operations Research 108, 1, 315–
333. 
FOTA, N., KAANICHE, M., AND KANOUN, K. 1997. A modular and incremental approach for 
building complex stochastic Petri net models. st International Conference on 
Mathematical Methods in Reliability (MMR’97), 151–158. 
FOTA, N., KAÂNICHE, M., AND KANOUN, K. 1999. Dependability evaluation of an air 
traffic control computing system. Performance Evaluation 35, 3-4, 253–273. 
GARDNER, T. 2003. Model-Driven Metadata Integration using MOF 2.0 and Eclipse. 
http://www.omg.org/news/meetings/workshops/MDA_2003-2_Manual/1-
3_Gardner.pdf. 
GERBER, A. AND RAYMOND, K. 2003. MOF to EMF: there and back again. Proceedings of 
the 2003 OOPSLA workshop on eclipse technology eXchange, ACM, 60–64. 
GERMAN, R., KELLING, C., ZIMMERMANN, A., AND HOMMEL, G. 1995. TimeNET: a toolkit 
for evaluating non-Markovian stochastic Petri nets. Performance Evaluation 24, 1-
2, 69–87. 
GRANDEAU, S.C. 1995. The process of airline operational control. Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, Flight Transportation Laboratory, Cambridge, MA. 
GRIFFIN, C. 2003. Introduction to the Eclipse Modeling Framework. MDATM 
Implementers’ Workshop - Succeeding With Model Driven Systems. 
!!
! 164 
GUPTA, P., BAZARGAN, M., AND MCGRATH, R.N. 2003. Simulation model for aircraft line 
maintenance planning. Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium, 2003 
Proceedings, 387– 391. 
HAMOUDA, O., KAANICHE, M., AND KANOUN, K. 2009. Safety modeling and evaluation of 
Automated Highway Systems. 73–82. 
HUGUES, E., CHARPENTIER, E., AND CABARBAYE, A. 2002. Application of Markov 
processes to predict aircraft operational reliability. Proc. 3rd European Systems 
Engineering Conference (EUSEC’2002), 231–235. 
JACOB, C., DUBOIS, D., AND CARDOSO, J. 2011. Uncertainty handling in quantitative BDD-
based fault-tree analysis by interval computation. Proceedings of the 5th 
international conference on Scalable uncertainty management, Springer-Verlag, 
205–218. 
JACOB, C., DUBOIS, D., AND CARDOSO, J. 2012. From Imprecise Probability Laws to Fault 
Tree Analysis. In: Scalable Uncertainty Management. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 
525–538. 
JARDINE, A.K.S., LIN, D., AND BANJEVIC, D. 2006. A review on machinery diagnostics and 
prognostics implementing condition-based maintenance. Mechanical Systems and 
Signal Processing 20, 7, 1483–1510. 
JONES, J.A., WARRINGTON, L., AND DAVIS, N. 2002. Integrated modelling of system 
functional, maintenance & environmental factors. Proceedings. Annual Reliability 
and Maintainability Symposium, IEEE, 399–403. 
KANOUN, K. AND BORREL, M. 1996. Dependability of fault-tolerant systems-explicit 
modeling of the interactions between hardware and software components. 
Proceedings of the 2nd International Computer Performance and Dependability 
Symposium (IPDS  ’96), IEEE Computer Society, 252–261. 
KARAGIANNIS, D. AND KÜHN, H. 2002. Metamodelling Platforms. In: K. Bauknecht, A.M. 
Tjoa and G. Quirchmayr, eds., E-Commerce and Web Technologies. Springer 
Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 182–182. 
KEHREN, C., SEGUIN, C., BIEBER, P., ET AL. 2004. Advanced simulation capabilities for 
Multi-systems with Altarica. Proceedings of the 22nd International System Safety 
Conference, International System Safety Society, 489–498. 
KINNISON, H.A. 2004. Aviation maintenance management. McGraw-Hill, New York. 
KOHL, N., LARSEN, A., LARSEN, J., ROSS, A., AND TIOURINE, S. 2007. Airline disruption 
management—Perspectives, experiences and outlook. Journal of Air Transport 
Management 13, 3, 149–162. 
KUMAR, U.D. 2000. Reliability maintenance and logistic support!: a life cycle approach. 
Kluwer Academic, Boston, Mass. USA. 
!!
! 165 
KWIATKOWSKA, M., NORMAN, G., AND PARKER, D. 2009. PRISM: probabilistic model 
checking for performance and reliability analysis. ACM SIGMETRICS 
Performance Evaluation Review 36, 4, 40–45. 
LABRI. 2010. AltaRica Language. 
http://altarica.labri.fr/forge/projects/altarica/wiki/AltaRicaLanguage. 
LABRI-TOOLS. 2011. ALTARICA - Wiki - ALTARICA. http://altarica.labri.fr/forge/. 
LAPRIE, J.-C., ARLAT, J., BLANQUART, ET AL. 1995. Guide de la sûreté de fonctionnement. 
Cépaduès, Toulouse. 
LE, M., WU, C., ZHAN, C., AND SUN, L. 2011. Airline recovery optimization research: 30 
years’ march of mathematical programming—A classification and literature 
review. 2011 International Conference on Transportation, Mechanical, and 
Electrical Engineering (TMEE), 113–117. 
LEE, W.S., GROSH, D.L., TILLMAN, F.A., AND LIE, C.H. 1985. Fault Tree Analysis, 
Methods, and Applications - A Review. IEEE Transactions on Reliability R-34, 3, 
194 –203. 
MALEK, M. 2008. Online Dependability Assessment through Runtime Monitoring and 
Prediction. Proceedings of the 2008 Seventh European Dependable Computing 
Conference, IEEE Computer Society, 181–181. 
MARSAN, M. AND CHIOLA, G. 1987. On Petri nets with deterministic and exponentially 
distributed firing times. In: G. Rozenberg, ed., Advances in Petri Nets 1987. 
Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 132–145. 
MARSAN, M.A., BALBO, G., CONTE, G., ET AL. 1995. Modelling with Generalized 
Stochastic Petri Nets. Series in Parallel Computing, John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
MASCI, P., MARTINUCCI, M., AND DI GIANDOMENICO, F. 2011. Towards Automated 
Dependability Analysis of Dynamically Connected Systems. Proceedings of the 
2011 Tenth International Symposium on Autonomous Decentralized Systems, IEEE 
Computer Society, 139–146. 
MEYER, J.F. 1992. Performability: a retrospective and some pointers to the future. 
Performance Evaluation 14, 3-4, 139–156. 
MEYER, J.F., FURCHTGOTT, D.G., AND WU, L.T. 1980. Performability Evaluation of the 
SIFT Computer. IEEE Transactions on Computers C-29, 6, 501–509. 
MEYER, J.F., MOVAGHAR, A., AND SANDERS, W.H. 1985. Stochastic Activity Networks: 
Structure, Behavior, and Application. Proc. International Workshop on Timed 
Petri Nets, IEEE Computer Society, 106–115. 
MIDKIFF, A.H., HANSMAN, R.J., AND REYNOLDS, T.G. 2004. Air carrier flight operations. 
MIT International Center for Air Transportation,  Department of Aeronautics & 
Astronautics,  Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge MA 02139 USA. 
!!
! 166 
MMEL. 2008. Master Minimum Equipment List - AIRBUS   A-340-200/300. 
http://fsims.faa.gov/wdocs/mmel/a340-200-300 original 05-30-08.pdf. 
MOLLOY, M.K. 1982. Performance Analysis Using Stochastic Petri Nets. IEEE Trans. 
Comput. 31, 9, 913–917. 
MOUDANI, W.E. AND MORA-CAMINO, F. 2000. A dynamic approach for aircraft 
assignment and maintenance scheduling by airlines. Journal of Air Transport 
Management 6, 4, 233–237. 
MURA, I. AND BONDAVALLI, A. 2001. Markov regenerative stochastic petri nets to model 
and evaluate phased mission systems dependability. IEEE Transactions on 
Computers 50, 12, 1337–1351. 
NICOL, D.M., SANDERS, W.H., AND TRIVEDI, K.S. 2004. Model-based evaluation: from 
dependability to security. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure 
Computing 1, 1, 48 – 65. 
OMG. 2010. Meta Object Facility (MOF) Core Specification. 
http://www.omg.org/spec/MOF/2.4.1/PDF. 
PAPADOPOULOS, C. AND BERNARD, D. 2008. Decision Impact Analysis Concept 
Description. AIRBUS -EDYDSU. 
PAPAKOSTAS, N., PAPACHATZAKIS, P., XANTHAKIS, V., MOURTZIS, D., AND 
CHRYSSOLOURIS, G. 2010. An approach to operational aircraft maintenance 
planning. Decision Support Systems 48, 4, 604–612. 
PERROT, B., PROSVIRNOVA, T., RAUZY, A., AND SAHUT D’IZARN, J.-P. 2010. 
Introduction au nouveau langage de modelisation pour la surete de 
fonctionnement!: AltaRica nouvelle generation. Actes du congrès LambdaMu’17, 
E. Fadier. 
POINT, G. AND RAUZY, A. 1999. AltaRica: Constraint automata as a description language. 
Journal Européen des Systèmes Automatisés 33, 8–9, 1033–1052. 
PRESCOTT, D.R. AND ANDREWS, J.D. 2005. Aircraft safety modeling for time-limited 
dispatch. Proceedings of the Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium, 
139–145. 
RAMESH, A., TWIGG, D., AND SHARMA, T. 2008. Advanced methodologies for average 
probability calculation for aerospace systems. Proc. 26th international congress of 
the aeronautical sciences, 1–9. 
RAUZY, A. 2002. Mode automata and their compilation into fault trees. Reliability 
Engineering & System Safety 78, 1, 1–12. 




RUGINA, A.-E., KANOUN, K., AND KAANICHE, M. 2011. Software Dependability Modeling 
Using AADL (Architecture Analysis and Design Language). International Journal 
of Performability Engineering 7, 4, 313–325. 
RUGINA, A.-E., KANOUN, K., AND KAÂNICHE, M. 2008. The ADAPT Tool: From AADL 
Architectural Models to Stochastic Petri Nets through Model Transformation. 
Proceedings of the 2008 Seventh European Dependable Computing Conference, 
IEEE Computer Society, 85–90. 
SACHON, M. AND PATÉ-CORNELL, E. 2000. Delays and safety in airline maintenance. 
Reliability Engineering & System Safety 67, 3, 301–309. 
SAINTIS, L., HUGUES, E., BES, C., AND MONGEAU, M. 2009. Computing in-service aircraft 
reliability. International Journal of Reliability, Quality and Safety Engineering 16, 
02, 91–116. 
SANDERS, W. 1995. The UltraSAN modeling environment. Performance Evaluation 24, 1-
2, 89–115. 
SANDERS, W. AND MEYER, J. 2001. Stochastic Activity Networks: Formal Definitions and 
Concepts$. In: E. Brinksma, H. Hermanns and J.-P. Katoen, eds., Lectures on 
Formal Methods and Performance Analysis. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 315–
343. 
SANDERS, W.H. AND MEYER, J.F. 1986. METASAN: a performability evaluation tool 
based on stochastic activity networks. Proceedings of 1986 ACM Fall joint 
computer conference, IEEE Computer Society Press, 807–816. 
SIGNORET, J.-P., BOITEAU, M., RAUZY, A., AND THOMAS, P. 2004. Disponibilité de 
production: les nouveaux outils sont arrivés. Actes du congrès Lambda Mu’14. 
SRIRAM, C. AND HAGHANI, A. 2003. An optimization model for aircraft maintenance 
scheduling and re-assignment. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and 
Practice 37, 1, 29–48. 
TEICHTEIL-KÖNIGSBUCH, F., INFANTES, G., AND SEGUIN, C. 2011. Lazy forward-chaining 
methods for probabilistic model-checking. In: C. Soares, ed., Advances in Safety, 
Reliability and Risk Management. CRC Press, 318–326. 
TEODOROVI,, D. AND GUBERINI,, S. 1984. Optimal dispatching strategy on an airline 
network after a schedule perturbation. European Journal of Operational Research 
15, 2, 178–182. 
TIASSOU, K., KANOUN, K., KAÂNICHE, M., SEGUIN, C., AND PAPADOPOULOS, C. 2011a. 
Operational reliability of an aircraft with adaptive missions. Proceedings of the 
13th European Workshop on Dependable Computing - EWDC  ’11, 9–14. 
TIASSOU, K., KANOUN, K., KAÂNICHE, M., SEGUIN, C., AND PAPADOPOULOS, C. 2011b. 
Modeling aircraft operational reliability. Proceedings of the 30th international 




TIASSOU, K., KANOUN, K., KAÂNICHE, M., SEGUIN, C., AND PAPADOPOULOS, C. 2012a. 
Online model adaptation for aircraft operational reliability assessment. ERTS2 
2012. 
TIASSOU, K., KANOUN, K., KAÂNICHE, M., SEGUIN, C., AND PAPADOPOULOS, C. 2012b. 
Operational reliability re-assessment during aircraft missions. 8p. 
TIASSOU, K., KANOUN, K., KAÂNICHE, M., SEGUIN, C., AND PAPADOPOULOS, C. 2012c. 
Impact of Operational Reliability re-Assessment during Aircraft Missions. 2012 
31st International Symposium on  Reliable Distributed Systems, IEEE, 219–224. 
TOMASZEK, H. AND WA-NY, M. 2009. Operation of an aircraft with risk of its loss. 
Scientific Problems of Machines Operation and Maintenance!: tribology, 
reliability, terotechnology, diagnostics, safety 44, 2 (158), 45–57. 
VESELY, W.E. AND ROBERTS, N.H. 1987. Fault Tree Handbook. US Independent Agencies 
and Commissions. 
WEI, B.C. 1991. A unified approach to failure mode, effects and criticality analysis 
(FMECA). In: Reliability and Maintainability Symposium 1991 Proceedings 
Annual. 260–271. 
YAN, S. AND YANG, D.-H. 1996. A decision support framework for handling schedule 
perturbation. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological 30, 6, 405–419. 
ZIMMERMANN, A. 2010. Dependability evaluation of complex systems with TimeNET. 
Proceedings of the First Workshop on DYnamic Aspects in DEpendability Models 





Lors de la conception des avions, il est courant que les constructeurs évaluent la sûreté de 
fonctionnement en utilisant des modèles stochastiques, mais l'évaluation de la fiabilité 
opérationnelle à l’aide de modèles en ligne, pendant la réalisation des missions, reste 
rarement effectuée. Souvent, l'évaluation stochastique concerne la sécurité des avions. 
Cette thèse porte sur la modélisation de la fiabilité opérationnelle des avions, pour aider à 
la planification des activités de maintenance et des missions, ainsi qu’à la bonne 
réalisation de ces dernières. Nous avons développé une approche de modélisation, basée 
sur un méta-modèle qui sert de base : i) de structuration des informations nécessaires à 
l’évaluation de la fiabilité opérationnelle d’un avion et ii) pour la construction de modèles 
stochastiques pouvant être mis à jour dynamiquement. La mise à jour concerne l'état 
courant des systèmes avion, un profil de mission et les moyens de maintenance 
disponibles dans les  diverses escales incluses dans le profil de la mission. L'objectif est de 
permettre l'évaluation de la fiabilité opérationnelle en ligne. Deux cas d’études, basés sur 
des sous-systèmes avions, sont considérés à titre d'illustration. Nous présentons des 
exemples de résultats qui montrent le rôle important de l’évaluation de la fiabilité 
opérationnelle pendant une mission d’avion. 
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